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ABSTRACT
UNRAVELING DNA AND IDENTITY:
A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON EPISTEMOLOGIES AND ETHICS
OF GENETIC ANCESTRY TESTING
Eve Carlisle Polley
May 1, 2022
The advent of DNA ancestry testing motivated a burst of human activities that
constitute a scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement of immense
scale, infused with epistemological and ethical questions of great and important variety.
This movement has motivated many discourses in the social sciences, with study subjects
ranging from the language usage of geneticists, to moral conundrums faced by test-takers,
to potential ramifications in global structures of political power. At the same time, and
especially in recent decades, the discourses of the comparative humanities have included
with increasing frequency and urgency research and theorization about concepts and
consequences of human social identities, alongside reasserting and developing longstanding questionings about the supreme dominance of the natural sciences in the
determination of truth and reality.
The problematics that arise when we consider the definitions, boundaries, and
intersections of human individual-personal and communal-social identities, impact not
only how we understand ourselves and the nature or composition of society but have
profound practical-applied impacts from the medical to the political. As I learned more
about genetic ancestry testing and the movements in human society that it has enabled
iv

and inspired, my training as a philosophical humanist begged me to analyze these extant
and arising problematics in other, or additional, ways.
This project involves the application of theory from both the humanities and the
social sciences, in order to answer questions such as the following: How are the
boundaries between different ancestral groups being drawn? Whose knowledges
contribute to the determination of these boundaries? What dynamics of social power are
present? Does the science that underlies genetic ancestry testing exhibit some of the same
characteristics as earlier sciences now considered to be pseudoscientific and entrenched
with scientific racisms, sexist and heteronormative patriarchies, xenophobic colonialisms,
and other subjugative conceptualizations of human being and identity? On the contrary,
what are the positives—towards the ends of knowledge of humanity and social justice for
humanity—in all of this?
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INTRODUCTION
“I found out I’m really white...” says my friend beginning to share the results of a
recent ancestry DNA test. “Scandinavia” soon comes up in the conversation.
A long-famous morning show host and direct-to-consumer ancestry DNA
company spokesperson exclaims in an ad, “I’m 74% Italian!”—with the brightest of
smiles—alongside a few utterances in a mixture of Italian and English languages.
A young person, born and raised in the United States and who identifies in terms
of familial and cultural history as a Palestinian man, grapples with how to interpret the
shifting percentages displayed in his ancestry test reports as they are updated
periodically. He wonders not only about how and why the numbers and category
descriptors continue to change over time, but also how is it that none of the reports
contain mention of “Palestine” or “Palestinian”?
At a family gathering, discussion turns to how a close relative recently received
results from a genetic ancestry test. “I’ve always liked Jewish traditions,” is responded by
a biological descendant of the test taker present at the party. Followed by, “And look at
my nose.” Shrugs and smiles arise from the group.
DNA ancestry reveal videos posted online by untold numbers of individuals
contain heart-wrenching jump cuts resulting from the abrupt turning off of the camera to
make urgent phone calls. In one video, the young, Black test taker had just opened an
envelope to a report that showed no African ancestry. Another video comes to a similarly
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abrupt—but more felicitous—end, when the report received contains long-sought
information about African matrilineal origins. Though for very different reasons, in these
instances, just two among so many, the individuals in question upon receiving their test
results appeared to feel the intense need to call immediately upon persons very dear to
them in order to emotionally process and better apprehend the information just received.
On white supremacist internet fora those who believe their whiteness indicates
superiority and a tandem right to reign over others who are not white debate about the
meanings of these tests. Sociological studies have monitored and measured some of these
conversations, concluding that often those who received the results that they desired
displayed them as proof of racial “purity”; at the same time, suspicions about the validity
of the science behind the tests were sometimes raised when test results indicated any
heritages considered to be undesirable by that person and group.
An organization of grandmothers in Argentina whose children and grandchildren
were lost during mass political violence advocates that their grandchildren who survived,
as well as the remains of their deceased children, be returned to them. They determine the
utilization of genetic testing is in their favor. However, what begins as a focused
endeavor aimed at saving individuals and reuniting families, ends in a state-sponsored,
large-scale reconciliation project among communities.
Pregnant persons and persons preparing for pregnancy who have certain more
privileged socioeconomic statuses are afforded the opportunity to undergo fetal and
personal genetic tests that give them access to information about the potential future
characteristics and abilities of their offspring unavailable to previous generations of
humanity. Decisions about how to proceed with regards to pregnancy, childbirth, and
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child-raising—about when and how to create new human persons—are made with this
new information in mind.
Young attorneys conceive of a legal plan to determine and institute reparations for
the descendants of African persons enslaved, in body and through law and derisible
custom, and forced to labor without the ability to profit, in the United States. Their plan is
centrally dependent on DNA ancestry testing services, and subsequently the underlying
genetic science.
Numerous indigenous communities and individuals converse and participate in
national and global debates about the usefulness of DNA for member-identification and
citizenship purposes. Some persons and groups are coerced by law, by bureaucratic
practice, and by force into incorporating DNA test results into their definitions of who
they are with regards to their indigeneity and their specific group membership. The result
of these oppressions can and does often have the immediate and practical effect of
increasing or decreasing, beginning or ceasing, the provision of basic goods and services
that sustain individual, familial, and community life. On a grander and longer-term scale
these efforts are a part of the continual reshaping of the conceptual boundaries that define
indigenous communities—present and past—sometimes with, but more often without,
meaningful consent from those same communities, or their descendants as may apply.
Meanwhile, foundational practices and principles utilized in the formation and evolution
of DNA ancestry testing science and technologies rely fundamentally on the acquirement
of genetic materials, actual bodily resources, from these communities, and indeed also
historical and cultural information. These foundational principles, or concepts, and

3

actions form the epistemologies and ethics which are being investigated as a part of this
project.

This may seem like far too many examples with which to begin our journey,
but—as I aim to demonstrate herein—it may be impossible to underestimate or
undervalue the number and intensity of the ways that genetic science and technologies,
including the direct-to-consumer (DTC) ancestry testing component which forms the
focus of this research, can and do influence real human lives, on the individual, group,
and global societal levels. And all signs point to the probability that the majority of the
capacities and influences of genetics and its applications have yet to emerge.
When I first began to think deeply about these matters, one of the things that was
readily apparent to me was that DTC genetic ancestry testing—including the scientific,
the technological, and the commercial-industrial aspects of it—did not give the
impression of accounting for much of what I have learned about human identity in my
training as a philosophical humanist. It seemed that there were so many questions
begging to be asked about the interpretation and significance of these tests, what science
underlies them, and how they are being used in the lives of individuals and groups to
create meaning. I was skeptical that whatever these tests were accomplishing that they
were going to be able to tell us who we really are (as is so often claimed in
advertisements, and more generally in everyday conversation and media).

Of course, I know that I am not alone in thinking these matters important and
worthy of extensive consideration. Commentaries, discussions, and analyses having to do
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with genetic ancestry testing quickly became and remain steadily and highly visible in
popular media and other (social) locations of discourse in which many people participate
or of which they are aware. In the specifically academic realm, as I began my research
and attempted to cognitively engage with what was already being discussed and
theorized, I found that it was in the realm of the social sciences, sociology in particular,
that the lion’s share of the scholarly discourse about DTC DNA ancestry testing had been
generated. This already extant discourse on the subject is a formative factor in my choice
of approach and methodology for this research project. It was indeed a formative factor in
my choice of topic for this dissertation, envisioning perhaps a lacuna in the literature of
the humanities where I might contribute something of value.

To incorporate this additional disciplinary variety of research into my work in a
manageable way, it became prudent and convenient to think of my resources as falling
within three different realms: the social sciences, the humanities, and non-academic
discourses. These realms I describe here not in order of importance, but rather in the
order which seems most sensible for effecting and communicating this research project.
The research from the social sciences sets the stage by establishing much of what is
already being discussed among recent and contemporary scholars about DTC DNA
ancestry testing and genetics more broadly. The research from the interdisciplinary
humanities gives dimension to and stimulates the setting with a breadth and depth from
ideas past and present about what it means to be human and how we identify one another.
Humanistic discourses likewise insert, affirm, and develop longstanding questionings
about the supreme dominance of the natural sciences in the determination of truth and
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reality. Non-academic discourses keep our analyses grounded in the great variety and
wealth of human experiences being reported on a daily basis as a result of new access to
this new type of scientific information.
Following the above, the first of these realms is that occupied by social scientific
works, especially the literature published by sociologists who study the social
characteristics (or social-ness) of science broadly speaking, of genetics more specifically,
and DNA ancestry testing in particular. In reading this research and analysis, I have
learned about the actual work that is being done in the laboratories and offices of genetic
scientists, about consumer usage patterns, about the business and industry of genetic
ancestry testing, about legal ramifications, and also of the theories that social scientists
have developed based on the data collected in the studies they have conducted. I have—
to my difficulty, but also to my intellectual stimulation—found many compelling
arguments of sociological origin that have contradicted, or at least complicated, some of
my initial intuitions about what conclusions I might come to at the end of this
dissertation.
The second realm consists of ideas drawn from the deep well of humanistic
contemplations of identity, from the scholarship and creative works of the
interdisciplinary humanities with which I am most familiar. I engage with poetry,
paintings, statues, tapestries, music, novels, and film, but the principal focus is on
theoretical texts and ideas, especially those to do with human social identity, specifically
epistemologies and ethics of identity—knowledge about who we are, and how we ought
act and be, in relation others. My concern here runs deep and has been present for a long
time. It has to do with the desire to have a more accurate and better-defined
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understanding of this new science-technology, that is, to resolve cognitive dissonances
and satisfy my intellectual curiosities about it, but also the aspiration to take action,
humanistic action through words, with regards to what I consider to be a precarious and
sometimes dangerous yet still nascent science-technology with so many apparent and
potential social impacts.
It should be noted here that my definition of the concept of identity might be said
to run as broad as my concerns about it run deep, but I will do my best to ensure that it
not remain vague. The broadness of or variety in the ways that I employ the concept and
use the term “identity,” and the manner in which I interpret others’ works as addressing
the same concepts or similar concepts though the term be not used, has to do both with
the relatively recent change in meaning in its English usage (making some historical texts
that are conceptually related less obviously so), but also, and I think more importantly,
the multiplying variety of ways that “identity” as an idea is being used right now. All
said, though I hope and intend that I successfully communicate explicitly and definitively
enough throughout this tacky web of what-is-identity, I do not make too much of an
effort to not get lost in it. The answers I am seeking I do not think are to be found by
obsessing about exact, unchanging definitions for certain terms, but rather in the very
human mess of all of it. This is a tactic that is in knowing and purposeful tension with the
always specifying and quantifying practices and theories of the natural sciences. I think
there may well be good objections to be raised against this aspect of my approach,
however given my perspective on and intentions in doing this work, this appears to me
the only to go about it authentically and with the freedom required to take paths
unsuspected and to come to meaningful conclusions that are not predetermined.
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The third and final realm is that into which I have immersed myself in multiple
ways in order to better understand DNA ancestry testing in society today outside
academia. This consists of things which might be labeled “popular” literature and
discourses; usually my preference is to refer to them as “non-academic” sources, which I
consider in no way as a class to be of lesser value or importance than any other potential
sources of knowledge. I surveyed the discourses present in newspaper and magazine
articles, best-selling books, education and entertainment-focused television shows, blogs,
graphic novels, short films, feature-length films, social media posts, and of course also in
conversations among people whom I spoke with personally. Although I know my
awareness of these discourses has been invariably heightened by the fact that I have been
doing focused research on the subject, I feel confident in reiterating that it is difficult to
underestimate the breadth and magnitude of all of these conversations about DNA and
identity. I have worked with these artifacts of culture hoping that they might point us
toward understanding and appreciating the multitudinous ways that this still-new sciencetechnology is affecting human lives.
It should be emphasized here that these three realms do not and are not intended
to exhaustively describe and encapsulate all the kinds of literature researched, artifacts
studied, and other human things contemplated, but rather are organizational tools that
have made the research more manageable to carry out and to communicate. It is hoped
that through the course of this dissertation it will become apparent the many ways in
which this method of classification into realms is ambiguous in its helpfulness—making
research more organized and graspable while simultaneously obscuring some of the
interconnections that exist through and among these un-necessary (but still helpful)
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delineations. Every effort will be made to address the subject at hand in a thoroughly
interdisciplinary and interdiscursive manner, ultimately aiming towards and promoting
the idea that the boundaries among academic disciplines and indeed all discourses are
porous, in motion, evolving, and always somewhat indeterminate.

The form of this dissertation follows an arc beginning with an initial exposition of
the subject including an introduction to some discourses and narratives that illustrate a
range of its diverse components and aspects; into statement of methodology and a review
of the scholarly literatures and other texts and cultural artifacts encountered and
employed during research; to the center and apex of this project, analyses of individual
narratives-cases which convey some of the particular, personal life experiences made
possible by this science-technology through the integration and application of the theories
studied and ideas generated during the research process; and finally, on towards the two
final chapters which take the results of these core analyses and place them back into
conversation and context with practical-applied concerns, from both politically and
philosophically-inclined perspectives, and some of the truly epic human questions which
underlie, override, and intertwine with all.

In Chapter One, building on what is initiated in this Introduction, I aim to convey
the full impetus and design for this research, including the necessity and urgency of the
critiques it entails, and some of the types of problems and possibilities it addresses. This
chapter includes: a description of the subject-context at hand, DTC DNA ancestry testing,
including explanations of terminologies used; and, a consideration of the subject from
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specifically global and historical perspectives; Throughout this chapter there are series of
questions which have been pondered—some answered—over the course of this research.
These series of questions are the starting point to the research.
To describe further the contents of the first chapter, it begins with a description of
some of the complexities of direct-to-consumer DNA ancestry testing, including
elucidation of the concepts and practices involved in its scientific, technological, and
commercial aspects, as well as considerations from the consumer end—from individual
human and community perspectives. Firstly, we must answer the question: What is DTC
DNA ancestry testing? But after answering preliminarily this question which in a sense
appears quite simple, we may go on to ask questions such as: What might it mean, for
example, to think about DNA ancestry testing as a social movement or as a set of social
movements? This perspective emphasizes the human, experiential, life-based aspects and
impacts of this science-technology-industry.
If it is indeed appropriate to think about certain aspects of DNA ancestry testing
as a social movement or a series of social movements, then we must ask who is it that is
participating in these movements? And also, whom else does it affect? It is necessary for
this reason to continually attempt to consider the matter from a global perspective. It is
not equally popular everywhere among everyone (or every social group). How might we
account for its explosive popularity in certain regions and among certain populations, and
the relative lack of interest found in it in other places and by other persons and
communities? It is, for example, very popular in Kentucky, while it is relatively
unpopular in Kenya. By considering these aspects of the movement, again at least
attempting to grasp or grapple with the globe of humanity, we might begin to
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contemplate the ways in which the history of colonization and racialization has, alongside
other manifestations of power over the Others, formed the conditions which do or do not
foster desire for this sort of information, and determine some of the ways in which it is
utilized and valued.
Throughout and at the closing of Chapter One are series of epistemological and
ethical questions that I aim to answer through the remainder of this dissertation.

Chapter Two’s principal aims are to communicate the methodology of the
research process, and to provide a survey of the scholarly literatures studied both of the
social scientific and humanistic varieties.
Firstly, the methodology of this research will be explained and given context and
reason. The methodology, as may have begun to be inferred from the above, aims at an
integration or synthesis or theory that brings together the three realms previously
described: social scientific research, humanistic literature, and non-academic discourses
with regards to the subject matter at hand. The primary purpose of having overviewed
and studied a great deal of non-academic discourses has been to gain an appreciation of
the breadth of this movement—the variety of ways that it is created by and impacts
people’s lives—in order to aim ultimately to understand the depths of its impacts on
individuals, communities, and the world of humans as a whole. Social scientific research,
sociological research especially, as described above, is a central component of my
approach due to the extensiveness of research on this particular topic by those trained in
that discipline. This provided an additional challenge to my work, but simultaneously
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drove it forward knowing that I might be able to contribute by bringing my own
disciplinary understandings to conversations already taking place in another discipline.
In this chapter, I outline also how this research is situated within the frameworks
created by discourses already in progress. Since it was determined early in the course of
research that sociology is a primary disciplinary forum for the discussion of DNA
ancestry testing, these scholars and their works are introduced, and a proposal is made for
how these works will be employed as a part of this humanistic research.
Preceding the literature review is an abridged consideration of what all is or can
be entailed in the ideas of categorization and classification broadly speaking, quickly
proceeding to how we might understand social groups and social identities in an
expansive and integrative manner that might somehow encompass the myriad
conceptualizations of categorization and identity that (I argue throughout this
dissertation) are a part of DNA ancestry testing. This includes, but is far from limited to,
race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, language, sex, gender, sexuality, and socioeconomic
status. Some of the questions considered include: How do we or can we correctly isolate
and classify these aspects of human identification? If that is possible in some way, in
what sense do we find these varieties of categorization or affiliation similar? Or rather,
are they completely dissimilar and unvaluable to compare? In considering the ways that
they cannot or should not be untangled from one another (considered separately), how do
they relate (intersect)? Specifically, how might their intersections and interdependencies
be evident in DNA ancestry testing?
Race is put first on this particular list for a reason which I aim to communicate
throughout this dissertation, but that is not because I consider it the most important
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concept or factor (within the context of this research) among those listed above. In fact, it
is not possible—as will be argued herein and has been argued and demonstrated by many
others—to extricate it from the rest of this web of identity-concepts. That said, I do focus
on race as one variety of my and many others’ focused concerns from a time well before
the advent of anything like DNA ancestry testing.
One of my earliest perceptions about genetic ancestry testing as a scientific
practice was that, while new, it seemed remarkably familiar. While it is a sciencetechnology-industry that promises to explain who each of us are in the greater context of
humanity, the sort of results it provides mimic social categories and understandings of
human groupings. More particularly, and gravely, it reminded me of the history of
“scientific racisms,” phrenology for example, influential and even dominant in previous
decades and centuries but presumed or hoped long expelled from scientific practices and
principles. The similarities between it and these other sciences—now called
“pseudosciences” and discredited among mainstream scientists and hopefully most
people—appears also to continue from types of basic principles to the manner of popular
uptake. As with phrenology (which I will not reference in the past tense alone; it has been
cited to me personally as accurate science more times than I can recount in recent years),
and indeed so much of the human anatomical and medical work done in the context of
early evolutionary (largely Darwinian) science, DNA ancestry testing is utilized as
positive evidence by those seeking to uphold white supremacist ideologies. And while
this is perhaps one of the most obvious and studied (to those familiar with the history)
and simultaneously good headline-making or click-generating (containing accusations of
direct racism) parallels between the societal impacts of these older sciences and the
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genetic science underlying DTC ancestry testing, there are many less apparent or
intricate, but also very important, impacts that I aim to better understand and to explain
through this research. In sum, I aim to question whether or not my fear is correct: Is DNA
ancestry testing just another manifestation of “scientific racism”—another example of the
way that racist ideas about race are embedded in the history of science as it has been built
and rebuilt over the last several hundred years? What more is there to understanding this
history? To immediately make this more complex—how is it, if any of these concerns
have basis—that there are those who effectively use the tools of this science-technologybusiness towards social justice ends?
Following this priming to focus on identity in this topical context is the literature
review. In the review I offer an account and description of the academic resources, social
scientific and humanistic, utilized in subsequent chapters’ analyses and reflections.
Of most immediate importance among these resources in the realm of the social
sciences are the studies and theories of sociologists and other social scientists who have
investigated DNA ancestry testing in action and considered it in a variety of its
conceptual aspects. Their studies take us inside the laboratories and offices of this
science-technology-industry, introduce us to key persons and organizations and their
roles within it, and provide fundamental operational details important in later analyses
such as the kinds of databases used to store consumer genetic information, including
details such as how fields are determined and named within it. Studies focused on public
or lay perceptions and uses of DNA ancestry testing and science are also a part of the
literature, and for the analytical purposes herein serve to add additional social-scale
contextualizing factors to the interpretation of the isolated (personal-individual)
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narratives that provide centers for the core analyses in Chapter Three. More expansively,
the sociological literature offers perspectives and theories on the makings and impacts of
both genetics and race and other social groupings. At their most expansive and inclusive
these discourses address the foundations of scientific and social inquiry; as much as
possible the most relevant of these impactful theoretical insights from the social sciences
are taken into account in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
Most important among these resources in the realm of the humanities are the
writings of philosophers and other humanists which form the soul of this dissertation. It is
my awareness of their conceptualizations and theories that drove me to think this subject
important and good to write about, and—so far—endlessly fascinating. Some of these
persons and writings I have been intimately familiar with for many years, while others
are new to me or have become newly significant to me over the course of this research.
Art and other human creative works, too, cannot be and are not forgotten. Fictional
narratives, expressions of visual and auditory creativity, multimedia arts and more with
themes of genetics are not hard to find and are an important part of this discourse. In my
research, with no difficulty at all, I found an abundance of works from graphic novels to
pop songs to television shows which unequivocally address the topic, and many more
which feature interrelated concerns. In artistic creations of the dramatic variety, many I
have come across form a subgenre composed of genetic nightmares, part of a greater
contemporary apocalyptic movement in art and especially in fiction; at the same time, it
is frequently utilized as a comedic device to generate laughs, too. And perhaps as may
need not even be mentioned, these genetic themes are often used as vehicles for plumbing
the deeper recesses of our thoughts and emotions about these matters that are so
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apparently interwoven into our body, being, and identity as humans. Artistic themes of
genetics present and represent a very broad swath of human experiences and modes of
understanding.
While Chapter One is densely peppered with questions, Chapter Two focuses on
problematics, as they are addressed in scholarly literatures and other creative works.
These problematics interrelate with the questions from Chapter One focusing especially
on those academic discourses and artistic themes found to be pertinent through the
process of research and study for this dissertation. What philosophical problems arise,
both epistemological and ethical, when we bring these theories and perspectives into
conversation with one another? What picture of identity is formed? What potential
problems do we perceive in the science? What opportunities? Considering the entire set
of human ideas and actions that we find in them, how might we best construe what is
happening? If we are thinking of DTC DNA ancestry testing as a social movement, what
problems are there to solve within this movement?
In bringing out these problematics—these patterns of disagreements, and
agreements, among and within these discourses and theories, and other complexities and
problems—the aim is to eventually come to (a) better and more functional definition (or
definitions) of (social) identity that we might use in the analyses and reflections in the
subsequent chapters.
No conclusions are drawn in this Chapter Two, the principal objectives are to
communicate methodology, provide greater historical context (and historic meaning), to
provide a literature and artifact review, and to inventory the (or at least highlight some of
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the) epistemological and ethical agreements and disagreements among the critiquesthemes-theories-discourses presented in the review as they pertain to this subject.

Chapter Three contains the core analyses of this dissertation. These analyses seek
conceptual connections and integrations contained in and among the diverse materials
surveyed during research that will help us to find answers to the questions and solutions
to the problems posed in previous chapters. This includes resources studied of both the
academic and non-academic variety. Specifically, the epistemological and ethical
conceptualizations and theories described in Chapter Two will be applied to the
narratives described in Chapter One. The dual aim of this application is to deepen our
understanding of the real human dramas playing out in these narratives, and to contribute
to the elucidation, integration, and evolution of the theories contained in these academic
works and the discourses from which they arise by confronting them with new life-source
material (new varieties of human life narrative arising from the advent of DTC DNA
ancestry testing) and one another.
Some of the dilemmas presented by the narratives are relatively easily explained.
By “easily explained” I do not mean without consequence and often deep meaning, but
rather that it takes just a few examples or arguments to answer the question at hand, or to
show the manner in which the problem or dilemma might have been avoided. By
“dilemma” here I mean, for example, the emotional distress that is generated in some
persons upon reading their ancestry tests results. Sometimes it is the case, I argue, that
just a bit more explanation about the potential outcomes of the results, their limitations,
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and the variety of ways they might be interpreted, could have prevented the distress by
avoiding the underlying misunderstanding which so often leads to the distress.
I begin with these simpler analyses, working towards those narratives and
themes—those complex problems of identity—which present more difficult analytical
challenges. Analyzing these stories and creations of life, each with real meaning and
consequence to the individual person, necessitates the utilization of the full breadth of
theories and discourses from the humanities and the social sciences previously described.
My aim is, as the title of this dissertation indicates, to unravel DNA and identity. By this I
mean to deal with life experiences and expressions generated by the advent of DTC DNA
ancestry testing in terms of the concepts entailed therein and determine what relationships
and what meanings might be found among them, and to do this by garnering the
capacities generated by the academic scholarship in which I have long been training—the
comparative humanities, as well as the new scholarship I have become acquainted with
over the course of this research—largely drawn from the social sciences. Creative works
of the humanities, too, are utilized and appreciated as conceptual tools for greater
understanding.
Concepts, as I understand them and write about them throughout this dissertation,
are always just that—that is, they are always created or generated or understood by
dynamic, living beings and are therefore never static (nor are they agreed upon by all);
they are always in the process of being formed. “Conceptualizations” is a term that I
often use to indicate this dynamism of all that which is conceptual (or being considered
conceptually). The terminology of “identity” is perhaps more obviously conceptual than
the terminology of “DNA,” which is often utilized or understood primarily as a
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denotation for something that is physical as opposed to conceptual. However, rather than
acquiescing to this binary distinction (DNA is physical and identity is conceptual), I
methodically avoid it throughout. It would be impossible not to recognize that reading
publications from the social sciences, particularly those of Alondra Nelson, Dorothy
Roberts, and Kim TallBear, was transformational in this aspect my research and analysis
(emphasizing or defining DNA as conceptual and social rather than physical), building on
my studies in philosophy of science and specifically feminist philosophy of science, and
perhaps combined with a longtime disposition towards understanding in this sort of
mode. This important piece of the puzzle is readdressed and argued throughout.
To begin the unraveling, we ask: What is DNA as an idea or a concept? What is
identity? How are these concepts intertwined in DTC genetic ancestry testing, and
following, what epistemologies and ethics can we identify as being formed when we
subject all of these concepts including their relationships with one another to careful
analysis? What are the epistemologies and ethics of DNA ancestry testing?
Knowing that these questions need not and cannot be considered effectively in
isolation from discourses already taking place, I meditate on the research done for this
project to inform the analyses. How might we be informed in our analyses by the
literature generated by social scientists studying this movement in its various
components, contexts, and aspects? How might we be informed in our analyses by the
literature generated by humanists who have been pondering the nature of identity (termed
differently in different places and times) for eons? And throughout all of this scholarly
work, how do remain informed and persuaded of the importance of narratives and
creative works spawned from non-academic sources as a result of this science-
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technology-industry throughout our research—keeping it focused on all human life as
much as possible?
A series of questions flowing from this concern may be stated in this way: In what
ways does DNA ancestry testing seem to influence test takers’ senses of their own
identities—of who they are in relation to others? In what ways are these influences
beneficial or harmful to the person? Do they increase perception and understanding of
human identity or obscure it, or both? In what ways? How about for those who do not
take the tests, but are members of the information-consuming population that are likely
well-aware of the tests’ existence and well-informed of the kind of results they produce?
With regards to practical concerns, what are some of the things that people do—actions
they take—in response to these tests? Again, beneficial or harmful to themselves? To
others? In what ways? If we return to the idea of DTC DNA ancestry testing as a social
movement, what do we now see in it given these considerations?
If we turn our analytical attention to the sciences and the scientists, we might ask
about how—since we know that sciences are practices that take place in society, are a
part of society, and not shielded or separate from its influences—there must
consequentially be social aspects to every scientific theory including those which form
the basis of DNA ancestry testing. What are those aspects? What epistemologies do we
perceive in them? What ethics?
Incorporating as much of this as possible into our meditation, we might ask: What
is taking place on a societal level in terms of how human identity formation is changing
in the face of this new scientific-genetic information? What trajectories of thought and
action are these and might these changes point us toward? All of these analyses are
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undertaken with (at least) the following concerns: correctness, clarity, and utility towards
social justice.

The last two major sections of the dissertation, Chapter Four and the Conclusion,
are briefer than those which precede it; these contain reflective considerations and are of
the sort that are necessarily ongoing and unending. It is planned that these will be
developed in the future through further research, study, and communications.

In Chapter Four, “Motivations: Accusations of Racism, Anti-Racist Hopes, and
the Scramble for Identity and Privilege,” we return to the context of contemporary society
with all of its political elements—such as “identity politics”—intact, but informed by the
history, narratives, theories, and analyses presented previously. Here we ponder questions
such as, “Why so popular?” and “Why is this sort of data so very meaningful to some?”
(and return to the question of “for whom?”). These questions, though stated casually here,
are not meant flippantly. An aspect of the impulse to take these tests, and to make
meaning from them, is related to a desire for better understanding when there is
confusion or uncertainty, or for connection to other humans when feelings of belonging
and inclusion are lacking. And not only desire for connection and understanding, but for
understanding of that connection—an understanding of who we are in relation to other
humans—an aspect of the definition of identity being used herein. I cannot see this in and
of itself as being a bad thing, despite my numerous skeptical concerns about its
consequences; moreover, it is surely sometimes good. All that said, once reconcretized
from the abstract realm and perceived in its many real-life, sociopolitical manifestations,

21

the framing could not be more epic. The potential impact of this science-technologyindustry on human life is enormous, and the clues that studying it holds to better
critiquing societal problems and remedying social injustices are hopefully significant,
too.

In the Conclusion, “The Problems with Realisms,” the concluding chapter of this
dissertation, we are emerged fully into the realm of the philosophical to reflect upon the
analyses undertaken, and to consider how the implications or conclusions of those
analyses might influence our understanding not only of what is human, but of what is
real. This will not be further summarized here, as it does not inform the core of the
dissertation, but rather reflects upon it (and is in a state of continual flux).

Having completed the arc from exposition to literature review to analyses and on
through reflections and conclusions, the dissertation comes to its end. It will be stated
here upfront that while some conclusions made are quite definite at least in certain
conceptual negations, and at least insofar as some of them might be translated into advice
for practical changes to be made, most of the conclusions of this research are but pointers
for future work. This research process has, if anything, made me understand that this
topic has even more tentacles than I was capable of expecting.

Inferred from the examples given at the outset of this introduction and so many
others we can try to take in the profound heights and depths and numerousness of the lifeexperiences generated by the advent and rapid deployment of DTC DNA ancestry testing.
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In terms of varieties of experiences, they are of course inherently impossible to list,
however, I will make a surely flawed and truncated attempt to do so here and now in an
effort to underscore in these introductory remarks the many varying social spaces where
the impacts of this science-technology-industry have already been realized: citizenship,
place of residency, custody of children, marriage, adoption, maternal and paternal
relationships and siblingships, other familial relationships of all kinds, immigration
status, criminal investigations and judicial proceedings (practicing investigative genetic
genealogy or forensic genetic genealogy), inheritance, personalized medicine (based on
the science of pharmacogenetics or pharmacogenomics), education, social reparations
programs, club membership, tourism, and fashion. From the obviously crucial to the
seemingly innocuous, such as genetic heritage tourism, all the impacts are at least farreaching. The crucial are on-the-face vital elements of life that cannot be disregarded
(and of course will be considered). But what about the rest, those we deem not so vital or
crucial or important, are they just harmless fun? Meaningful fun (as advertised)? Much
less or much more, and how so?
Given the necessity for these critiques, it will be illustrated and argued throughout
that more of this sort of research—this critical thinking, this purposeful reflection,
consideration, and discussion about our ideas and morals related to DNA and human
personal and social identity—needs to happen now and among the so many people who
are affected by it (that is, everyone).

The ideology of genetics, in different ways, permeates the cultures of the world
and contemporary human society as a whole. The science is widely considered so valid
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that it has turned to metaphor. “It’s in their DNA,” whatever the context, biological or
otherwise, means that it must be so. Popular anthropology and archaeology episodic
programs and feature-length documentaries mythologize about ancient human history via
DNA talk, all the while strands of multicolored light representing DNA and its molecular
components twirl about on the screen. And the musical scores, they are often aspiring to
the pinnacles of symphonic uplift, unless a segment mentions some potentially
frightening dimension of genetic science, such as “mutations” or “virus,” then the notes
might turn minor and darker in tone. There are prominent patterns in the mise-en-scène of
DNA.
But it is not only in those things produced that are specifically and explicitly
related to genetic sciences and technologies, but also so many other manifestations of
culture including all forms of art, that we see the impressions of genetic epistemologies
and ethics. “I just took a DNA test / Turns out I'm 100% that bitch,” as the Lizzo song
goes.1 The symbolic power of genetics is complicated and present in so many human
creations and ideas.
And we are so educated in it—so knowledgeable about it. Apparently, it is so.
The local, national, and world news in recent weeks (January 2022) has made yet another
genetics term, “subvariant,” a part of everyday speech. It is stated with little explanation
but great emphasis, in deepened voices and boldface type. It seems the audience is
supposed to have prior knowledge of what it is and why it is so important.

1

Lizzo (Jefferson, Melissa Viviane). “Truth Hurts.” Nice Life Recording Company and Atlantic Records,
2017.
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“Trend” is not nearly strong enough to describe the deep impressions this genetic
science-technology-industry has made on human lives. “Movement” is right. In the
history of ideas, DNA and the science of genetics are destined to be colossi. I am so
curious to understand better how it is that these epic and ambitious ideas are shaping
people’s thoughts and actions; excited to interact with people through conversation and
texts, and other cultural artifacts, to understand how and why it is that there are so many
different interpretations of these ideas, ways of assigning meaning to them, and reactions
in terms of changes in activities for both individual persons and for groups. Finally, I am
anxious to contribute to this conversation that I am sure is so urgent and exceedingly
important.

The subject is clearly vast and as such, still determined to tackle it, I knew I must
provide boundaries for my research in order to give it definition, and the possibility of
coming into reality so that it might be communicated. Consequently, I do my best—
particularly in the core chapter of analyses—to keep the focus on DTC DNA ancestry
testing rather than allowing my analytical wish to incorporate it all to cause my mind to
wander too far or too frequently into the surrounding spheres of genetics and more
broadly the natural sciences. Though all of these ways or aspects of understanding reality
or perceiving the world are inextricably interwoven, incomplete on their own, and
therefore on some level necessary to take into account in order to accomplish the aims of
this research, the sharpest focus must remain on the exact topic specified so that results
can be achieved.
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At present direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry testing is an active and important
presence in the world of humanity. From the time the first commercially available test kit
shipped to this moment, it has continually increased in presence and influences with gains
in popularity and number and variety of applications. It came into existence in 2007.
This genetic science-technology-industry should be considered very significant
and important by those who have taken such tests and by those who have not. Whether or
not one has taken a genetic ancestry test does not determine whether or not this sciencetechnology-industry affects one’s life and the lives of close loved ones, and indeed the
whole of human society. I hope that the narratives which kicked off this introduction
have begun to establish this as a true statement.

What can this complex science-technology-industry and the social movement it
has spurred or of which it is a part tell us, and what can it not tell us, about our
identities—about who we are in relation to others? How should those of us contemplating
and debating these matters in academia, using terms like “epistemologies” and “ethical
problematics,” think about what is going on? How are human knowledges changing?
How are moralities? And, what does or might this mean for all of human society and the
rest of life on Earth in practical terms? Are there any actions we really ought consider
taking?
My skepticism has undoubtedly been on display in this introduction, and it is
unavoidably the case that this research takes place in the midst of that doubt and concern.
I am skeptical about the prospect that genetic testing conveys or will be able to convey to
us the sort of information and experiences that we are seeking when we set out to better
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understand our own identities and those of others. I am as certain as I can be that this
variety of data does not and cannot contain all of the diverse and rich experiences of
human life that give rise to differentiated social identities. This is argued throughout the
dissertation. That said, I remain so curious. Our DNA is, surely, telling us something. But
what?
It is about who you are, who I am, who we are, in relation to others. What does it
mean to have and proclaim identity and identities as a human, and to be identified in this
spectrum of humanity? What role can or might DNA play, or not play, in answering these
great human questions?
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CHAPTER ONE
THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL-INDUSTRIALPERSONAL-SOCIAL MOVEMENT: DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
GENETIC ANCESTRY TESTING
The idea that our ancestral, hereditary traits passed down to us from previous
generations—including our capacities, our limitations, and perhaps even the essences of
our identities—are tied to something inside our bodies called “deoxyribonucleic acid”
(DNA) is very new in the story of humanity. Herein I will demonstrate how it is that this
idea and the practices related to it are and must be factors that radically shift our
epistemologies and our ethics. Evidence will be offered from scientific, technological,
industrial, personal, and social perspectives, providing a basis for our analyses of directto-consumer genetic ancestry testing as a movement in human global society that has
significant implications for all humans, and one that presents both problems and
possibilities.

DNA was introduced to the scientific world through a 1953 research article by
James Watson and Francis Crick entitled “Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A
Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid.”2 In this article, Watson and Crick spell out the
structure of this long molecule with its twisting, double-helical form held together by

2

Watson, James Dewey, and Francis Harry Compton Crick. “Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A
Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid.” Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science, vol. 171, no.
4356, 1953, pp. 737–38.

28

pairs of nucleotides. At this moment sequencing (counting, identifying, naming, and
grouping) the entire genome (all the nucleotide pairs in the DNA) of any organism was
not yet on the list of realizable objectives. Theorizing about the relationships between
specific genes and what they do was an even longer-term goal.
Just a half century later, confidence in knowledge about DNA as it pertains to
humans reached a major apex, empirically and politically, with the completion of the
Human Genome Project (HGP) in April 2004. With goals established in 1988, and
research launched in 1990, the HGP aimed to identify, map, and ultimately make
meaning of all the DNA that makes up a human genome. The project reported meeting
these aims, and the announcement was widely heralded. It might briefly be noted here
that the complete genome sequencing had only been completed for one human subject’s
sample at the time.
In 2003, even before the announced completion of the HGP, at least one of the
companies analyzed as a part of this research project, African Ancestry, had begun
offering the sort of test being examined herein: a direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic test
with results containing information about ancestral heritages. Around that time there was
an explosion in services of this variety, some of which are still in existence in a form
similar to that in which they were founded, some of which popped onto the scene only to
melt away just as quickly, and some of which still exist but have morphed or merged into
other services. African Ancestry then and today provides matrilineal and patrilineal
genetic data to their customers. By the tail end of 2007 in time for the holiday season,
23andMe became the first company to offer autosomal genetic testing as a DTC service,
which incorporates in its processing DNA that is not just of part of matrilineal and

29

patrilineal lines, but from the broader range of genetic code available from the 23
chromosomes of the human genome.

Many works surveyed in the course of this research have provided brief histories
of this chronology of events. Rather than rehashing those histories or giving more details,
it will be taken that what has been stated here is sufficient evidence to affirm that this
scientific-technological-industrial movement is recent, fast-paced, and spreading quickly.
This abbreviated historical context is also given knowing that more of it will yet emerge
through the rest of the expository, analytical, and concluding portions of this dissertation.

In this exposition of the subject, first the focus is on the fundamentals of the
consumer experience, that is, the typical individual procedure for taking a DTC genetic
ancestry test. Next is explanation of the central scientific ideas and terminology
employed in genetic ancestry testing and as referred to in subsequent chapters, in order to
establish the mutual foundation in conceptualizations and language required for executing
and communicating this research project. With basic scientific principles established,
next it is possible to proceed to some technological, including data-related, elements that
are necessary to refer to in later analyses. In closing the exposition of the scientifictechnological-industrial elements and terms involved, there are remarks that log some of
the key businesspersons, organizations, and economies, that can figure as landing points
on a map of how this plays out in the domain of industry including capital, finance, and
commerce, profits, and power.
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All of these scientific, technological, and industrial fundamentals having been
outlined, a large portion of the subject matter of this dissertation comes into better
definition. It then becomes analytically feasible—from our newly informed vista—to pull
our focus purposefully and carefully to reflecting on how all of this relates to what it is
that we really want to know—what we really want to discover—which is more about who
we are. Who-what are we? How do we identify ourselves (as individuals and as members
of groups) and how are we given identities by others? What problems bother us in these
processes of identification, whether self-determined or assigned by others? Why are these
problems significant to us? How might we solve these problems? Does DNA hold, if not
the entire answer, a big portion of it? How about not DNA itself, but societal patterns in
reactions to the idea of it and its applications (especially genetic ancestry testing)? What
does all that mean?
With humanity intact and in our focus, but informed in the science-technologyindustry, we may turn our attention to the social-ness of all of it and consider DNA
ancestry testing as a social movement rather than as a solely empirical, or technological,
or commercial concern. This is where the core of this dissertation starts to develop,
beginning to consider this as a movement in human life that incorporates all of these
considerations: from the personal, to the interpersonal, to the cultural, to the societal;
ultimately, to struggle with what all these human social identities are about, what they
mean, and how we might and ought to interpret them in the context of this subject. How
does and might all of this inform us about who we are?
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Most DTC DNA ancestry tests are of the laboratory-processed, mail-in-your-spitand-await-the-results type. A generalized consumer experience, subsequent to the
decision to purchase, can be described as follows. The consumer registers and pays for
the test online then it is shipped and delivered to them, or to whomever they are giving it
as a gift. The test-taker-to-be then collects their own saliva sample in a small tube, seals
it, and returns it in the preprepared packaging. All the while the communications
component of the service is in full swing. The test taker has several choices in how to
interact with the company and the information it provides: email and text message
updates, website logins, and mobile and desktop apps with notifications for a variety of
devices. Perhaps needless to say, the company or companies the consumer chooses to
purchase service from will be in regular contact, unless one purposefully opt-outs of all
these options. Digital interactions encouraged by the companies range from
straightforward product promotions and updates to complex social-media-like services
connecting the test-taker with fellow consumers. Once the results are ready, they are
communicated to the test-taker through one of the above digital means, and often also
elaborate printed mailings of the sort opened by reveal video makers.
The contents and presentation of the test results received by consumers have
varied significantly over time and among the various services. A number of such
discourses and narratives about test results are discussed in detail throughout this
dissertation; a list containing just a few examples is provided in Appendix II. As for the
variance among the companies, it may be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that the
companies’ services referred to in this dissertation have the same or insignificantly
dissimilar testing procedures and practices as what is stated here.
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The sciences that provide the conceptual foundations for DNA ancestry testing
can be construed as existing on a series of spatial scales from the macroscopic to the
microscopic. They furthermore include several scientific disciplinary perspectives: from
that of the science of genetics broadly conceived, that is, the basics of DNA; and from
those varieties of science which provide foundations particular to the ancestry component
of our subject, which includes archaeology and anthropology, and also, as will be
demonstrated, the more-encompassing science of biology, especially when it is
considered from a historical point of view.

We begin this description at a human scale and proceed towards an understanding
of the molecular structure of DNA insofar as is required for there to be a basis for
employing those details when needed during later epistemological and ethical analyses.
This is a meditation on some things that are likely familiar to those of us who had
the opportunity to study cellular and molecular biology at some point in our lives, and
who can recall the basic principles at least in part. However, what may be different in this
presentation of the topic is that—in addition to establishing the vocabulary and theory
needed to understand structures and functioning—we will attempt to pay very close
attention to how this anatomical and physiological information is derived empirically;
that is, how it is that one goes from viewing an image that, but for it being a photograph
(or other sort of imaging) taken from a microscopic perspective, might be mistaken for an
abstract artistic creation consisting of so many colors and shapes created with great detail
but also an amorphousness that make boundaries difficult to discern, to textbook graphics
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of human anatomy and physiology with clear lines, color-coding, labels, and names for
absolutely everything in the image. A question to consider as we observe this
progression: How is it that what at first might appear chaotic takes form when what is
being seen is given a terminology and a theory?

To begin, we envision a form of a human body. We bring our attention to some
point on the surface of the skin. Examining more closely this point on the surface of the
skin it is possible to differentiate a variety of features. We might notice a hair or hairs
emerging. We might be able to see some variations in skin texture, tone, and shape in the
small patch of our focus, perhaps due to blood vessels beneath the surface, or freckles,
moles, or other common features. From some of these observations we might surmise
that not every constituent part of the bit of the body that we are looking at is identical in
its composition, and also might draw the inference that they are not all identical in
function, or at least consider those as possibilities. At this point the unenhanced portion
of our investigation comes to an end. We must at least grab a magnifying glass.
As we look more closely with this modest increased magnification at the same bit
of skin to investigate some of those variations that we noted previously, we will likely be
able to see even more variation within them, and among them as well. It is not one
continuous, homogenous scape but rather appears more and more complex as the
magnification factor increases upward.
Now on to the microscope. Even the most inexpensive optical one, one which
requires only simple training in order to operate, will do for now. If we harvest a small
sliver of skin from the surface and put it onto a slide, then view it under a microscope at a
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magnification of about 100 times, we might be surprised to see—if we weren’t expecting
it—that this bodily sample appears to be made up of numerous tiny somethings all
squished together. They are not utterly identical to one another, but very similar and with
discernable boundaries and common characteristics, enough so that they all appear to be
the same kind of thing. But what kind of thing are they?
Increasing the microscope’s magnification further to around 1,000 times or so in
order to isolate as best as possible one of these squished somethings in our field of vision,
we begin to see more clearly its boundaries and that it too is made up of yet smaller parts.
We might even have been able to discern fairly well one of these smaller parts—a
noticeably large center portion of the something, a singular and central something,
distinguishable from that which surrounds it—before turning up the magnification to this
degree. But now we see so many other features in this complex environment.
The “somethings” starting to pile up, it is at this point that we—at least I in my
abilities of perception—must employ scientific terminology and therefore simultaneously
scientific theory in order to both perceive and understand what it is that is within our field
of vision in empirical terms. That is, I do not find it possible beyond this point in our
meditation towards the microscopic to simply observe with my vision the gist of what
scientific textbooks diagrams display. I can see, up until this point, that the skin sample,
and using magnification tools that I can readily comprehend, is comprised of these
smaller things, which have smaller things in them, and with some major attributes that are
immediately visible. But to discern in any meaningful fashion what I’m seeing or to give
greater depth to my understanding of the processes that are taking place, and before
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turning up the magnification any further as we head towards DNA, we must begin to
explain what is being seen utilizing scientific terminology and theory.
Returning to a magnification of 100 times, the crowd of “somethings” we are
seeing are what have been labeled “cells” (in English, at least, but derived from Latin
through French the etymologists tell us) by biologists. These cells we have been informed
are among the most primary, fundamental, and significant constituent parts of life—the
building blocks of life as they are sometimes described for simplicity’s sake.
Increasing the magnification again to 1,000 times, the center something within the
somethings that comes into even greater definition is the aptly named the “nucleus.” I say
apt because, like the seed inside a fruit, this nucleus is said to hold something so
powerful, asserted by some to even be all-powerful and wholly deterministic of our being
and experiences: DNA.
Like the boundary of a single cell (the cell membrane) delineating it from the
other cells which push up against it, we can tell that the nucleus is a clearly
distinguishable environment within the greater environment of the cell (cytoplasm) that is
noticeably different and bounded from that which surrounds it even upon this basic, onedimensional visual inspection. But rather than being one of many, like one cell among all
those cells which surround it, there is only one nucleus, and it does not appear to be
pushing against and being pushed like the cells all bunched up together. Rather it appears
to be floating or swimming in this microscopic, but from this perspective vast,
environment. The spherical-ish boundary (in our current view, circular) between the body
of the cell and the enclosed body of the nucleus is called the “nuclear envelope” or
“nuclear membrane.”
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At a magnification of 10,000 times, we may begin to inspect what is within this
envelope or coating of the seed, the constituent parts of the nucleus, and continue to work
our way further into the microscopic and eventually molecular perspective required to
comprehend and appreciate this idea of DNA.
Inside the nuclear membrane we see a complex of features among which we can
make out stringy concentrations within what appears to be a less dense backdrop. While
it would be fascinating to turn our intellectual attention to each of the distinguishing
features that we perceive inside the nucleus and learn more about all of them, having
determined at this point in our meditation that in order to reach our goals we must employ
scientific ways of understanding rather than relying being guided by our visual perception
alone, we know that that we should focus on the stringy concentrations.
These strings or threads, as they are often described, are termed “chromosomes.”
Chromosomes are DNA, combined with just a few other molecules which cause them at
times in the cell’s reproductive cycle to bunch and form into the probably familiar X-like
shapes in which they are so often represented. One of the fascinating things that they do
spatially is act as a bunching mechanism that makes it possible for such a length, often
cited as six feet, to fit in such a microscopically small space. They, perhaps even more
importantly, organize the DNA for cell division. We are focusing on a cell at a moment in
a cell’s cycle of growth and division called “prophase” when the chromosomes are easier
to distinguish from one another—not so tangled up as during interphase—but before
lining up during metaphase to further the process of reproduction via division. Perhaps
needless to say, although we may feel at times like we are analyzing static things and
moments, there is constant change within a cell, this basic bit of life.
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DNA, the major constituent component of chromosomes, is so frequently
described as a double-helix, the description seems so automated, that it may no longer be
all that helpful to some. Its form is like a twisted and slightly wobbling ladder. Our
meditation now arrives into a realm that must be described molecularly. The sides of the
ladder are made up of phosphates and sugars, and the rungs are pairs of nucleotides. It is
these nucleotide pairs or rather their ordering that is genetic coding. The nucleotides are
the characters in the language of genetic codes in the same manner that one and zero are
the characters in binary computer codes, and True and False are the only two choices in
Boolean logic.
However, rather than having two options as in a binary code, the nucleotides
(nitrogenous bases) are of four types and commonly referred to by their letters: A
(adenine), T (thymine), C (cytosine), and G (guanine). In combining to form a two-part
rung in the ladder, A always matches with T, and C always matches with G. That said,
any one of the four may be half a rung on either side of the ladder, so that the result is
that for each rung in the ladder there remains four possible configurations of nucleotide
pairs (AT, CG, TA, GC). Genetic code or logic is a quaternary logic.
If we are to analyze well DNA ancestry testing, and even DNA testing more
generally speaking, there are certain divisions or categories within these long molecules
of DNA which are helpful to consider. These terms and ideas from the natural sciences
are those which I have encountered during my research of the social scientific literature
that deals with genetics (especially DTC genetic ancestry testing), and which these
scholars have highlighted as especially significant in the science and practice of genetic
testing.
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Firstly, it is very important to consider one concept-term that is at the root of
genetic science and genetic terminology, that is: the “gene.” A gene is often referred to as
having a “position,” “location,” or “locus” on a chromosome, and it is a stretch of genetic
code (sequence of nucleotide pairs) that has been determined to be of significance in a
particular way through genetic research. This genetic research in turn is dependent upon
genetic theory. It is not possible to just look, discern, and understand what is required via
a static picture, or even a series of images no matter how high the resolution or framesper-second recorded. It is not a matter of (material) tools, but of concepts. We must at
least understand the basic theory of how the information stored in the code that is DNA is
utilized in order to give form and function to an organism, in our investigation a human. I
do not suspect that too much detail is required here for our purposes, so here the DNARNA-protein progression will be described simply in order to bring to the forefront of the
mind this process for those who may have knowledge of it that includes greater detail,
and to provide a skeleton framework for understanding the following discussion of the
definition of a gene and other subsequent discussions.
If it is the case that you the reader in following this meditation with your
knowledge and training are able to perceive more or further than I without the application
of biological terminology and theory, I would ask you to consider: At what point do you
do find yourself needing to turn to that knowledge of scientific concepts in order to
understand what it is that you perceive with your senses (in this meditation we are
focusing on the visual)? I do argue that it is a necessary thing that such a crossing in the
ability to understand from perception alone to in combination with theory is required to
understand genetics. This I hope will continue to be sufficiently demonstrated throughout
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the dissertation, but this topic will be left at that meditative rather than conclusive level
for now. And I would certainly be interested to hear any answers to this question from
those more deeply knowledgeable about genetics than I am.
The same DNA is present in every somatic cell in the human body. In other
words, every cell that comprises the body (mutations ignored for now) that is not a
gamete (either ova or spermatozoa, which are also known as sex cells or reproductive
cells) contains the same 23 pairs of chromosomes. (Gametes contain only a single set of
chromosomes, instead of two as the non-reproductive cells do.) We have in mind that
chromosomes are composed of DNA, and that DNA is part of a cell that is constantly in
the process of change, growth, and division. The process we are meditating on here is
how the information in the DNA of a somatic cell is used to create a template for the
building of proteins, which eventually build organisms with all of their diversity inside
each being and among them all.
Envision again the twisting DNA ladder, but now it is splitting down the center of the
ladder between the nucleotide pairs eventually resulting in the production of RNA
(transcription and translation). RNA (at least this sort of RNA) then exits the nucleus and
acts as a genetic messenger (T->U) to specialized organelles outside in the cytoplasm
called ribosomes. On the ribosomes, the information from the RNA (derived from the
DNA in the nucleus) is used to build amino acids and ultimately proteins are synthesized.
Proteins comprise almost the entirety of the human body, so we might be able to make
the connection to a more tangible reality at this touchpoint in the meditation (e.g. proteins
form tissues, tissues form organs, organs form systems and bodies).
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I do not pretend to comprehend in a very deep manner the scientific details of
these structures and processes that make up the chain of events from DNA information to
full organism, and I don’t think that extensive of a study is required in order to
understand what is we need to know in order to analyze the subject at hand. But what I
find good in this meditation is that now, with these connections among the molecular, the
cellular, and ultimately the anatomical in mind, I can think more clearly about the place
of DNA in human life as I know it, embodied. I also ponder that these processes
ultimately manifest simultaneously great similarity and great variety, both internal to
each organism and among all of them.

Returning to the gene and its multiple definitions, and to put them into a
framework that hopefully will be very useful herein, sometimes the term “gene” is used
to refer to a particular nucleotide sequence (of varying length) that codes for the synthesis
of certain protein molecule or a certain part of a protein molecule per the process outlined
previously.
In other usages, the definition also includes what are called “regulatory
sequences” of DNA that are required for the “expression” of that gene (i.e., that the
particular sequence of DNA in the cell, the gene, is not only present but activated in that
particular cell in the synthesis of whatever protein or protein part it codes for). This
expression might be explained another: Not all cells are the same in all parts of the body
which we might infer, in combination with cell theory, because it is obvious just from
experiencing being a human being that the body is not one homogenous substance like a
crystal or pool of pure water but rather much fuller of complexity and diversity. So, if
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according to this theory all the DNA in every somatic cell of a human body (and all
multicellular organisms) is identical (still not quite yet considering mutations), then how
is that not all cells are identical, if it is the DNA which provides the information for the
structure and function of cells? Not all genes are expressed in every cell due to the
combination of regulatory sequences that are a part of DNA and epigenetic factors. This
is the “expression” factor that some geneticists appear to include in their
conceptualization of what a gene is.
More expansively, popular non-academic and some academic discourses
sometimes have the term even more broadly conceptualized in their vocabularies. Think
of article titles that read something like, “Find Out if You Have Genes for Breast
Disease” or “Gene that Increases Odds of Opiate Addiction Located.” In these instances,
the concept of a gene might even incorporate not only physiological outcomes but also
complex social ones, too.
The idea that there are certain genes that code for certain traits, perceived features
and disadvantages, is commonplace even in conversations that aren’t even remotely
scientific. It just comes up. Especially dominant in these discourses are concerns about or
focuses on the heredity of diseases in association with certain genes. Contrastingly, talk
of “good genes” is also colloquial and doesn’t usually seem to be desiring of follow-up
inquiry about what exactly that phrase means and entails. What is important for our
consideration here is to be well aware of the diversity in conceptualizations of what a
gene is and does. In a spectrum of conceptions, a gene might just be a series of letters, a
gene might be a series of letters that are put into action as code that results in the
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generation of a particular physical something in the body, or a gene might be all of the
above plus phenomenologically real, significant, experienced outcomes in a living being.
Furthermore, it is helpful at this point in the meditation to consider how this
vagueness or uncertainty in the definitions of what a gene is and does differs from, for
example, conceptualizations of chromosomes. Chromosomes are microscopically visible
structures that are bunched up strands of DNA. They can be viewed, distinguished from
one another, and even drawn by young student observers for confirmation of anatomical
understanding with relative ease (granted, it helps if one is setup for this exercise). This is
not to say that one can understand chromosomes’ role in biological functioning just by
looking at them, but they can be perceived and delineated as (seemingly) being of the
same kind on visual inspection alone. Genes, on the other hand, are not visible in such a
manner. They are too concept- and theory-laden, as is displayed by the variety in
definitions and the usages of the term, even inclusive of those definitionsconceptualizations which appear to be the most directly related to molecular structure
alone and not inclusive of medical or social considerations, or other theoretical
considerations such as whether or not “expression” should be part of the definition. For
example, comprehension of the first and simplest definition of a gene outlined here is
dependent upon an understanding of the theory of the entire process leading to protein
synthesis from the information stored in DNA. In sum, genes are types of things-concepts
that are determined in a manner different and much more epistemologically problematic
than DNA or even chromosomes.
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With these empirical and scientific notions and terminologies refreshed, we will
turn to just two examples of genetics as employed in DTC DNA ancestry testing that will
come up again in later chapters. It should be emphasized here that these are just two
examples among many. As we proceed through the literature review and analyses to
come, a variety of genetic concepts utilized in genetic ancestry testing will be explained
as is required to proceed with our inquiry into this scientific-technological-industrialpersonal-social movement. As will be seen, the variety of concepts and their applications
is great, and are necessary for understanding some of the epistemologies and ethics
involved.

The first genetic idea to consider now single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).
Recalling the rungs in the ladder of DNA—consisting of nucleotide pairs AT, CG, TA, or
GC—a SNP is said to occur when there is a change in the nucleotide pair at a single
position on the strand of DNA; one of the rungs in the ladder is different than the rung in
the ladder it was copied from. These SNPs can occur within stretches determined to be
genes, and they can also occur in “non-coding regions.” (These non-coding regions will
come up again later.)
So, what are these variations, SNPs? They are part of a more-encompassing class
of ideas: mutations. Mutations, which have been set aside up until this point in this
meditation, are changes in genetic code that occur when it is being replicated during the
process of cell division; each of the two cells generated in the replication process
(typically) has the same DNA. (Interestingly, these mutations are often referred to or
taught as being “mistakes.” I say interesting because it is ultimately according to
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evolutionary theory these changes result in the great diversity of forms of life that we can
observe. “Change” is certainly accurate; but how helpful is “mistake”?) When these
changes occur during the copying of code in gametes (sex cells) they can be passed on,
and are passed on (at least one generation) if that particular gamete results, in its part, in
the production of a new organism. In sum, SNPs are a kind of mutation that occurs during
the cell replication process that takes on hereditary and ultimately evolutionary
significance when it occurs in gamete that is passed down for generations.
Some forms of DNA ancestry testing utilize SNPs that have been passed down for
many generations (we’ll discuss how many generations as we get into the analytical
portions of this dissertation) as a part of their determination of group assignment. That is,
certain groups are claimed to have certain SNPs, and therefore having a certain SNP in
one’s genome can be a factor (according to this theory-application) in determining group
membership, or probability of group membership. There are, it has been argued in the
sociological literature, and will be argued in (possibly) different ways herein, that there
are significant and meaningful problems in the usage of SNPs to determine ancestry.
We will consider at this moment just one more genetic concept-term that is
utilized in DNA ancestry testing: “maternal haplogroup.” It is not the last of the genetic
concepts that will need be engaged in order to analyze this scientific-technologicalindustrial-personal-social movement, but it is another term that was frequently
encountered during research and it is a centrally important one in these discourses.
Discussing it now, it is hoped, will continue to communicate the scale of the variety of
ways that DNA is being analyzed by those scientists and others working on problems to
do with ancestry via genetics, and prime the discussion for future demonstrations that will
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involve real-life examples and applications, which are invariably more complex than
these generalized scientific descriptions might lead us to believe.
The idea of a maternal haplogroup is dependent upon another genetic termstructure-concept that has not yet been mentioned: “mtDNA.” mtDNA stands for
mitochondrial DNA, that is, DNA that is present in the mitochondria of the cell, which
are organelles in the cytoplasm outside the nucleus. The DNA discussed so far consists of
those 23 chromosomes that are inside the nucleus of human cells. This is the DNA that,
when present in a gamete cell that is part of human reproduction, combines with DNA in
another gamete cell so that the offspring’s DNA (not including mtDNA) consists of a
half-and-half combination of DNA from both gametes. mtDNA operates differently in
terms of how it is passed from one generation to the next, and thus enables different sorts
of applications in ancestry DNA testing. Rather than each generation being a combination
of the genetic code from two (gamete) cells, as is the case with DNA inside the nucleus,
mtDNA is (typically) passed intact from one generation to the next, but only along the
maternal line, that is, through an ovum each generation. Thus, one’s mtDNA is
(typically) identical to one’s mother’s, one’s grandmothers’, one’s great-grandmothers’,
and so forth, for many, many generations. This mtDNA only changes from one
generation to the next when a mutation occurs in replication. Thus, mtDNA enables the
tracking of a particular kind of genetic-genealogical information that differs from that
enabled by the most famous kind of DNA, the 23 chromosomes inside the nucleus; it
enables us to trace ancestrally long lines of descendance, ovum to ovum, but only those
lines.
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The “haplogroup” aspect of this concept-term refers to the groups and subgroups
that geneticists assign to various samples of mtDNA according to the similarities and
differences in their genetic sequences. (Haplogroups are also determined based on Ychromosome, but we will focus on the mtDNA variety of haplogroups here.) This is done
in order to determine long-term maternal lineages. As the matrilineages slowly diverge
from one another (have greater differences in their genetic code) over times through
mutations, according to this conceptualization it is possible to group (and subgroup)
mtDNA according to the variations in an empirically precise and accurate manner. Thus,
if one is told their “maternal haplogroup,” also referred to as a “mitochondrial DNA
haplogroup” or “mtDNA haplogroup,” it is referring to a grouping of (in our case)
humans with whom one shares the greatest similarity in the composition of their mtDNA.
Haplogroups are referred to by codes that are combinations of letters and numbers
(some of so many examples: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, K, L1, L2, L3, M, M14, M42a,
M42c, N, N1, O, P, Q, S, X, Y) but these codes are almost always presented grouped and
listed alongside the names of corresponding proposed geographic origins or on top of
world maps. Almost never (or, dare I say, never, so far as I have surveyed) are they listed
in the manner above, that is, alphanumeric order; it is curious to ponder the evolution of
the assignment of these combinations of letters and numbers to groupings of people.
While some genetic scientists and others such as certain genetic genealogy
enthusiasts might use these codes in conversation and consider them ends in and of
themselves, for most test-takers (and especially in the vein of our inquiry) they only serve
as a means, or perhaps a superficial symbol. A typical aim is to find out whether or not
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one’s maternal lineage is from Oceania, not whether or not one’s mitochondrial
haplogroup assignment is N.
This brings us to a point in our meditation where it makes sense to begin
considering the roles that sex and gender have this inquiry. Although some other aspects
or forms of human identity such as race and ethnicity might seem more obviously a part
of these discussions, sex and gender absolutely run through them, for both empirical and
social reasons. As has been shown in this discussion of mtDNA haplogroups, empirically
determined facts, such as that the genetic code in the mitochondria of any given human
cell is only passed down from the sex cell-ovum of the one parent, make possible it to
discuss matrilineality in this way.
To begin briefly to consider some social reasons for the considering sex and
gender herein, I will begin by sharing that for a good period of time I thought that the
“mt” in this term was an abbreviation for “maternal,” and this was despite knowing that
mtDNA is located in mitochondria. Of course, “maternal” and “mitochondrial” have their
“m”s and “t”s located in the same positions in their sequence of letters, so that is part of
it. And I might just chalk this up to the fact that “mt” and “maternal” are so frequently
found alongside one another, but I do not think that either of these coincidences
sufficiently explains the totality of this (repetitive) error in my comprehension and
memory. In retrospect, it is my intuition that this was the case at least in part due to the
tremendous influence sex and gender have on—if I can simply put it this way for now—
all human discussions, including scientific ones.
Not only (biologically) sexed but also (socially) gendered terminology is highly
present in many types of scientific discourse, as has been demonstrated many times and
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in many ways by feminist philosophers of science and other feminist theorists whose
analytical focus is scientific theory and practice. Following their leads, it is impossible
not to notice that there are so many ways in which scientific theory, practice, teaching,
and learning is embedded with gendered ideologies, in some ways quite obvious, in some
quite subtle, and in others utterly disguised. To give few simple examples, it is easy to
find depictions of eggs as passive beauties (fulfilling social tropes of femininity) and
sperm as efficient aggressors (fulfilling social tropes of masculinity); and let’s not even
mention all of pink and blue color-coding (in diagrams of chromosomes the X and Y are
frequently found following this schema). Even the phrase “daughter cells” to refer to two
cells produced at the end of mitosis (cell replication process). And while some or all of
these examples might seem harmless to some people, there are consequences of this
gendering, again pointed out by feminist theorists, that would be considered
consequential by many of those who might find the other points to be insignificant and
harmless. In their application in the medical arts, for example, where there is a long
history of determining diagnoses and treatment for women based not only upon their
biological features but also their social roles.
Placing this discussion of sex and gender into the fuller context of human identity
with its many aspects—and particularly idea of the descendance of aspects of identity
through generations—it is helpful to begin our consideration attempting to analyze in
combination only two factors rather than trying to take in too much at once. Here we will
consider gender in combination (or as it intersects with) nationality, an aspect of human
social identity quite relevant to ancestry DNA testing. It is also expedient to consider the
matter by utilizing as analytical instruments some terminologies available in languages
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other than English; in this instance a language in which the term for nationality changes
depending on gender (one of many). I was once corrected during a conversation, “No,
colombiana,” a woman said to me, with unusual emphasis on the final “a.” I had referred
to another woman as “colombiano.” I am not fluent in Spanish, and I have tried to learn
to not be too hesitant in trying to speak just because I am uncertain of the grammar, or
because I fear I might not get it quite right in the moment. At the same time, I know that
some points of grammar are more important than others (in varying ways and differing
among people), and the person with whom I was conversing (who I am sure disregarded
my numerous other malformations of the language), in this case a woman, was showing
me that she thought this distinction important and worth pointing out in conversation.
Hearing and seeing these words which describe nationality in gendered forms, it
is easy to be inspired to (or rather, are we encouraged to?) consider the differing
characteristics of those who are being referred to and grouped together in such a manner
by each of these terms. Here, I do not mean to conflate the existence of the usage of a
single term with the existence of a singular concept, but rather to draw analytical capacity
from reflecting on these concepts in a different way, through a different language. And,
in this living conversation, my companion interlocuter was drawing my attention to her
consideration of the importance of the distinction.
What, following this and in this sense, do we think are the differing characteristics
which differentiate colombianas (Colombian women) and colombianos (Colombian
men)? What unites them in meaning? When we hear, read, or think of these
conceptualizations, is the imagination that they motivate: exactly the same, just a little
different, or vastly different? Put in the terminology of essences or being, is or how is
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Columbian-ness in a woman different than Columbian-ness in a man? How is it the
same? Is or how is the woman-ness in una colombiana different from the woman-ness in
women who are not colombianas? Again, how is it the same? Less specifically, how are
experiences of gender identity shaped by having or being of a particular national identity?
Conversely, how is are experiences of national identity shaped by having or being of a
particular gender identity? How else might we think about these overlapping,
interweaving, interdependent conceptualizations of identity?
As has been wonderfully emphasized in non-academic discourses, and as we have
learned from the perceptive and influential theorization of Kimberlé Crenshaw,
intersectionality is a theoretical approach which enables and encourages us consider all of
these varieties of identity not independently as abstractions or essences which are
separable from one another (e.g., woman-ness, Columbian-ness)—not to think about
them as independent layers or components which build up to an entire identity—but
rather to consider them as they exist in life with all their complexities, each influenced by
the others, or rather utterly intertwined and interdependent in conceptual existence,
possibilities of interpretation, and in the experience of life as it is lived. This also relates
to other discourses not using the terminology of intersectionality but that engage with the
same or similar problematics. Here I think in contemporary times of bell hooks and
Angela Davis in whom I encountered this variety of thinking (or similar) before learning
of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s. Some of the theoretical outputs of these thinkers will be
reviewed in the next chapter.
So rather than analyzing identity in any sort of essentialist mode, arguments
against which will be described as present in the scholarship researched and as detectable
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in or derivable from the artistic productions studied, we will fight this tendency and
create our questions and have the analyses be inspired by conceptualization and phrasing
from intersectionality, phenomenology and ideas about embodiment, among several other
emphases (all described in Chapter Three as part of the literature review).
To bring our meditation for a moment into a mode that is focused on outcomes,
we will turn to some historical evidence to make the point of the intersections even
clearer. In the place, or rather the nation wherein I was born, reside, and in which I am
categorized as a citizen, the Nationality Act of 17903 was among the earliest of legislative
acts of the United States Congress having to do with immigration. While I first
encountered and highlighted this Act in my reading due to its language of “free white
person,” while research about this Act with regards to the structural racism it displays, I
became especially intrigued as I read onto what is in the last few lines of the Act—almost
seeming like an afterthought: “Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to
person whose fathers have never been resident in the United States.” Without restating
every detail of the act prior to this point, it might be summarized as generally allowing
white persons who have lived in the United States for two years to be admitted as citizens
and has a few other not-so-certain attributes such as “good character.” Following granting
of citizenship, the children of these white persons too would also be considered citizens.
Throughout the Act, as would be expected for the time, place, and authorship of this
document, the pronoun “he” is used in an unsexed fashion to refer to any would-be
citizen; however, it is not referring to males or men only but everyone in this instance, as
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again can be inferred from the circumstances of the writing’s production, but is also
confirmed by the subsequent text which was quoted.
Putting all of this together, it is seen that it is the citizenship of white men and not
white women which is meant to hold generationally; this is of course also meant to
exclude any person regardless of sex or gender who was not considered white. Though a
white woman could be granted citizenship based on the provisions of this Act, any child
or children she might have would be citizen(s) by virtue of the Act if and only if their
(white) father were a citizen. In contrast, the child or children of any white man granted
citizenship based upon the provisions of the Act would be according to the Act citizens
regardless of the citizenship of their (white) mother. It is the citizenship of the father, in
this instance, and in the context of these racial definitions, which has greater legal weight
and longevity. Of course, it might also be mentioned briefly here that who was
recognized legally as a (legitimate) mother, a (legitimate) father, and a (legitimate) child
had as much to do with marriage as claimed biological relations according to the laws of
that place and time. This Act cited here is but one demonstrable instance of a legally
tangible influence of gender on nationality. But we must slow this intersectional inquiry
here, as the intention was to (try to) begin by looking at two aspects of human identity,
gender and nationality, but we have already collided with race, marriage, and legitimacy
as well.
Perhaps attempting this analysis in such a way and coming to this result only
better demonstrates and supports the theoretical approach that stimulated it. Hopefully it
has been demonstrated sufficiently that gender and nationality, at the very, very least, and
in this sort of instance, cannot be considered in isolation from one another. To stretch the
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analysis in terms of its historical breadth further, one can begin to imagine all the
innumerable and varying sorts of intersections between conceptualizations of national
(and ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, and other forms of) identity and
conceptualizations of gender (and sex, and sexuality, and other forms of) identity in the
scope and scale of global human history, and even into the realm of myth. How many
histories and other stories have we heard told of men going away to war and coming
home with wives or other women with whom they planned to have children or had a child
or children? How many stories about men going away to war, reproducing with women
(who were often raped, or perhaps who took on complicated heterosexual relationships in
difficult situations probably typically without what today can be described as informed,
meaningful consent and a real, practical choice in the matter) in the place where they go
to fight, conquer, and control, and going home without the children? How are the
children resulting from these varying sorts of human reproductive acts counted in terms
of their identifiers? When did gender carry the most import? When did nationality? When
did current or prior geographic location? Other factors? Stated as a broad question having
to do with relationships between ideas about descendance and concepts of identity, in
what ways does it matter that one ‘receives’ an aspect of their social identity from one or
the other parent? What takes precedence, when, and what might we change in our
conceptualization of the roles and laws in society as a whole as a result of these
understandings?

As we come to close this scientific portion of our meditation and exposition—
which was intended to introduce some crucial ideas from genetics that are a part of this
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scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement, and to integrate some
humanistic material along the way—it is helpful to recall what all we are attempting to
take into our consideration of these matters. We began with a single human form and
zoomed in progressively and with purpose until it was possible to ascertain some
fundamental terms, concepts, and theories from genetic science in such a way that they
are as connected to our experiential reality as is possible, but simultaneously we
acknowledged the limitations of knowledge about the structure and functioning of these
tiny objects-concepts through simple observation alone, that is, when theory must be
applied for comprehension. Then, we turned our attention to two applications of this
science to exemplify its utilization in DNA ancestry testing: the recording and tracking
generationally of SNPs in order to determine a variety of ancestral groupings according
to shared mutations of that kind; and, mtDNA (or maternal) haplogroups used in the
determination of specifically maternal or ovum-to-ovum descendance. Following this, in
an attempt to integrate early on the complexities of analysis with regards to the
intersections of conceptualizations of social identities, it has begun to be demonstrated
how difficult it is to isolate any one aspect or form of human social identity in an accurate
or meaningful way.
This brings to mind Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion and analysis of the
phrase,“Tota mulier in utero” in the introduction to The Second Sex.4 Translated into
English, “woman is a womb,” or perhaps more precisely but less elegantly, “[the] total
woman [is] in [the] uterus,” or “all of woman is in the womb,” many of the sorts of issues
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that we have begun to get into here by thinking about mtDNA are addressed by de
Beauvoir by thinking about and analyzing this phrase, including demonstrating the
ubiquity of the concept-definition of woman that it points towards, also describing thencurrent discourses that pushed against it, and providing some additional problematics or
lacks that may be found in it when stacked against any number of theoretical
considerations and the actual life situations of women. It is hoped as de Beauvoir was
able to demonstrate many of its problematics, herein I might be able to demonstrate the
epistemological and ethical problematics (and perhaps also opportunities) involved in
some of the conclusions drawn by ancestry DNA testing, including those to do with
“maternal” haplogroups.
Before putting away the microscope, we harvest another small sample of our body
from a completely different location, then try blood and saliva and any other somatic
(non-gamete) cells that we can easily obtain; the results are all the same. The cells in the
samples have great variations in their shapes and colors and many other features, but we
when we ultimately arrive at the nucleus of a cell, we find the same DNA sequences: our
23 chromosomes.

Now that we have clearly and firmly in mind what DNA is (in terms of its
structures), what it does (in terms of its functions), and some of the things which can be
done with scientific knowledge about it as part of genetic ancestry testing, we will return
our awareness back to that single human form we envisioned previously. From that single
human form, this time, instead of progressing in our meditation from the individual
human towards the microscopic and the molecular, we will attempt to place our imagined
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standpoint on trajectories that move outward in space to encompass more people and
places, and backwards in time towards generations of humans who have long since
passed away from our living sphere of existence. Our aim is to understand the ancestral
components of the sciences which enable—and as we will eventually see, benefit from
the information generated by—DTC genetic ancestry testing services.
So far, we have primarily focused our investigation through the lenses of the
natural sciences, genetics in particular. Now we turn to some of those sciences which,
while applying many of the principles and practices of the natural sciences, have a
peculiarly human, and ancient, character: anthropology and archaeology.
Anthropology with its root in humanity (or at least man, “anthro”) perhaps most
obviously fits this characterization. As I understand it, the aim of an anthropologist, a
scientist of humanity, is to study that which makes us human as opposed to some other
kind of being or thing or experience or idea, that is, to propose answers to the question:
What is a human? Being a widely diverse discipline in terms of its methods and aims
also, one of the core modes of thinking that appears to unify the discipline is its focus on
understanding and analyzing humanity by searching into the distant past. This is
accomplished through analyses of human artifacts of all different kinds and also the
remains of human bodies.
Numerous discourses of anthropology have understandably burst onto the scene in
response to the waves of genetic information and theory that have been made available
(at least) since the beginning of the HGP. Highly visible for at least the last two decades
in the scene of popular and public education media is Spencer Wells, who has specialties
in both anthropology and genetics. I can only imagine how much such a mind would
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whirl in the midst of these rising and intertwining movements in science and society. But
I need not merely imagine too much, for Wells’ presence is in my experience impossible
to ignore within the midst of study in these arenas. The dramatic, beautifully-designed
and produced documentaries in which he is a star, all the times he has been featured in
scientific television series, his numerous interviews, his articles and books geared
towards audiences of science enthusiasts, all seem to turn up in searches and references
whether or not that is what one is seeking. The artwork that often accompanies or is
incorporated in these are filled with bones, haplogroup maps, DNA spirals, and usually
unnamed persons who have distinctly varying phenotypes. I think it is fair to say that
Wells’ perspective is probably very influential among many people who are deeply
interested in these matters and seek to educate themselves on them, but are perhaps not
specialists. And this is not to say Wells’ work is not influential within anthropological
and other scientific circles; from what I can tell from my position outside scientific
disciplines, it is.
Kim TallBear, in Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise
of Genetic Science,5 utilizes Wells’ work to both to (I think) make more broadly
appealing and relatable the work that that she is doing, but also (and certainly) to critique
it. More particulars about her approach, arguments, and conclusions will be discussed in
subsequent chapters; here may it suffice to state that the questioning and analyses
presented in her scholarship on this subject ranges from who gets studied in genetic
anthropological research, to how they are studied, to what the repercussions of this sort of
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research are, to critiquing the underlying patterns of social power within and among
social groups that are manifest in the processes of this research and the data that it
generates.
Archaeology, complementarily, also has its roots in humanity, but with the focus
not so much on human being as on human creations, always seeking those things that
were in the beginning, as the ancient past might be described. By examining the physical
evidences left behind by humanity’s presence over time, especially in prehistorical times,
this mode of study provides much of the data (and theory, also) that anthropological
scientists employ in their work to understand the nature of humanity. Archaeologists
examine the big, obvious things, but also seek out those remnants that have become
obscured under layers of earth and sea and ideologies. While the level of detail and
context provided by archaeological science will (likely) not need to be considered too
much in this research, the dependence of anthropological research and theory on this
discipline (or subdiscipline, as it is sometimes categorized) as source of data and
knowledge needed to be acknowledged at least this much.
The knowledge produced through archaeological and anthropological efforts
becomes a part of DNA ancestry testing insofar as it is involved in the process of group
determination. Some anthropological research and theory, such as that described here is
enabled and spurred on by genetic research, and consequentially involves terms such as
haplogroups and chromosomes. Other anthropological research and theory is used in
genetics as applied in DTC genetic ancestry testing. The complexities of this disciplinary
epistemological relationship must be held off on until we reach the analytical portion of
this dissertation, but even in the literature review it will be seen that there have been
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those who have been investigating and questioning this relationship for some time now,
especially with regards to the manner in which DNA samples are grouped and regrouped
along ancestral lines. Part of the questioning in the analyses will have to do with
ascertaining to what degree or in what ways are these groupings determined by the code
that is in DNA and that code alone, and in what ways these ancestral groupings might be
or are also delineated from one another in part due to other sorts of knowledge, for
example, knowledges about language, religion, art, architecture, political order, and so
many other aspects of human cultures that are a part of social group and identity
formation.

A few last historically and philosophically contextualizing elements will round
out this consideration of discourses and ideas from the natural sciences. These elements I
suspect will form portions and add aspects to the conceptualization of this movement
ultimately arrived at in the conclusion of this dissertation. If we think about all that we
have been considering here in the context of the history and philosophy of science, we
might find that some of the patterns we are beginning to detect within this geneticsinspired movement are familiar. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, concerns about this
familiarity are part of what drove me to choose DTC DNA ancestry testing as a basis for
the topic of my dissertation.
The familiarity I refer to here is not one of the uplifting, reminiscent variety. It is
rather a sense of haunting echoing spiked with sometimes epiphanatic alarms. If we place
the scientific endeavor of genetics within the historical context of the development of the
varying natural sciences as we know them today, we might construe it as one of the many
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branches among human quests for empirical knowledge that is difficult (or meaningless)
to pinpoint as having a definitive starting point. At the same time, at least insofar as
history is told in the West or the Global North (these pseudogeographic terms will
invariably arise again later) these human empirical endeavors morphed into something
that might be recognizable today as “science” during the period of European history so
often referred to as the Enlightenment. (Arguing that this Enlightenment was neither
enlightening nor beneficial to all falls outside the scope of this research; however, I will
state here that I certainly and wholeheartedly agree with this attempt to decentralize
institutional Western history away from its longstanding European, male, elite core. See,
for example, the scholarship of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze.6)
While it is not the aim of this dissertation to attempt a historiography of science
leading up to the development of genetics, it does seem important to at least place it
within such a context. Though a simplified version of history might point to science as
being on a direct course from innocent ignorance to verifiable truth, the story is so much
more complicated. To cut to the core of this issue, the question is this, does genetics
follow the patterns of racialization and racism, gendering and sexism, nationalism and
colonialism, that many of its predecessor sciences did? Biology, especially in its
applications in the practice of medicine, although it is certainly not exclusive in this
regard, carries with it markedly among the sciences inscriptions of social ideas about
humanity. And among those social inscriptions are ideologies that have caused some of

6

See, for example, Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi. “Introduction.” Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader,
edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 1–9; and, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of
‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology.” Anthropology and the German Enlightenment: Perspectives on Humanity,
Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1995.

61

the most devastating and persistent abuses of human beings according to what we now
call their various (or intersecting) social identities.
The theoretical insights from the social sciences encountered in this research deal
with this critical issue in a variety of ways, and particularly with regards to genetics and
race. The overall concern has to do with what can (and I think, should) be termed
scientific racism. Scientific racism, as discussed in the Introduction, is a way to the
variety of ways that scientific theory and practice has been influenced by social
ideologies about race over time. These social ideologies are of course not neutral in their
racializations (assigning people to various racial groups), but rather always assign those
groups rankings in order of their goodness and value, with white or Caucasian or the
comparable terms of the day always at the top. So, when those study human bones began
to break them up into groups according to (seemingly empirical) types, according to this
idea of genetic racism their determinations had to do not only with the empirically
verifiable properties of the bones, but also those ideas which those scientists already had
in their minds about what bones should be more alike to one another, and that this did
have to do with their ideas of race.
Has this kind of thinking passed on into the present, or is this just a history lesson
with no contemporarily applicable value? Much social scientific research and
argumentation, the details of which will be addressed in the literature review, affirms
resoundingly that, yes, this scientific racism is present, and that they can detect its
presence strongly in today’s genetic theories about race (such as those applied in DTC
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DNA ancestry testing). Duana Fullwiley, for example, describes this as the
“molecularization of race,”7 and other social scientists offer similar descriptions.
The theories from the interdisciplinary humanities applied in the subsequent analyses,
especially from the philosophy of science, also address this issue but not so much directly
as it pertains to genetics as to the more longstanding scientific discourses of which it is a
part. In confronting and debating the traditions of scientific practice and theory which
cause it to be proclaimed impervious to having its conclusions affected by social factors,
feminist philosophers of science especially have provided us with much to make evident
the intrinsic sociality or social-ness of science. An example of this can be found in Helen
E. Longino’s Science as Social Knowledge wherein the chapter on research on sex
differences is especially helpful as an analytical tool.8 More broadly it is stated here that
Longino’s overarching argument that science is social knowledge is one that has long
been on my mind and certainly shapes my thinking considerably. Some theoretical
insights into this problematic, as well as others from the philosophy of science and other
arenas of humanistic inquiry, will be described in the literature review in the next chapter.

It has been taken as established in the course of this research that these arguments
are correct; that science cannot and should not be understood as anything but a social
practice, imbued and created by all that social-ness. What truths there are to be obtained
in its practice are not absolute and cannot be outside of what is human. And genetics, like
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all sciences, and as will be discussed and argued for throughout this dissertation, is
likewise not impervious to social influences; it does not stand outside of society but
rather is a part of it.

Now that we have completed (what we can here of) our overview and
consideration of some of the central scientific ideas and vocabulary employed in DTC
genetic ancestry testing—especially from genetics, anthropology, and archaeology, and
as referred to in subsequent chapters—we will continue the effort to establish the mutual
foundations in conceptualizations and terminologies necessary for executing and
communicating this research project. It is now time to turn to technological matters. This
exposition will be much shorter than the scientific one, as each technology in turn will be
explained as the need arises in the analytical portions of this dissertation.
The technologies utilized in DTC DNA ancestry testing are (of course!) numerous
and diverse. Each (if they may even be counted as existing separately from one another)
is not only dependent upon the accuracy and precision of the empirical knowledge gained
from the scientific discourses from which it sprang, but also upon one another.
Throughout this research the focus has remained on considering those
technologies which are either unique to genetic ancestry testing or especially key in its
operations as a distinguishable scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social
movement. There does not need to be, for example, an examination of the technologies
involved in the delivery of parcels, or everything that is involved in the operation of this
great network of communication called the internet, but of course each of these must
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have been in place, and continue to be in place (or replaced in its role), if the
technological component of this movement is to remain in place and keep it running.
Therefore, each technology (or each aspect of a technology) as it is required in a
particular analysis will be explained rather than attempting to relay all of this sort of
information upfront. It is hoped that through this process a more encompassing and
integrative understanding of the technological aspects of this movement will steadily
arise. Most of explanation required will be about the varieties of laboratory tests utilized,
DNA sequencing and analysis technologies, and the different kinds of computer
databases in which all of this genetic information is stored and computer programming by
which it is continually processed.
To give one example here of the crucial role understanding technological factors
can play in a critique of DTC DNA ancestry testing a brief mention of databases will be
made now. In our biological meditation earlier, when we came to focus our attention on
the molecular, the greatest level of detail we arrived at was genetic code itself—the As,
Ts, Cs, and Gs representing the various nucleotides. Ascertaining these sequences of
letters, or usually rather certain stretches of them, is accomplished through the application
of genetic sequencing technology and laboratory procedures. The data generated through
these procedures is stored in computer databases. Now, it might seem that this process of
storing sequences of code would be a neutral one; that is where our questioning begins. In
a database there are fields (similar to column in a table; analogically a column name is to
a table as a field name is to a database, but databases contain multiple tables), which are a
means of organizing data into varying types. Every bit of data stored in a database has a
field with which it is associated (that it is, categorically, inside of). In the case of DNA
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ancestry testing, some of these filed names include terms for human identities such as
Luo, Scandinavian, Ashkenazi Jewish, and Native American. These are the sorts of
identities being analyzed herein, and therefore this level of detail does become at times
quite relevant. As with much of the other scientifically detailed research utilized in the
analyses in the project, the research pointing to these databases as significant is from the
social sciences.

Having begun the process of incorporating technological considerations into this
research project, it is now industry’s turn. This exposition flows easily from the
technological as of course it is human activities, institutions, and ideas that can be
described as commercial, financial, and industrial that bring these technologies into
reality. As with the technological, rather than attempting to consider all that might be
taken to be a part of the economies that surround DTC DNA ancestry testing, our focus
will be on that which is unique, or particularly important, in its realization.
For one, we may think of the companies that created or hold the rights to
aforementioned proprietary technologies such as database structures (among which there
are several prominent competitors). But first and foremost, and for the purposes of
containing this research to manageable bounds, there are the DTC DNA ancestry testing
services and the companies which provide them.
Three of the most prominent services discussed in the discourses researched for
this project are those provided by 23andMe, AfricanAncestry, and AncestryDNA. Here
will be laid out a description of those three services’ specialties, some of the key people
and organizations that have driven the provision of these services, and some financial
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considerations. Some comparisons among the three will also be drawn. Here I will not try
to describe these services exhaustively, but rather to highlight some of their attributes that
will become relevant as the analyses proceed.
Numerous other services of this variety are available and will be discussed as they
become peritent in analyses of particular cases. Some other services well-known in the
market in the United States include Family Tree DNA, HomeDNA, LivingDNA,
MyHeritage, MyTrueAncestry, and NebulaGenomics. Some services that are more
prominent in other markets throughout the world will be discussed in a subsequent
sections.
All of these services provide estimates labeled “ethnicity” or “admixture” or
related terminology in their genetics reports to consumers. These particular labels will be
critiqued in the analytical section as they are highly relevant to this inquiry, especially in
the many ways that they are and can be interpreted.

23andMe, Inc. was formed in 2006 and became the first company to sell and
process an autosomal DTC genetic ancestry in 2007. An autosomal genetic ancestry test
differs from an mtDNA or Y-chromosome DNA tests in that incorporates genetic
information from (select portions of) all 23 chromosomes inside the nucleus of the cell. A
typical consumer’s experience was described in the Introduction. 23andMe offers a
variety of bundled genetic testing services which result in reports to test-takers that
include ancestry, health, and other genetic “traits.” Today the title of the homepage is
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“DNA Genetic Testing For Health, Ancestry And More - 23andMe.”9 The current,
undiscounted costs of their bundled services range from $99 to $228 in US currency. The
least expensive of these services, the “Ancestry + Traits” service, provides the sort of
information being researched in this project. The most expensive service includes
extensive health outcome probability-prediction reports that are beyond the scope of this
research, including pharmacogenetics reports, which aim to give consumers information
about which pharmaceutical medications are most suited to their genetic make-up.
(Pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics are names for the scientific practices and
theories which underlie what is sometimes marketed as “personalized medicine,”
“precision medicine,” or similar; it has been claimed in many headlines to be at the center
of what will be a revolution in medicine.). It is notable, however, that all versions of
23andMe’s bundled services include the “ancestry” and “traits” components. Though a
significant portion of their marketing focuses on health (and the positive experiences of
seeking health) rather than ancestry (today’s homepage featured headline is “Your
personal health experience starts with meaningful info from your DNA,” followed by
“Shop now”), it appears assumed in their approach that everyone who purchases any of
their services is desiring or at least content to receive the ancestry information. And this
is not to say that they don’t heartily promote the ancestral component of their services. A
summary of their services places it upfront and claims eminence, “23andMe offers DNA
testing with the most comprehensive ancestry breakdown, personalized health insights
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and more." In the FAQs one might read that these ancestry “breakdown[s]” are
determined in part through their “patented Genetic Communities™ technology.”
The look of the 23andMe website is sleek—the most so of all the DTC DNA
ancestry testing company websites that I can recall ever perusing—if sleekness is defined
by having the fewest number of words “above the fold,” the most simply layered graphics
and photography, and a highly limited color palette with few subtle variations. The
branding of 23andMe’s other online and physical presences matches this aesthetic. By
comparison, the marketing and product aesthetics of the two other services being
surveyed here (AfricanAncestry and AncestryDNA) are significantly more multifaceted,
and are targeted to much smaller, more specific, audiences.
The central human figure in the corporation of 23andMe is Anne Wojcicki, who
has been CEO of the company since it was founded along with Linda Avey and Paul
Cusenza in 2006. Wojcicki’s undergraduate degree is in biology and her work
background prior to 23andMe is largely health care investment-related. Some prominent
financial relationships of the company and its leaders show (what is likely) a tiny fraction
of its interconnectedness with other major industries. The pharmaceutical company
GlaxoSmithKline made an initial $300 million dollar investment in the company. Anne
Wojcicki’s sister, Susan Wojcicki, is the CEO of YouTube. Anne Wojcicki was the longtime spouse of Facebook (now Meta) cofounder Sergey Brin. There is not space within
the bounds of this project to examine all of these and other such relations, nonetheless it
does seem important to note that there is a close web of relationships among these leaders
and institutions in data-intensive industries.
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African Ancestry, Inc. is a company more specialized in its approach than
23andMe and many of its competitors. In terms of their consumer audience and company
identity, it is stated, “By Black People, For Black People.” 10 Their focus, as their
corporate name indicates, is on tracing African lineages, and most specifically their target
audience is African Americans in the United States. Unlike both 23andMe and
AncestryDNA, their tests are of single-line lineages (in a family tree) following either
certain markers in the mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA, maternal) genetic code or certain
markers in the Y-chromosome (paternal) genetic code. Their logo is two As partially
entwined into the double helix of DNA, and the look of their marketing and interfaces is
a bit more subtle and complex than 23andMe’s super-streamlined look. African
Ancestry’s branding features bold colors: deep and bright shades of purple are prominent
with highlights of burnt orange and golden yellow. The graphics are clean and active; the
photography has deep focus and is celebratory.
Their services appear to allow for higher market prices than the other two services
being considered now. Their service packages currently range in undiscounted cost from
$299 to $793. At the lower price level, consumers with a Y-chromosome (most often
men) can choose from either their “MatriClan” or “PatriClan” test options to test their
own DNA; consumers with no Y-chromosome (most often women) may only choose the
MatriClan option, as the PatriClan is a Y-chromosome test. Those with no Ychromosome are encouraged to, if they would like to know their PatriClan results to have
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a living relative in the same paternal (Y-chromosome) line who has a Y-chromosome
take the test to know their results. The highest priced option includes both tests.
The company’s primary consumer audience being much narrower than that
previously discussed, this is a helpful point to begin considering who it is that is
interested in taking a genetic ancestry test in the first place, what kind of information they
are seeking, and for what reasons. The popularity of the services of African Ancestry is
one good and important indicator in answering these questions, and much can be derived
from looking at their advertising and the nature of the services they provide.
Looking at two portions of text from their marketing is helpful in discerning this.
The first of these two, “African Ancestry helps people of African descent trace their
ancestral roots back to a specific present-day African country and tribe/ethnic group,”
might help in understanding (at least from the company’s perspective) the goals of their
customers and potential customers in terms of the kinds of data that they are looking for,
that is, quite specific (perhaps as specific as possible) information about their ethnicity in
terms of its relation to those living in Africa today in terms of country and tribe.
Now, it might be asked, why information generated in relation to the present
instead of the past, if it is that aspect of current-day identity that is spawned from the past
that one is seeking when taking such a test? The answer in this case, I suspect, has not so
much to do with what consumers are seeking as what information is available. The details
of this will not be discussed here as they will come up in the review of the social
scientific literature, but as might be imagined it is far easier to obtain adequate lots of
DNA samples from living humans than from the scattered remains of those who lived in
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the distant past (archaeological evidence is an aim in ancestry DNA science, but one that
is comparatively only very partially realized).
Another passage from African Ancestry’s current primary sales pitch today is,
“Knowing where you’re from is a critical component of knowing who you are. Find those
missing pieces of your identity with this transformative and powerful experience,”
followed by “SHOP NOW.” This helps us understand another critical aspect of African
Ancestry’s audience which is critical and important to this discourse and to life.
Compared with others living in the United States, especially white Americans, and
perhaps all other social groups living in the United States, it is African Americans, Black
Americans, at least those desiring to trace such ancestries and with the time and means to
do so, who have the greatest difficulty in obtaining this information through public
records and other verifiable means. Although oral histories are sometimes available,
along with certain amounts of private and family records, for the most part it is not
possible to verify family trees and other genealogical information through public
documentation, and even more difficult to try to ascertain with any certainty origins
reaching back to the African continent. This is of course due to the great genealogical and
genetic shift of epoch-making and people-defining proportions caused by the human
monstrosity of stealing away human beings from their homelands, liberties, health, and
life to service the capital of Western elite and the political foundations, in so many ways,
of the United States, and the privileged lives that so many, especially white Americans,
live in it. Here again we must abbreviate this discussion, as the focus is on the corporate
aspects of this movement, and this is analyzed in a latter portion of the dissertation where
motivations and ramifications of the anti-racist variety are discussed.
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African Ancestry’s cofounders and current-day leaders are Gina Paige (President),
and Rick Kittles (Scientific Director). In the social scientific literature Alondra Nelson11
and Dorothy Roberts12 offer significant analyses of African Ancestry’s practices since its
founding in 2003, the works of which are both a part of the upcoming literature review.
“African Ancestry – Trace Your DNA. Find Your Roots. Today.”

AncestryDNA, like African Ancestry, is a more specialized service in its appeal
than 23andMe, but at the same time simultaneously part of a broader platform. It evolved
as a service of the corporation named simply “Ancestry, Inc.,” which still exists today.
Ancestry was formed out of a conglomeration of many companies and sets of
genealogical databases through the 1990s, beginning with sets of records from Latter-day
Saints publications. It is interesting to note the partially religious practice-inspired aspect
of the foundations of this service
Ancestry started its online presence with Ancestry.com in 1997. Today its main
website’s homepage features the title, “Ancestry® Genealogy, Family Trees & Family
History Records”13 Prior to beginning to include genetics testing as a component in their
service offerings, Ancestry.com was a digital space mostly occupied by genealogical
records and family trees created by users; there was (and is) a great deal of interconsumer interaction in this space and related social media spaces, with sharing and
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discussing the results of mostly familial genealogical research being the principal
activity.
As DTC DNA testing technologies became available and genetic testing was
added as one of their services, AncestryDNA was born. Today the AncestryDNA
website’s main page is titled, “AncestryDNA® DNA Tests for Ethnicity & Genealogy
DNA Test.”14 It is clear from this and many of the other advertising texts and graphics
generated by the company that the focus on the AncestryDNA platform is ethnicity and
currently living familial relations. They currently offer two options for purchasers. The
lesser priced option costs “Only $119 – Buy now” and includes the "AncestryDNA"
service alone. Similar to 23andMe, the option priced higher, in this instance at “Only
$119 – Buy now,” includes a component labeled "Traits." Combined with the Ancestry
platform’s emphasis on genealogy, this creates a potential user experience (for those
customers who use both Ancestry and AncestryDNA) that incorporates ideas about what
is family, past and present, interwoven with concepts of what ethnicity is and means. This
is confirmed in their phrasing, "From your origins in over 1,500 regions to the most
connections to living relatives, no other DNA test delivers such a unique, interactive
experience."
The Ancestry (ancestry.com) entry point features a color palette of earthy dark
browns in the background with soothing blues and greens highlighting certain important
graphics and text, and many layers of sepia-toned photography. While complimentary,
the AncestryDNA (ancestry.com/dna) landing page is distinctly different; it is packed
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with geographic maps of the world. A subtle black and dark grey global map fills the
entire background of the principal sales pitch. Just below are a variety colorful maps
alongside portraits of smiling people who have recently learned more about their
“ancestors’ journeys over time.”
So, given this potentially very complex user experience of data—about genetics,
about family, about ethnicity—how might we think of some of the generalized objectives
or aims of an Ancestry-AncestryDNA user (or user of a similar service)? In this I aim not
to oversimplify—it is certainly and inherently true that there are wide variety of reasons
that people wish to engage these services (which will be examined in the analyses of
individual cases)—but to attempt at this point in the exhibition of this movement to
continue to gather ideas about the personal and social motives involved. Also, although I
do not want to fall prey to taking any corporate advertising text as truth, I am generally of
the persuasion that advertisers who work for commercially successful companies likely
know what they are doing and know their audience quite well (that they do indeed have
their fingers on the pulses of certain important trends or movements in society), thus, in
part, the success of the companies. So again, we can look to some of the text generated by
AncestryDNA to see what it is at least that they think their customers want to achieve in
using their service.
“Connect with your people in new ways.” Every word in this condensed statement
carries meaning. “Connect with” points towards what seems to me a core aspect of this
movement overall and for everyone (as much as anything can be said for everyone). Who
does not want to connect? And if they don’t, why would they use such a service? “Your
people” gives a more colloquial spin to the terms “ethnicity” and “family” which are used
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repetitively in the site’s texts; the possessive “Your” connecting it to the individual user’s
place within that identity. And then, the “in new ways.” “New” is also used repetitively
throughout AncestryDNA’s marketing and information texts. Another example may be
found in, "Millions of people have uncovered something new. You can too." Genetic data
is course exciting, new information, to humanity at large, but that doesn’t seem so
important in these presentations. What is important is the experience of finding “New”
information about “You.”

23andMe, African Ancestry, and Ancestry/AncestryDNA are the same in that
they use the terminology of ethnicity as a central part of their conveyance of genetic data
to consumers. (This is specifically important in this research; what is called “ethnicity” is
one of the central forms or aspects of human identity of which greater understanding is
being sought.) That is not to say that these three services use the terminology in exactly
the same way; the similarities and differences in their and other companies’ usage of that
terminology and others will be displayed through the course of the upcoming analyses of
individual cases.
Another characteristic, perhaps equally important, that appears to unite all three of
these companies, as derived from the wording of their own marketing, is that they are
selling “experiences” as much as they are selling (genetic) information. These
experiences, one would think and hope, and one might derive from the smiling faces and
glowing recommendations, should be on the whole positive. This points towards one
important aspect of the analysis of this movement. Are these activities or these
experiences, on the whole, positive? Or rather in what ways are they positive, negative, or
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should be described in neither of these ways? What are the epistemologies and the ethics
involved?

The next stage of this project, in Chapter Two, contains the statement of research
methodology and the social scientific and humanistic literature reviews. There is just one
final but hugely important task to complete before entering this next stage. This task is to
make an effort to place DTC DNA ancestry testing into more global perspective; this is
an effort in which there surely will be failures and omissions, but nonetheless the effort
put forth must be as good as is possible.
So far in this exposition of this movement—especially the presentation of some of
the industrial elements involved (the three testing companies surveyed are all US in
origin with largely US-based audiences)—the focus has been largely on the United
States. This is for several reasons. Firstly, and foremost of which, is that I live in the
United States and I have always lived in the United States. I do not pretend to escape this
position and associated perspectives (along with many other positions and perspectives),
no matter how many other positions and perspectives I aim incorporate into my analyses,
and ultimately into my understanding of this movement. Secondly, in the social scientific
literature that I read as a part of research the companies and services given the greatest
attention were US in origin. This is undoubtedly in part due to my reading literature in
almost entirely in English and largely within the framework of US academia (this will be
discussed in Chapter Two), but I am certain is also due to the especial popularity of DNA
ancestry testing in the US. And thirdly, because there must be some bounds for this
research, and it makes sense, at least in part, to focus on those things which I know best
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(though always stretching and aiming to comprehend others as best I can) and
subsequently arenas in which I might have the best hope of making a positive
contribution.
All of that stated as context, there is as a part of this research’s approach and
method a determined, integrated effort to continually consider whatever the case at hand
may be in terms of global societal considerations in addition to analyzing the
individualized, personal concepts (ethical and knowledge-oriented) involved for the testtaker or their more immediate communities. There must be in the methodology of
research such as this a continual alternation among concepts as they are situated within
various spheres of (conceptual) existence from the personal, through various social
groupings such as family and nation, to the world of humanity. The works of many
philosophers and other scholars are used to guide and inform this conceptual alternation
from the individual to the larger group. These will be reviewed in the next chapter. It
almost might have been noticed that at the very outset of this dissertation in the listing of
various example narratives, intention was placed on choosing narratives or personal cases
which carry deep meaning for the individual test-taker and also considerable meaning for
broader communities of people, and the world. I do my best to keep all of this in mind,
while acknowledging my perspectival and other limitations.
Among the aforementioned reasons given for some of the US-focus of this
research rises a question that is helpful to consider at this juncture, in order to have in
mind a specific consideration of the global scale of concepts that must be involved in an
analysis of this movement. Why is it that DTC DNA ancestry testing is so much more
popular (and made available) in some places, such as in the United States, than in others?
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Why are these services more popular among certain persons and social groups more so
than others, even within such geographic designations? Why is there so much more
velocity within this movement in some places and among some groups of people more so
than others?
A short (and partial) answer to this question, and a terminology that has not been
used since early on this writing, is: Colonization and colonialism—along with a host of
other ideas that point to terrestrial-scale historical forces which have shaped and continue
to shape or create human identities over time. The history of colonialism and capitalism,
and incorporated racialization and racism, sexism, gendered and sexualized violence,
religious discrimination, and nationalism, and the terrible list goes on, has drawn and
redrawn lines on the maps of the world that are an intimate and intricate part of DTC
DNA ancestry testing results and also the interpretation of those results.
Global scale forces such as these have caused it to be such that it is far easier for
certain persons advantaged in these schemes to have knowledge of their familial and
cultural histories than other disadvantaged in the social hierarchies. In the United States
this is the case for most African Americans, as was previously described in brief, and also
indigenous persons from many different groups and nations whose histories have been
profoundly altered by genocide, forced labor, and forced adoption of culture, and also
innumerable other groups, for example the mass forced labor of Asians and Asian
Americans and others in the western portions of the continent as the national boundaries
were pushed and pushed in that direction. For everyone who lives in patriarchalpatrilineal cultures wherein their maternal heritages are obscured or erased, with familial
names and symbols typically being inherited through one paternal line only; and, so often
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for married women specifically, so many names and other social identifiers being
dissolved into the bonds of (so-called) matrimony. For so many people the disruptions in
their familial and cultural (including linguistic and religious, and other aspects of) stories
are so massive that it is not possible to piece them together through genealogical and
other document and artifact-based research. It seems given all of these grave and
foreboding considerations a scientific and technological marvel that it is now possible,
possibly, to uncover aspects of these histories from a relatively simple code that was once
completely hidden from any human knowledge, in each of these tiny bits of our physical
selves called “cells.”
And yet, and this should not be understated, among all of these forces of human
oppression, violence, disregard, and dehumanization, are also those aspects of identity
which are created from personal and group-focused pride, cultural richness and shared
achievements, resistances to oppression, and self-determinations of uncountable kinds.
Postcolonial scholarship of all kinds, and scholarship from many socially critical sources,
instructs on both the negative-oppressed and the positive-resistant-and-creative aspects of
identifiers in part delineated by these processes of colonization, racialization,
exoticization, and other usages of humans without regards to their personhood and as
means alone. Following this, it is not meant to be predetermined or presumed here that
the sources of human identity being discussed herein are either all uplifting or all
oppressive, but to see how all of this is interwoven, and to do so by looking at this global
(and globally significant) movement that has to do with our greater knowledge of our
bodily composition on a molecular level.
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We have hopefully now engaged our minds sufficiently in thinking about DTC
DNA ancestry testing in terms of its scientific, technological, and industrial aspects.
Furthermore, we have asked many questions about it, and have begun to incorporate just
a handful of scholarly theoretical sources into our possible ways of comprehending this
scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement.
It is now possible to emerge fully from this necessary passageway of exposition
into what is at the core of this research and contemplation, which is to take these
considerations of science, technology, and industry, and apply them to ideas about human
identity, both individual-personal and communal-social, and do so within epistemological
and ethical frameworks. These analyses will take place in Chapter Three, and following
that central chapter there are reflections and arguments about the political and
philosophical impacts and other conclusions.
But first, before getting into any of that, we must continue to ask questions and to
gather more scholarly resources (both from the humanities and from the social sciences).

So far in this dissertation, there have been scattered throughout a baker’s dozen or
so series of questions. These series of questions—these examples of questioning in this
arena—have been aimed to display some of the breadth and depth of this movement, and
the relay the importance of engaging in critiques of it (now). Some of these questions
have had to do with: identities and identifiers of nationality and gender and their
interrelationships; concepts of race, racialization, and racism; the history of specifically
scientific racisms, and questions about present-day scientific practices that echo this
history; the nature or idea of categorization, broadly construed (how our sometimes-
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chaotic perceptions and experiences are ordered through conceptualizations); whether
these experiences (of taking and getting the results of DTC DNA ancestry tests) are on
the whole positive, negative, or should be considered in other (more complex) ways, and
how. Taking in as many of these factors and considerations as possible, what are the
epistemologies and ethics involved? Who am “I”?; Who are “we”?; and, Who are “they”?
in these contexts?
To begin at a starting point, what makes us human as opposed to some other kind
of being? What characteristics or traits (or essences) are required? What do we perceive
and feel in ourselves as members of certain human groups that cause us to identify “us”
and “them” in these various contexts of identity?
What cognitive processes that lead to these differentiations are the result of or are
sourced from the senses alone? What are the phenotypes (not just visual)? What do we
consider necessary to call someone or ourselves a member of [x] social group? What do
we consider necessary to say someone has x identity? How does this vary based on the
kind or variety or type of identity? Let us consider here just a sampling: sex, gender,
sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, citizenship, geographic origin, marital
status, domestic status, familial status, language, dialect, accent, age, ability, education,
profession, socioeconomic status, immigration status, carceral status, indigeneity, and
diasporic membership?
Following, why do these various group distinctions and associated identities exist
and persist? Are they true and helpful, or false and harmful? Does it simply (or not so
simply) depend on the situation?
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Subsequently, to focus in on our exact purposes here, what does DNA have and
have not to do with some or all of the above categories of identities and others? Take race
as a critical example. In the context in which I live in what is frequently termed “the
South” in the United States, to be deemed and understood as Black historically the basic
requirement is having African lineage-ancestry, in tandem with necessary requirement of
no (“one drop rule”) or very limited (unperceivable to institutional forces, “passing”)
African lineage in order to be considered white. All DTC ancestry testing services
include the African continent (or African genetic lineage) and various subcategories
within it as among the possible outcomes in reports to consumers. How do these
percentages of African ancestry (or certain African ancestries) relate to conceptions of
what it means to be Black or be identified as Black? Be white? Do these percentages,
these quantifications, really relate or describe or qualify in meaningful ways the complex
fabrics of social identities and their embodiments in individual persons? And so forth the
seemingly never-ending story goes in its pain and uplift. Perhaps we can find some
intellectually fascinating and morally important understandings among these complexities
through our reviews and analyses.
In one sense it seems we understand identity so well; in another it continues to
elude us. I would think that everyone at some point in their life has said that a certain
person is not x. In that negation we appear simultaneously to affirm that we know the
definition of [x], that we can define that category of identity. Yet, if asked to define it,
who can give a short and quick answer, even to categories of identity applied to oneself?
I cannot.
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The goal herein is to consider, as best as possible, what it means to consider DTC
DNA ancestry testing as an important and intense movement in ideas and actions among
humans that has (at least) all five of these aspects and components: science, technology,
industry, individual person (or personhood), and society. What are the epistemological
and ethical systems we might perceive in this movement? To cite just one particular
example, we might consider AncestryDNA’s “Genetic Communities™.” What groups of
human identity are included in and match these “Genetic Communities™”? Which are
excluded (or don’t match)? Are these delineations of communities adequately and
appropriately representative of our knowledges and ethics about community identities? If
so, how? If not, how not, and what ought we think about and do as a consequence of our
critiques? In sum, what are the problematics and the possibilities of the movement?

“Science” is often used as a near-synonym for truth. And not just any truth, but a
truth that is beyond human affairs, unchanging, and infallible. The power of scientific
ideas and scientifically-enabled creations, technology, is everywhere. To even begin to
count the number of scientific-technological devices that are supporting this endeavor
I’m undertaking right now would be an epically monstrous job. This efficiency of
science, its many tangible, usable ideas which are verified through its applications, make
it highly epistemologically persuasive as a good, or even the best, source of knowledge. It
has such widespread social acceptance (even among those who rebuke aspects of it).
In what follows, I will not try to argue that science is not or cannot be a good
source of knowledge, but rather that it is not unlimited but limited, not singular but plural,
not infallible but human and social, and not unchanging but rather almost the definition
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of change. Science, I agree and affirm in my research, can tell us much. But what can it?
What can it not? In particular, what can our DNA tell us and not? Does DNA science
really hold the key to understanding how it is that humanity passes its most important
traits and characteristics—our many interrelating identities—from generation to
generation?
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CHAPTER TWO
MODES OF CATEGORIZATION-CONCEPTUALIZATION:
DNA AND IDENTITY IN THE HUMANITIES AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
The theoretical insights available to us from humanist and artist thinkers past and
present, combined with those generated by social scientific researcher-theorists, are what
create the field into which we now enter, prepared to ready the ground for the upcoming
analyses of others’ and our own understandings, affirmations and misgivings, about
human identity from the perspective of the individual and in its many collective forms or
aspects. This chapter is focused on relaying the methodology of this research project and
communicating a review of the literature studied from the social sciences and from the
humanities.
The theories presented in the literature studied, or particular conceptualizations
that form parts or aspects of the literature’s theoretical and critical contents, will be
considered as sources for developing helpful modes for the analyses of the individualpersonal narratives-cases undertaken in Chapter Three. By modes, it is meant modes of
cognition, specifically modes of conceptualization, that will enable us to better and more
finely analyze this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement,
especially in terms of its inherent or present epistemologies and ethics. Some varieties of
these modes that are already suspected to be necessary components of the forthcoming
analytical endeavors are those to do with categorization broadly construed, and those to
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do with what human identity is and/or how it is meaningful and significant. By
developing helpful modes, it is meant that rather than aiming to summarize or describe
the theorists’ conceptualizations as might be good for encyclopedic or intellectualbiographic purposes, the defined purpose will be to find those aspects or constituent parts
of their theorizations that will help to orient us and give us the needed conceptual tools
(methods) to do the specific sort of analyses being undertaken in this dissertation. In short
form, the goal is to keep closely in mind the subject (movement) at hand, in as many of
its parts and aspects as possible, while surveying the literature.

Now—before proceeding into further discussion of research methodology, and
then immediately into the literature review—it is helpful once more to emphasize in
review and in brief some of the many momentous, historic contexts in which this seeking
of modes (theoretical-conceptual insights and methods) is occurring.
Thinking in terms of the history and philosophy of science within a Western
context, and within a global context, it cannot be said with accuracy that Aristotle was the
first to initiate a reflective or metaphysical conversation about categorization. What
comes to mind especially are the numerous human mythologies from cultures around the
world about cosmological and existential origins. In these mythologies so often the
pointing out and naming the constituent parts of the world-universe is an important
component and symbol not only of origins but of ongoing human affairs. That said, when
it comes to how Western philosophy in particular is so often taught, and therefore
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understood, it is Aristotle’s Categories15 that launches the curriculum. Also affirmed,
however, is that the Aristotelian ideas and ideals contained within Categories, and
incorporated throughout Aristotle’s works about how to divvy up the world, whether
through direct cause and effect or through its historicity’s amalgamation of a variety of
possible human ways of thinking about categorization into one personage’s oeuvre, have
had powerful effects through the threads of, especially Western, intellectual history up
through to the development of the contemporary sciences, including our focus here,
genetics. Regardless of origin, these conceptualizations (or perhaps rather, this modality
of conceptualization) are (is) crucial.
Charles Darwin, thinking over two millennia after Aristotle, certainly inherited or
was surrounded and infused by many aspects of these Western intellectual traditions
about categorization. Again, not pointing to Darwin’s work alone—his was but one step
in a series of human endeavors to understand the world in an empirical way, dependent
on the work done before his own, and dependent on the work that came after in its
recognition (and epistemological interdependence) that now makes him so notable as to
be impossible to ignore in this dissertation about human groupings—but looking to it as a
principal example and symbol of a change in cognition toward the evolutionary in
biological thinking.16
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Aristotle. “Categories.” The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton
University Press, 1984, pp. 3–24.
16
See, for example, Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. D. Appleton and company, 1860; The Descent of
Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 1871. 2d ed., rev. augm., D. Appleton, 1902 (note the full titles of
these two volumes, so often truncated); and, Darwin's letters and journals.
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But this change in intellectual orientations toward the evolutionary did not remain
within the realm of the natural sciences, within biology, alone. It spread to so many other
academic and popular non-academic discourses that will simply be labeled here, as it has
been before, as social Darwinism and it was especially manifest in those discourses
where the primary subject was human beings and how they might be differentiated from
one another and appropriately delineated into groups of varying kinds. Also, even within
biology, as has already been discussed within this dissertation, there was theorization
embedded with racist racializing, xenophobic ethnicizing, heterosexist gendering, and a
host of other epistemically and morally hierarchical taxonomies, and through all of this
runs, in its part, the influences of this social Darwinism.
In contemporary times, the capacity of humans for empirical knowledge about our
own DNA has led to high hopes about the possibility of—once and for all—determining
how it is that we should empirically (or otherwise, correctly) think about human beings as
being classified into different groups. Science, with its high esteem in society, is said to
rightly hold the key to unlocking this mystery about how we are the same, how we are
different, and our origins, too. It is hoped that by the end of this research project some
additional or improved ways to think about this deeply human mystery will have been
determined, or at least accentuated.
In thinking about philosophical conceptualizations of categorization that are
directly and intimately related to human identity, and therefore specifically relevant to
this critical endeavor, many will be introduced (and some described) throughout the
review of the literature from the humanities. To give an idea of the range of this
literature, among these (in no particular order other than their occurrence to me in this
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moment) are: the “cultural universals and particulars” of Kwasi Wiredu; the theory of
colonial identities that arises from the writings of Frantz Fanon; the particularly ethicsfocused recent writings of Kwame Anthony Appiah to do with identity in many of its
manifestations; bell hooks on social identities and representation; Charles Mills on the
metaphysics of race; Linda Martín Alcoff on visible identities and whiteness; Jean-Paul
Sartre in several of his ideations of what might be termed identity including his explicit
discussions of Black racial identity; Sara L. Gilman on the pathologizing of difference;
Angela Y. Davis on women, race, class, and more; and, several theories which have to do
with the relationship between self and community, person or personhood and community,
or other conceptualizations of the relationship between the individual and groups among
humans.
In thinking especially about these relationships among ideas of what individual
persons are and ideas about different kinds of human groups, much of the theoretical
literature with which I have the most familiarity comes from my studies of African
philosophies. Of particular importance in my studies for many years (and its cause for
coming first to mind when writing the list above) have been the works of Kwasi Wiredu,
on which I wrote a significant paper while completing my master’s degree. In this I
focused on Wiredu’s intertwining conceptions of person and community. Works
discussed in this paper included Philosophy and an African Culture17 and Cultural
Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective;18 also, by Kwame Gyekye, An Essay
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Wiredu, Kwasi. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Wiredu, Kwasi. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indiana University Press,
1997.
18
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on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme,19 and Tradition and
Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience;20 and, by D. A. Masolo,
African Philosophy in Search of Identity,21 and Self and Community in a Changing
World; 22 and, by Ivan Karp and Masolo African Philosophy as Cultural Inquiry.23 The
most important historical personage included was Anton Wilhelm Amo (1703-1759).
More recently I have begun to study the works of James Ogude, among which I suspect
will be especially relevant in this sort of analyses are Ubuntu and Personhood24 and
Ubuntu and the Reconstitution of Community.25 Another scholar working in this
philosophical space, and pushing its feminist bounds, is Nkiru Nzegwu, in Family
Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture,26 and the earlier but more
geographically focused, “Bypassing New York in Re-Presenting Eko: Production of
Space in a Nigerian City,”27 which is very helpful in thinking about the specificity of
conceptions of identity as they relate to relatively small geographic spaces such as cities.

Concepts and terminologies of culture, which I anticipate will be important in the
upcoming analyses about human identity and hopeful conclusions, are fascinating
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especially in this dissertation because of the very different, but perhaps similar, usages of
“culture” between the natural scientific and humanistic realms. In the natural sciences,
one thinks of a culture as something that is perhaps being grown in a petri dish. It is a
group of organisms that has been separated off from the rest in order to study it in greater
isolation and therefore with fewer variables. The growth of organisms is controlled by the
medium in which they are placed and by the control of other specified conditions. A
biological culture might be quite homogenous, consisting of, for example, many cells of
the same kind all from one organism and placed in a simple medium; or a culture might
be extremely heterogenous, constituted by organisms which differ on the order of
biological kingdoms, as in the case of a symbiotic culture of bacteria and yeast (i.e.,
“SCOBY”).
Culture in the arts and humanities is described by many of my first-year
undergraduate students (at least at the beginning of the semester) as consisting or being
defined by things like language, religion, holidays, cuisine, and clothing. They are
exactly right. This is an incomplete and not particularly theoretically oriented way of
defining culture, but they clearly have a good idea of what the quite abstract idea of
culture means when used in many everyday conversational contexts. And I will say also
here, to give good credit where it is due, that with the tiniest bit of prompting most
students provide far more interesting examples even on Day One, many of which would
not have occurred to me, and which have modified my understanding of culture in
contemporary society. One example of this is the magnitude and variety of the cultural
impacts of social media influencers far beyond their immediate audiences. (Thank you,
Students!)
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Culture of course can be understood as much more than just a list of typical
shared human characteristics and traits, or even customs, and I bring it up here primarily
because of this fascination about the dueling ways that this term-idea is employed in the
natural sciences and in the humanities. Culture in the humanistic sense is, like the petri
dish method, a way of attempting to comprehend a complex system that exists within so
many other complex systems. It presents such complicated, interesting, and important
problematics that even the most intensive of theoreticians such as Homi K. Bhaba have
sought to locate it.

From the exposition in Chapter One of some of the constituent parts and aspects
of this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement, it is clear that there
are many academic disciplinary elements involved in its operations, and that there are
likewise a number of academic disciplines and subdisciplines that are (or are potential)
fora for critiques of it. Here the focus is on literature of two main disciplinary types:
literature from the social sciences and literature from the humanities.
As described in the Introduction, early on in the research process it became
apparent that it was in the social scientific realm (academically speaking, at least) that the
majority of the discourses having to do with DTC DNA ancestry testing were taking
place. That was the call and purpose for including this literature from the social sciences
so extensively in a paper written while seeking a degree in the humanities. It was also
beckoning because, seeing that the most comprehensive and penetrating discourses on the
subject were taking place outside my disciplinary bounds, there seemed to be potential
space for contribution within the realm of the comparative humanities. I will also reiterate
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here that it was not solely this perceived lacuna that led me to the subject, but my
determination that additional critiques (from many perspectives, both academic and
otherwise) of this fast-paced movement are necessary and urgent.

This literature review begins with the social scientific and progresses toward the
realm of the humanities. This follows a methodology of progression through the literature
from those sources which most specifically address this scientific-technological-personalsocial movement towards those which do not (necessarily) address it at all, but through
their theoretical contents on human identity and/or the relationships between the personal
and the collective, provide vital components of the helpful cognitive modes being sought
through the study of this literature and through this review. The seeking of these modes is
to be held constantly in priority. The sociological is primarily emphasized within the
realm of the social sciences, and the philosophical is primarily emphasized within the
realm of the interdisciplinary humanities, but the literature being incorporated into this
research project is purposefully not limited to these disciplines, nor subdisciplines (as
they might be designated), alone.

A core discourse in the literature from the social sciences on this subjectmovement, and one that is so especially relevant in this research project, has to do with
studying and analyzing how it is that geneticists understand-conceptualize (biologically)
the relationship between human bodies-beings and race. Historically, as need constantly
be held in mind, the practices of the biological sciences have been far from free from the
structures of racism; rather, they have been embedded with them. In what are their most
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cruel and brutal forms these scientific racisms have contributed to the engineering of
eugenicist institutionalizations-imprisonments, sterilizations, and killings, and mass
genocides. So, the question put, more pointedly and urgently, is: Does this still-youngand-rapidly-growing science of genetics constitute yet another kind of scientific racism?
Should we be vigilantly on guard?
This survey of social scientific literature begins with some of the multiple ways
this problematic of scientific racisms is addressed therein. Some of the terminologies
include, for example: “racial essentialism,” the “molecularization of race,” and, the more
encompassing, “genomic logic of difference” and “biological determinism.” After
outlining these critiques, the review then proceeds to a consideration of social scientific
discourses that address additional problematics that arise from this scientifictechnological-industrial-personal-social movement.
The Human Genome Project (HGP), described at the outset of Chapter One, was
hoped and heralded by so many for its potential capacity to bring to an end the scientific
racisms of the past by providing, definitively, all of the answers we humans might want
to know about race in a true, biological sense. For many the hope was that raceracialization would be proven not to be scientifically valid, and that this would lead
humanity towards a new era wherein racism was decreased or even eliminated.
Despite this, there has been a resurgence in the use of race in genetics and in
scientific practice more generally. According to W. Carson Byrd and Matthew W.
Hughey in “Biological Determinism and Racial Essentialism: The Ideological Double
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Helix of Racial Inequality,” 28 there has also been an associated rise in the utilization of
biologically deterministic theories about race. They point to this as being especially the
case in pharmacogenomics, but also with regards to theories about human behavior and
many other attributes. They describe this as “racial essentialism,” and write about it in the
context of racial inequality and the dominance of essentialist and deterministic modes of
thought.
In “Return of the Race Myth?” 29 Osagie K. Obasogie discusses the technologies
of genetics, and the ways in which these technologies and procedures related to them can
be formative factors sustaining essentialist ideologies about race. Obasogie describes
these ideologies as construing race as a(n) (empirically verifiable) genetic category and
therefore also a physiologically-biologically causal factor in health outcomes and
specifically health disparities. There are health researchers who are looking for disparities
based on race. This is a very good thing, thinking in terms of efforts for health equity on a
societal scale built upon the provision of good air, water, food, shelter, education,
relationships, and so forth, which are unequally and unfairly distributed along racial and
other socioeconomic lines. (For a localized example of this approach, see the Louisville
Metro Health Equity Report in its most recent version.30) This becomes a problem, as
Obasogie indicates, when researchers looking for disparities based upon race assume or
otherwise have the belief that race is (correctly) a genetic category. In these instances,
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researchers looking for health disparities based upon race can and do sometimes conclude
that poorer health outcomes are tied to certain (racially-genetically inferior, though that
would not be stated as such) racial identities rather than looking into environmental
factors and social causes. An important monograph by Obasogie studied is Blinded by
Sight: Seeing Race through the Eyes of the Blind,31 which is found to be especially
interesting when considered in tandem with philosopher-epistemologist Linda Martín
Alcoff’s Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self .32 Conceptual relations perceived
between these two works will be considered in the humanistic literature review. Most
recently in 2018, Obasogie was coeditor, along with Marcy Darnovsky, of a volume
entitled Beyond Bioethics: Toward a New Biopolitics,33 which brings the ethical concerns
of these discourses to the forefront, and as fully engaged with contemporary politics. The
edited volume contains an introduction by Troy Duster (an early initiator and proponent
of these discourses, and related discourses about biology and difference, in the social
sciences)34 and an afterward by Patricia J. Williams.
Dorothy Roberts, in Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business ReCreate Race in the Twenty-First Century,35 published in 2011, provides an analysis of
genetic science and some of the technological-medical-industrial revolutions it has
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inspired, in terms of public-lay perceptions and the intertwining (as Roberts explains it)
histories of science and law with regards to race. (Roberts’s analyses of legal aspects of
this movement are interesting to consider in combination with Obasogie’s.) Roberts
structures the discourse of this monograph in part by following the history of African
Ancestry, Inc., beginning with its founding by Rick Kittle. (African Ancestry, as
described in Chapter One, specializes in mtDNA sequencing, also known as matrilineal,
genetic testing for African Americans seeking to know their lineages’ origins on the
African continent.) Roberts also follows the much longer history of changing
conceptualizations (biological and otherwise) of race and behaviors around race,
especially in the United States, and especially as they interface with law.36 An example of
work that has a similar analytical approach, but with an emphasis on medical applications
rather than legal and political frameworks, is Making the Mexican Diabetic: Race,
Science, and the Genetics of Inequality by Michael Montoya, also published in 2011.37
The sociological histories Roberts forms illustrate a legal construction of race as a
mechanism of the maintenance of white supremacist social structures, accompanied by
natural scientific practices that justified and encouraged, which has most recently found
revitalized form in a new science of race grounded in genetics; that is, another return of
scientific racism. Roberts’s analyses are persuasive, and the conclusions and
consequences of those analyses are powerful. Earlier works by Roberts (among many
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others) that are related include “The Genetic Tie” 38 in 1995, and Black Body: Race,
Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty in 1999.39 Recently, there is an article
coauthored by Roberts and Oliver Rollins, “Why Sociology Matters to Race and
Biosocial Science,” 40 which argues the necessity of many of the sociological studies and
theories being addressed in this dissertation, among others, given the increase in interest
and usage of models of science as biosocial. Roberts and Rollins describe both the
innovations of sociologists in thinking about how the biological and the social are
interrelated, and concerns about how some models reinforce racisms and subsequently
perpetuate injustices.
This problematic of scientific racism is analyzed by Duana Fullwiley, but from a
different and more scientific laboratory-oriented perspective, and with such elegant
descriptors as the “molecularization of race”41 and “the enculturated gene.”42 Fullwiley
expresses concern for the “biological reification” of health outcome inequalities as a
consequence of this geneticizing of race (describing race and racial categories in genetic
terms), that is, making health outcomes in fact more dependent on race rather than less so
through mistaking the nature of race, or rather, having an incorrect conceptualization of
what race is.

38

Roberts, Dorothy E. “The Genetic Tie.” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 62, no. 1, 1995, pp.
209–73.
39
Roberts, Dorothy E. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty. First
Vintage books edition, Vintage Books, 1999.
40
Roberts, Dorothy E., and Oliver Rollins. “Why Sociology Matters to Race and Biosocial Science.”
Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 1, 2020, pp. 195–214.
41
Fullwiley, Duana. “The Molecularization of Race: Institutionalizing Human Difference in
Pharmacogenetics Practice.” Science as Culture, vol. 16, no. 1, Mar. 2007, pp. 1–30.
42
Fullwiley, Duana. The Enculturated Gene: Sickle Cell Health Politics and Biological Difference in West
Africa. 2017.

99

Though their contributions should not to be conflated—the social scientists’ work
being reviewed now contain significantly varying descriptions and conceptualizations—
there are several theoretical iterations of this sort in the literature which in combination
might bring greater depth to a comprehension of this scientific-technological-industrialpersonal-social movement: Abu El-Haj refers to this process similarly as “genetic
reinscription”43; Jeremy Freese and Sara Shostak as “geneticization”44; Troy Duster as
“molecular reinscription”45; and, Alondra Nelson as the “geneticization of race.”46 Each
of these theoretical angles provides its own modal advantages, to be kept in mind for
future analyses.
Fullwiley’s method (in the research reported in her 2007 article), is to focus
analytical attention on seeking to understand the manner in which geneticists have
utilized the language-concepts of their science to describe race. Fullwiley’s interviews,
and subsequent analysis of those interviews, show that very often medical researchers’
language usage in laboratory setting reflects their cognitive (social) biases about race.
Fullwiley presents further interrelated research and analyses in “Can DNA ‘Witness’
Race?: Forensic Uses of an Imperfect Ancestry Testing Technology” in 2011,47 and “The
‘Contemporary Synthesis’: When Politically Inclusive Genomic Science Relies on
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Biological Notions of Race” in 2014.48 Fullwiley’s attention, as related to this movement
being researched herein, appears to move from the specificity of the laboratory to more
encompassing concerns related to the relationships between scientific (specifically,
genetics) practices and political power. Also helpful in understanding what the
sociological literature has to offer in terms of studies of scientists regarding human
difference, still focused on race but expanding outside the bounds of genetics into science
more broadly is, The Nature of Race: How Scientists Think and Teach about Human
Difference, by Ann Morning.49 Joan H. Fujimura has also written critically over a
significant period of time about scientific practices with regards to knowledge
production, including, for example, in “Authorizing Knowledge in Science and
Anthropology,” in 1998,50 and “Staying the Course: On the Value of Social Studies of
Science in Resistance to the ‘Post‐Truth’ Movement,” in 2019.51 Perhaps especially
helpful in the analytical applications of this research will be an article coauthored by
Fujimura with Ramya Rajagopalan. “Different Differences: The Use of ‘Genetic
Ancestry’ versus Race in Biomedical Human Genetic Research.”52
Freese and Shostak provide a meta-discourse of the scope of social science
literature on genetics in terms of two principal endeavors. Firstly, they say that social
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scientists study genetics to understand the possible role and importance of the genome’s
influence on social outcomes and heritability. This variety of social scientific work (often
anthropological or archaeological) is undertaken primarily in the study of large-scale
social phenomena such as the movement and changing of societies over great stretches of
time and space, and its aim is to improve “estimates of effects of environmental causes”
of social phenomena,53 rather than genetic causes. In sum, in this first variety of social
scientific endeavor described by Freese and Shostak, the aim is to understand how it is
that the knowledge gained from genetic science should properly affect, and not affect,
social scientific theories about how humanity has changed over very long periods of time.
The second variety of social scientific endeavor described by Freese and Shostak
aims to ascertain the social implications of the theory and practice of genetics. As
mentioned previously, they discuss “geneticization” and its implications,54 and also
“medicalization,” which has a parallel definition but applied particularly to the making of
medical categories from genetic data, as in pharmacogenomics. In this they focus on
perspectives of the consumer-patient-public. Public opinion surveys about genetics are
introduced,55 and it is stated that a significant majority of respondents thought genetics to
be important with regards to illness (90%), and “success in life” (two-thirds). Particularly
fascinating is Freese and Shostak’s discussion of “biosociality.”56 It seems to me in
retrospect an excellent predictor of what was to come, which was the formation of new
collective group identities based on the mutual sharing of certain genetic traits. They
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were publishing in 2009; I think now about how there are so many of these (genetic)
communities out there, aggregating memberships and communicating through social
media.
Additional and more recent examples of studies from the social sciences which
address public perceptions of genetic determinism and racial essentialism, include
Jennifer Hochschild and Maya Sen, “Genetic Determinism, Technology Optimism, and
Race: Views of the American Public,” published in 2015,57 and Şule Yaylaci, Wendy D.
Roth, and Kaitlyn Jaffe, “Measuring Racial Essentialism in the Genomic Era: The
Genetic Essentialism Scale for Race (GESR),” published in 2019.58 Considering some of
the consequences of the widespread acceptance or estimation of the objectivity of genetic
science, Ruha Benjamin studies and writes about formations of public policies crafted in
reaction to such ideologies in “The Emperor’s New Genes: Science, Public Policy, and
the Allure of Objectivity.”59
Returning attention to the literature which addresses aspects of this movement
from the perspectives of the provider-geneticist-specialist (those that take form in
laboratory and/or commercial settings), rather than the consumer-patient-public, Duana
Fullwiley’s extensive fieldwork in genetics research laboratories previously mentioned—
learning about the people, technologies, and processes therein—resulted in conclusions
about what sorts of logic were being used in the determination of racial categories, and
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how people are distributed among those categories. What Fullwiley determined was that
those researchers, at best, employed unclear (and previously unrecorded) socially biased
definitions of race in the course of their research, and that this did necessarily affect the
outcomes of their research. Fullwiley provides several examples of some apparently unor semiconscious notions of biological race present in the ideology of some genetic
researchers that point to their intellectual and emotional attachments to the ideas, whether
explicitly stated or not. One interviewee, while explaining the difficulties of drawing
geographic boundaries among racial groups, maintains that the groups determined by
scientific method do correspond with “popular notions.” Another researcher, similarly,
trying to explain why the debate is so complicated, resorts to utterances such as “I’m just
of the belief,” and, finally, “sure of it.”60
A similar sort of research into what’s going on in genetics laboratories, but
utilizing a very different methodology, is presented in Catherine Lee’s “‘Race’ and
‘Ethnicity’ in Biomedical Research: How Do Scientists Construct and Explain
Differences in Health?”61 In this article, Catherine Lee presents a survey of 204
biomedical research articles and concludes that while researchers utilize and rely on
categories of race and ethnicity significantly in their research, they rarely define race nor
ethnicity nor state how they draw boundaries among the various races and ethnicities that
they distinguish. This appears to affirm and coincide with Fullwiley’s previously
described conclusions about the researcher’s usage of racial (and ethnic) terminologies in
uncertain and unstated ways.
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Examining this usage of racial categories in genetic research in yet another way,
Sandra Soo-Jin Lee in “The Biobank as Political Artifact: The Struggle over Race in
Categorizing Genetic Difference”62 studies the structures of the some major (huge-global)
databases utilized by genetics researchers to store the information derived from genetic
sequencing. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee’s focus is on, as the title indicates, studying these
databases (biobanks) as political artifacts, objects created by humans that live-participate
in large communities and that therefore contain political meaning. Lee concludes that the
categorization schema employed in the databases studied arise from an intricate
combination of scientific and sociohistorical factors, and that there are logical
incoherencies in these combinations. Some incoherencies of this sort—of the mixed use
of multiple logics of difference, biological and sociohistorical—were examined
previously by Lee as part of an interdisciplinary group of concerned faculty from
Stanford University, with a focus on the ethics of these practices and the development of
better guidelines for “characterizing difference” in human genetics.63
An overview of a good portion of these discourses is available in the helpful and
concise volume edited by Sheldon Krimsky and Kathleen Sloan, Race and the Genetic
Revolution: Science, Myth, and Culture,64 which contains essays by a number of the
scholars reviewed herein. Also, to note Krimsky’s significant and early contributions in
particular, there is, for example, published in 1982, Genetic Alchemy: The Social History

62

Lee, Sandra Soo-Jin. “The Biobank as Political Artifact: The Struggle over Race in Categorizing Genetic
Difference.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 661, no. 1, Sept.
2015, pp. 143–59.
63
Lee, Sandra, et al. “The Ethics of Characterizing Difference: Guiding Principles on Using Racial
Categories in Human Genetics.” Genome Biology, vol. 9, no. 7, 2008, p. 404.
64
Krimsky, Sheldon., and Kathleen Sloan, editors. Race and the Genetic Revolution: Science, Myth, and
Culture. Columbia University Press, 2011.

105

of the Recombinant DNA Controversy65 and, in 1991, Biotechnics & Society: The Rise of
Industrial Genetics.66
Here I will interject a brief intermission into this literature review, to discuss
something that comes to mind that is related, and that has influenced many others and my
own thinking about genetics-related matters in the past couple years. Over the course of
the past two years, almost exactly, as I have done research for this dissertation, and as I
write this particular paragraph right now in February 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic has
structured life for everyone in so many ways, and surely changed its structure deeply for
many of us. A relatively superficial aspect of the major changes to my schedule in the
first few months of (awareness of) the pandemic was that I would listen to the Kentucky
governor’s daily “Team Kentucky” announcements, in which he and his staff including
top public health officials would provide guidance for individuals, for businesses, and so
forth. In these video announcements they would also provide scientific data—lots of
charts and graphs—as evidence to support these public health measures. Just after one of
these announcements, I recorded my thoughts about how racial categories were being
used in some of these charts and graphs. I was writing my comprehensive exam at the
time, so my mind was very much on the subject matter of this dissertation (though not its
exact focus, as it has taken and changed form over the course of research).
To quote my writing from April 9, 2020, “Right now, racial categories have
begun to be employed to analyze COVID-19 infection, hospitalization, recuperation, and
mortality rates. As I listen to the governor's daily announcement, it is evident he thinks
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that racially defined statistics on this pandemic are significant, or at least he thinks that
his constituents think so, but he does not state why. Nor, unsurprisingly, does he define
what is meant by race in this instance, nor justify why the particular (Census-based)
taxonomy of racial classification being used is suitable for this purpose. And, it is entirely
unclear whether the racial statistics are thought important due to genetic differentiation
among the defined races, varying socioeconomic circumstances among the defined races
and subsequently access to good living conditions and healthcare, or some other
biological or social factor or factors.”
My great concern in writing this then, which has already been written about again
this review as it is shared similarly in the sociological literature, is that poorer health
outcomes charted along racial lines (in that particular instance, with regards to COVID19), especially in a culture such as the one that I live in, are very likely to be interpreted
by many white people as due the physical-genetic inferiority of all other races as
compared to white. That is, I know that the data won’t be interpreted by many white
people here (in Kentucky, as was the audience of these messages) to mean that there are
great historical reasons that all non-white communities at large have access to lesser
resources for a good, healthful life than white communities here, but rather because the
members of those communities and those communities are inherently-biologicallygenetically-essentially inferior. This is still so very much a part of the white culture here.
Scientific racisms—long pronounced to be pseudosciences in so many academic and nonacademic circles—still circulate in so much white parlance, often communicated
ambiguously with a half-joking tone and a half-knowing look. Combine this with the
practical concern that, so long as this remains so much an insistent aspect of white culture
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here, there cannot be a sufficient scale of political will to change the necessary
governmental and institutional (including industrial-corporate) systems in such a way that
reparations might even be attempted to rectify the ongoing failures in these aspects of
social justice.
Freese and Shostak’s studies, in addition to including the previously described
surveys on public opinions about (the power of) genetics, also describe problematics that
have to do with how genetics is and might be utilized on a societal scale. Their concerns
relate to those described earlier about the possibility of genetics science being utilized as
a tool in those actions which comprise the greatest human atrocities. This is part of a
greater discourse in the social scientific literature about genetics-based eugenics. It is
known that eugenics, a system for the prevention of procreation and sometimes murder of
individual humans on the basis of certain (supposedly) undesirable characteristics for the
(supposed) greater good of a whole population, took place in many societal-scale forms
during twentieth century. As these discourses point out, it is now worrisome whether this
(newly racially and otherwise deterministic) science-technology of genetic ancestry
testing is creating or will enable twenty-first century manifestations of eugenics as well.
The possibility of future genetics-based eugenics practices and also genocides is
far from outside the public imagination. I would argue, based upon artistic creations, for
example prominent movements in apocalyptic literature and film, that it is very much a
part of what many people think and are concerned about. This is not the space to discuss
that here, other than to say that I think that the fear is real for many; but that at the same
time, there are probably many people who would simultaneously think it a stretch to say
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that there is some connection between commonplace (for those with access) sorts of
genetics testing, and eugenics.
Freese and Shostak argue otherwise. They analyze this in terms of the possibility
that women might be forced to terminate pregnancies based on prenatal testing for
genetic abnormalities that could (probabilistically) lead to significant health problems in
the future. This sort of testing is commonplace for most pregnant persons in the United
States today who have good health insurance coverage and the means to access and
utilize it, but, what if the tests were mandated? Then, in turn, what if a legal authority or
perhaps a change in health insurance guidelines, mandated or made it highly determined
that, if the tests turn out a certain way, that the pregnancy be terminated (or not, as is
another instance to consider)? Freese and Shostak conclude that the forced prohibition or
limitation of the reproduction of certain populations, eugenics, is not an unrealistic
problematic consequence of the congruence of these various technologies and ideas that
are the “molecularization of race.” This is yet another theoretical conception of how
scientific racism is or can be a part of genetics that will be helpful to recall during future
analytical work.
Some other portions of this discourse (or set of discourses) in the social sciences
about the problematics of genetics testing with regards to eugenics, both follow and long
precede the analyses in the 2009 article by Freese and Shostak, “Genetics and Social
Inquiry,” described herein. Some of the breadth of these discourses is displayed in the
2013 article by Jo C. Phelan, et al., “The Genomic Revolution and Beliefs about Essential
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Racial Differences: A Backdoor to Eugenics?”67 In this article Phelan alongside Bruce G.
Link and Naumi M. Feldman reflect back on and analyze Troy Duster’s 1990
monograph, Backdoor to Eugenics, and discuss their research done in an effort to test
Duster’s premises, which they affirm.68
Issues regarding the broader epistemic and practical powers of scientific
authorities are raised in the social scientific literature in “Race, Genes, Power” by Duana
Fullwiley” 69 and “Ambiguity and Scientific Authority: Population Classification in
Genomic Science” by Aaron Panofsky and Catherine Bliss.70 In the former, Fullwiley
argues that race is a system of categorization that is “rarely neutral.” This is a broadranging article which brings together several longstanding discourses and incorporates
examples beginning with the relations between the lynchings, public and publicized
tortures and murders of Black persons in the United States not so long ago, contemporary
violence, and the Black Lives Matter movements; and geographically ranging around the
globe from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to contemporary living
conditions of several North American indigenous populations, including the Havasupai
and the Pima. Utilizing such examples, Fullwiley demonstrates the negative utility of race
towards members of oppressed groups. (An argument related to this might be, even if
genetics is an indicator of race, there is no such thing as a socially neutral conception of a
race. All conceptions of race, whether they involve biology or not, also involve social
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factors. This is not Fullwiley’s argument, but rather one that I think can be drawn from it,
if only to be utilized in conversation with stubborn believers in biological race, and as a
part of a bigger discourse about the realities and functions of race in life.)

Now the survey will begin to proceed through a series of examples from the social
scientific literature that demonstrate some of the breadth and depth of the concerns
exhibited within it. Some of these concerns and problems directly interrelate with the
preceding discussion of scientific racism in genetics, and some extend into other realms
of problematics of human identity as related to genetics. The focus, per the form of this
research project, is on epistemological and ethical problematics researched and analyzed.
The examples provided from the literature included analyses of concerns related to the
proclaimed broad health and social benefits of genetic testing, genetic-genealogical
research and its consequences in family definition, broader historical research, law
enforcement utilization of genetic databanks, data privacy, specific usages by those
working both for and against the dismantling of unjust structures in society, and finally,
what has been called the “marketization of identity politics” by Catherine Bliss.71
The proclaimed health and social benefits of genetic ancestry testing for
consumers are numerous. In personalized medicine and pharmacogenomics, from its
initiation as a medical and scientific practice, the assumption was that race is a pertinent
factor in the administration of medical treatments. A foundational example provided in
many instances in the literature (both from the social sciences and from philosophy of
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science) is that of BiDil, which received the United States Food and Drug
Administration’s (US FDA) first approval for a race specific pharmaceutical application
in 2005. BiDil is still marketed along these lines. The current headline phrasing is, “BiDil
is the only heart failure medicine specifically indicated for self-identified African
American patients.”72 There are also untold number of other kinds of personalized’ health
services—both explicitly medical and otherwise—being offered on the basis of genetic
testing services (including DTC services), such as nutritional advice and personal
exercise training.73
With regards to social benefits, genetic testing is also supposed to aid, and often
does aid, in the location of biological family members. But I think it has yet to be seen, or
may never be known, whether tales of celebration or tales of woe are more commonplace
at the conclusion of such pursuits. Having followed many non-academic discourses on
this subject over the last few years as well, I can attest to no great trend in one direction
nor the other (that said, of course the most dramatic tales are told the most). Sandra SooJin Lee discusses similar utilizing conceptions of play and its risks and benefits in “Race,
Risk, and Recreation in Personal Genomics: The Limits of Play.”74
The identification of (presumed dangerous) persons suspected to have committed
crimes is also often purported to be a social advantage of this sort of testing. Profiling
based on DNA samples which estimate phenotype are being used in police investigations
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today, as has been examined by Dorothy Roberts. Famously, long cold police cases are
being solved in part due to the enormous databases created by direct-to-consumer testing
companies, and some of the star genetic genealogists who frequent them and ultimately
influence criminal and judicial proceedings. In the critical examinations of Dorothy
Roberts, the prognosis for this usage of genetic information is quite dire; its investigative
(and predictive) usage is entrenched with racially biased ideologies and data sets. This is
the same sort of issue that has come up in recent years on the teaching front in academia,
with questions of a similar sort being raised about software used to proctor and monitor
student exams in order to prevent cheating. This variety of software has repeatedly been
called into questions, and in many cases universities and other institutions of higher
learning have suspended its usage due to proven or suspected racial biases against Black
and Brown students, and other students with relatively darker skin tones and also certain
culturally influenced stylings and habits of movement.
Alondra Nelson in The Social Life of DNA, previously introduced in this review,
examines the use of genetic testing, both for familial and racial identification purposes, as
a part of large-scale efforts for social justice. She gives as examples Las Abuelas de Plazo
de Mayo who were separated from their grandchildren during the so-called National
Reorganization Process in Argentina between 1976 and 1983, a research study of an
African burial ground in New York City in the 1990s, and recent and contemporary legal
actions in the United States for reparations in restitution for the enslavement of African
and African American persons.
These sorts of examples, provided by sociologists such as Nelson and other social
theorists, I must admit, have provided such challenge to my initial inclinations of near
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total skepticism and pessimism about this movement. Although there are so many living
and grave concerns about the personal and social aspects of this movement made possible
by science, technology, and industry, examples such as these show the great actual and
possible positivity in it as well. Insofar as this is not the moment to discuss such
consequences (these will come up again in Chapters Three and Four), I will be brief and
only say that: While I at first came to this subject with such great and intense skepticism
that I did not see much possible good in it, or at least so much potential harm that the
good was overwhelmed, Alondra Nelson in particular provided me with great fodder for
thinking about some of its positive impacts and potential as a powerful force of change
towards social justice ends. I should also state here that this is not to say that the primary
lessons I learned from Nelson weren’t critical in nature, they were, but it is to affirm that
this monograph was particularly inspirational to me in shaping my purposes and aims at
the end of this research. The memorable and meaningful main title’s “social life” conveys
a lot. Nelson’s work reckons with DNA as it usually is not—as an idea generated by
social beings in a social society and therefore bursting with social content and meaning,
and consequences. Earlier articles by Nelson leading up to the monograph, very relevant
to this research also, include, “Bio Science: Genetic Genealogy Testing and the Pursuit of
African Ancestry” in 2008,75 and “GeneTiC AnCesTry TesTing As An eThniC opTion”
in 2014.76
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Regarding familial relations and genealogical research being aided by DTC
genetic testing, Catherine Lee and Torsten H. Voigt in “DNA Testing for Family
Reunification and the Limits of Biological Truth” conclude that genetic information is
insufficient in the defining of familial bonds, and that one of the limits of biological truth
is that, in this instance, it is bounded by the social.77
A related arena of endeavor that is often touted to benefit from ancestry DNA
testing is historical research that incorporate the genetic-genealogical information. For
example, historical research in the United States related to the history of Black families
and communities has been energized by genetic research. Surely among the most-well
known examples of this have to do with the lineages of Sally Hemmings and Thomas
Jefferson. This has spawned so many conversations both academic and far more
widespread, many of great value.
Regarding law enforcement utilization of predictive technologies developed from
genetic testing services focused on phenotype, Fullwiley in “Can DNA ‘Witness’ Race?:
Forensic Uses of an Imperfect Ancestry Testing Technology,”78 breaks down a variety of
police investigation software applications that are used to create computer-generated
images of suspects based on DNA evidence found at crime scenes, when there are no
exact or near-familial matches in databases to which they have access. That is, if police
have DNA evidence from a crime scene and they cannot determine exactly who it is
through personal identification methods (sometimes called “DNA fingerprinting”), then
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they can turn to this sort of software to generate a purportedly phenotypically correct
image of that suspect, along with a list of features, at the top of which, coming only after
“Gender,” is “Race.” As might be suspected, Fullwiley is highly critical of many of the
social aspects of race incorporated into the generation of these phenotypical images and
profiles.
Another aspect of this movement critiqued in the social scientific literature has to
do with the privacy of this genetic data, as collected into the sorts of databases previously
discussed and accessible by so many means and to so many parties. For instance,
Elizabeth E. Joh’s concern with health and other personal data privacy issues as related to
genetics is evident in a significant series of publications over a span of years. For
example, in “Reclaiming ‘Abandoned’ DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic
Privacy,”79 Joh discusses how the right to be protected from unlawful search and seizure
is proving porous in legal decisions regarding consumers’ rights to keep private their own
genetic information and material, especially for law enforcement purposes. This is
discourse continued by Joh in, “Your ‘Abandoned’ DNA: Up for Grabs by the Police?,”80
“DNA Theft: Your Genetic Information at Risk,” and more recently in a 2019 New York
Times op-ed, “Want to See My Genes? Get a Warrant.”81
Kim TallBear, in Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise
of Genetic Science,82 explores the complex and treacherous interrelationships between
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Native American conceptions of identity and group membership, and genetic researchers’
conceptions of Native American identity. One example of this that was discussed
intensely over a few years, as US presidential electoral politics fluctuated wildly per
usual in its focus, was that of Elizabeth Warren’s usage of a genetic ancestry test in order
to (fallaciously) demonstrate that she had Native American ancestry as she had claimed
in the past due to familial history. Her reactions to the test results, and the reactions of
Native American national and other social leaders in the United States to the results of
her test, were numerous and did influence political discourses—albeit relatively briefly—
on a national-international scale.83
TallBear’s illustrations and conceptualizations of DNA and identity in Native
American DNA, and her other writings leading up to and around the time of that
monograph’s publication,84 were highly influential (in a similar degree as Alondra
Nelson’s and Dorothy Roberts’s, though in very different ways) in my evolving
understanding of what all the idea of DNA (and identity, too) encompasses as I have gone
through the process of research and study in the writing of this dissertation, as gained
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through reading social scientific literature. Some of the particular illustrations and
arguments from TallBear’s “indigenous, feminist approach” will be utilized as a part of
of the discussion of political aspects and ramifications in Chapter Four. Also relevant is
TallBear’s joint work with Jenny Reardon, “‘Your DNA Is Our History’: Genomics,
Anthropology, and the Construction of Whiteness as Property,”85 as well as TallBear’s
contribution to a Routledge handbook, “The Emergence, Politics, and Marketplace of
Native American DNA.”86 TallBear’s most recent work is burning in my intellectual cue,
but it is doubtful that I will be able to take in any meaningful portion of it in order to
incorporate it before the end of this phase of my research on this subject (though I know
it could be utilized and should be).87 Framing their argument in terms of
antireductionism, which is well in line with the approach and methodology of TallBear,
Alyssa C. Bader and Ripan S. Malhi focus on a particular family in “Case Study on
Ancestry Estimation in an Alaskan Native Family: Identity and Safeguards against
Reductionism,”88 to illustrate a number of localized and generalized concerns about the
identification of self and others in the context of community.
Studying white nationalism, Aaron Panofsky and Joan Donovan, in “Genetic
Ancestry Testing among White Nationalists: From Identity Repair to Citizen Science,”89
study the reactions of white nationalists in an online forum when they receive what they
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conceive to be unsettling news in the result of a DNA ancestry test. Their analysis culls
evidence from user posts on a white nationalist website. Their work concludes that often
it is the emotional reactions of the test-takers which drive what they make of genetic
ancestry testing, that is, whether they find it to be valid or not. If test-takers believed the
results that they received confirmed that which they already thought to be the case
(whiteness and in tandem supremacy), then test takers tended towards assessing the
science-technology as valid. If test-takers believed that the results that they received
contradicted what they already thought to be the case (whiteness and in tandem
supremacy), then test takers tended towards assessing the science-technology as invalid.
Another fascinating study which provides an analysis of this movement at the
level of discourse and incorporating contemporary political considerations about white
nationalism-supremacy, is “Discord Over DNA: Ideological Responses to Scientific
Communication about Genes and Race,”90 by Alexandre Morin-Chassé, Elizabeth Suhay,
and Toby E. Jayaratne. Other research in the last few years about the reactions of and
impacts on consumer-test-takers with regards to racial and ethnic self-identification
include that of Wendy D. Roth and Biorn Ivemark in “Genetic Options: The Impact of
Genetic Ancestry Testing on Consumers’ Racial and Ethnic Identities,”91 and Janet K.
Shim, Sonia Rab Alam, and Bradley E. Aouizerat in “Knowing Something versus Feeling
Different: The Effects and Non-Effects of Genetic Ancestry on Racial Identity.”92
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The “marketization of identity” in DTC DNA ancestry testing is at odds with
“existing sociocultural and humanist ways of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ racial identity in
society.”93 The exposure of concepts of group identity to the tremendous forces of
financial and other economic markets is a significant concern for many. How might
changes in social groupings over the shorter and the longer term be affected by the
impact of data input from the genetic ancestry testing industry? In 2006, in the “The
Science and Business of Genetic Ancestry Testing,”94 Deborah A. Bolnick, et al. (i.e.,
Richard S. Cooper, Troy Duster, Duana Fullwiley, Jonathan Kahn, Jay S. Kaufman,
Jonathan Marks, Ann Morning, Alondra Nelson, Pilar Ossorio, Kim TallBear, Jenny
Reardon, and Susan M. Reverby) jointly present their concerns and analyses related to
the marketization of identity, and there is additionally a 2008 collection edited by Barbara
A. Koenig, Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, and Sarah S. Richardson, Revisiting Race in a Genomic
Age,95 on race in genetics that contains a number of sociological analyses on the business
and marketing of DTC ancestry tests, particularly with regard to the marketization of
racial identity.
Sociocultural and humanist ways of understanding race are destabilized and, at
times, displaced by the forces of this marketization of identity or marketization of identity
politics. In addition to the ongoing epistemic privilege of science generally as an arbiter
of knowledge, DNA and genetic research in particular seem to a hold a fascination in the
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public imagination as evidenced by the numerous artifacts of culture with it as a theme. It
is also used in medicine, in legal affairs, in the family, and so many other spheres, which
have been outlined: crucial realms of life in which ones expects or at least hopes that the
rules of evidence will be in order. I do not think that the rules of evidence are in order,
and that they are well in conflict with “sociocultural and humanist ways of ‘knowing’ and
‘doing’ racial identity,” and other forms of human social identity, “in society.”
In “The Emergence, Politics, and Marketplace of Native American DNA,”96 Kim
TallBear discusses the extraordinary popularity of genetic narratives, such as that
generated by Spencer Wells. These made-for-streaming popular documentaries make so
many of the errors (which have been pointed out by humanists and social scientists alike),
and in doing so heavily rely on samples of DNA from “pure” (Wells frequently uses
terminologies of “purity” and similar) indigenous populations around the world. In sum,
Wells does not hesitate to use concepts of ethnic or racial purity in the narratives of
ancestry he creates nor in his explanations of them. And the episodic shows and films are
popular. The forces of the marketplace are not correcting this error, and the marketization
continues.
In the edited volume, Beyond Bioethics: Toward a New Biopolitics, published in
2018,97 Osagie K. Obasogie and Marcy Darnovsky organize a series of contributions by a
group of scholars from a variety of disciplines, including the humanities and the sciences,
social and natural. It contains three parts, one of which is on emerging biotechnologies, in
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which genomic technology in particular accounts for a few chapters. This volume is
exciting in its interdisciplinarity, and it lends encouragement with regards to the
possibility of containing or redirecting the “molecularization of race” so that it might not
reinforce ideologies that are harmful to so many. As mentioned previously, I have
become highly interested in Obasogie’s research and theoretical approaches, both the
earlier work on how race is perceived by those who do not have vision, and the more
recent work that is a part of discourses that encompass a greater variety of social and
political critiques such as those contained in this collection.

Genetic testing whether for the purposes of ancestry exploration, genealogical
research, familial reunion, criminal investigation, civil legal matters, pharmacogenomic
research, or any other purpose, largely takes the same form, and can be construed
(simply) in terms of four steps. Firstly, as described in greater detail in Chapter One, a
sample is donated or procured from the body of the person being tested (in the form of
tissue samples, blood samples, hair samples, saliva samples, in utero samples, and so
forth, depending on the kind of test or research being undertaken). Secondly, DNA is
extracted from the sample. Thirdly, the extracted DNA is tested for various
polymorphisms (polymorphisms are genetic variations) according to the sort of research
being undertaken (rarely is all the DNA sequenced). Fourthly, the data about
polymorphisms present in the DNA extracted from the sample are compared to a
database or databases of information about polymorphism frequencies in different
populations in order to determine their relative frequencies. Different arrays of
polymorphisms are used as a basis of comparison depending upon whether the purpose of
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the test is to learn information about ancestry, disease probabilities, risks for certain
medications, individual identification for criminal investigation purposes, and so forth.
In genetic ancestry testing these arrays of polymorphisms are often described as
ancestry informative markers (AIMs). AIMs are used (as a concept) in mtDNA (maternal
lineage), Y-DNA (paternal lineage), and all-chromosome DNA ancestry testing. AIMs
are also associated with the varying and various types of haplogroups (described in
Chapter One). All-chromosome AIMs testing is publicized by some companies, such as
23andMe, as being more accurate in its overall depiction of biogeographical ancestry, but
in it still arises many problematics, though of different sorts than mtDNA and Ychromosome based tests. In the social scientific literature, Mark Shriver and Rick A.
Kittles, for example, in “Genetic Ancestry and the Search for Personalized Genetic
Histories” explore these issues as early as 2004.98 (This is the same Rick Kittles who was
the founder of African Ancestry, Inc.) Also related is Sarah Tishkoff’s “Exploring
Genomic Studies in Africa,” 2011.99 Tishkoff’s research in particular will be of value in
analysis in the next chapter that addresses some specific problematics of identifying
African ancestries via genetic means.

These arrays of polymorphisms that are used as bases of comparison are
determined by research undertaken on persons who are members of target populations
who are known or presumed to be representative of those groupings (examples: ancestral,
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medical, or criminal). For example, if a research study is focused on prostate cancer, then
polymorphisms hypothesized as being related to prostate cancer would be tested for in
research participants, then the research participants’ polymorphisms would be compared
to the corresponding genetic sequences in the target population, in this instance persons
who have been diagnosed with prostate cancer in its various stages or predecessor
conditions.
In parallel, if a genetic test is taken to determine an individual's ancestry, then
polymorphisms hypothesized as being related to ancestry (AIMs) are tested, and
individual test-takers AIMs are compared to the (huge databases of) AIMs of target
populations, in this case an array of persons who are thought to have a defined diversity
of geographic origins: some wholly African in origin, some wholly (indigenous)
American in origin, some wholly Asian in origin, some wholly Irish in origin (the
geographic scales vary widely), and so forth. One important note, geographic designators
of identity are not the only types of identificatory descriptors utilized in genetic ancestry
testing; this simplified example has been given here for clarity’s sake, but it remains to be
analyzed and reflected upon how complex the intersections are among the various forms
of (social) identity used as descriptors in DNA ancestry testing.
Additionally, to complicate a study of how race is and has been used in genetic
research, is the long list of terms denoting concepts that coincide exactly or partially with
ideas of race, or are often mistakenly confused or conflated with ideas of race. This
variety includes ethnicity or ethnic group, heritage, descent, population or subpopulation,
continental group, geographic origin, and ancestry; also, phenotype groups (referring to
physical appearance), haplotype groups (haplogroups), taxonomic classifications, and
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(historically) subspecies. All of these terms have been used not just in scientific language
broadly speaking, but in medical terminology in particular.
For many persons in everyday social contexts (and certainly in the social worlds
that I largely live in), racial classification is an unproblematic practice. To say, “that
person is Black” or “this person is white” (or alternatively, “that person is AfricanAmerican” or “this person is Caucasian”) appears to many to be a simple descriptive
practice. When we get a driver’s license renewed, apply to a university, go to the doctor,
or undertake any number of normal life activities, we are often asked to complete a form
or questionnaire which prompts us to indicate or our race. The discrete checkboxes
reinforce the idea that races are discrete categories of persons that are uncomplicated.
Even the idea that a person might be “interracial” or “mixed” again indicates that races
are separate categories of persons that can sometimes be combined and co-indicate
ideologies of racial purity. There is an essentialism inherent in this sort of usage of the
term “race,” which is deeply problematic, and this sort of racial essentialism is not
escaped in the practice of genetic ancestry testing.
Before closing this review of literature from the social sciences pertinent to this
research project—invariably incomplete—there should be some more mention of
examples of the sort of social scientific work which seeks to better think
(epistemologically and ethically) about human groups with regards to genetics. That is,
knowing that there are deeply entrenched structures of injustice such as racism embedded
within, these social scientists ask, if geneticists are often using ideas of human groupings
wrongly (epistemologically and ethically) in their work, then what can genetics tell us
about the biological variation among humans? Examples of this include, Janet K. Shim,
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Katherine Weatherford Darling, Martine D. Lappe, L. Katherine Thomson, Sandra SooJin Lee, Robert A. Hiatt, and Sara L. Ackerman in “Homogeneity and Heterogeneity as
Situational Properties: Producing – and Moving beyond? – Race in Post-Genomic
Science,”100 and Fujimura in the especially terminologically-conceptually helpful article,
“Clines Without Classes: How to Make Sense of Human Variation.”101
Concerns about how knowledges of human identities and interwoven moralities
are changing in response to this science-technology-industry are very present in the social
scientific literature. Topics addressed include (but are certainly not limited to): scientific
racism, biological determinism, how to better think about human social groups with
regards to genetics, the relationships between race and law, genetic database structures,
personalized medicine and pharmacogenomics, eugenics, law enforcement policymaking
and investigatory practices, privacy-related activities and concerns, familial and other
genealogical-genetic research, the assignment of social benefits based on (genetic) group
membership, the “marketization of identity politics,” white nationalism, empire,
reparations, and purity.

Now the course of this literature review makes a turn towards the humanistic and
the philosophical, still seeking epistemological and ethical concepts and theories that
might be of use in future analyses and reflections.
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In 1903, W. E. B. Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches102
describes the experiences of people of African descent in the “American world” as
lacking a “true self-consciousness.” Rather, the sensation of being Du Bois described was
that of a “double-consciousness” wherein the black person has the sense of being able to
perceive their own self doubly with the additional lens of white perceptions of the world.
It is from this that I infer that, were Du Bois to be living to witness the explosion of
genetic ancestry testing, he might question what sort of knowledge about “who we really
are” might be gained from these sorts of tests. As he considered the issues contemporary
to his time, such as the distribution of land and other resources to African Americans
after the legal abolition of their unpaid and brutal forced labor, in terms of the dynamics
of social and ideological power between white communities and their interests, and black
communities and their interests, it is interesting to consider how Du Bois’s epistemology
might be applied to the genetic ancestry testing movement. Following this line of
thinking, the Du Boisian self would question the social constructs that underlie, permeate,
and are advanced by the practice of genetic ancestry testing. It would question what
racially related and other social hierarchies are involved, and how these are manifest in
the experiences of black selves. It might also question the aims of genetic ancestry
testing. Do they align with the goal of merging the ambivalent variety of experience of
the self he terms (double-consciousness) into an uplifting, just experience of the self, “a
better and truer self”? Or rather is the result a maintenance of or increase in the
divisiveness or level of strife within the self, and unjust social hierarchies in the world of
humanity?
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Du Bois’s understanding of the nature of race is at least two-pronged. First—and
this is utterly unsurprising given his historical situation—it is conveyed repeatedly in his
body of work that his understanding of the nature of race is that it is, in part, a biological
or “blood”-based grouping of humans. His understanding is a naturalized and markedly
essentialist one. However, and this is a significant exception—Du Bois’s understanding
of race is not entirely biological and essentialist, it also contains a social component. That
second component is described in one instance as having “a common history, common
laws and religion, similar habits of thought and a conscious striving together for certain
ideals of life.” So, although Du Bois’s understanding of race has biological and
essentialist features, it is not utterly so. That which is social is also crucial.
In Kwame Anthony Appiah’s reading of Du Bois, it is quite possible to separate
out those components of Du Bois’s scholarship that rely on a biological understanding of
race without doing harm to his social theory; on the contrary, this approach of Appiah’s is
employed in order to bring out those aspects of Du Bois that can still be relevant to those
of us today who have abandoned the idea that the concept of race may be correctly called
biological. Mills likewise applies Du Boisian concepts in his understanding of racial
dynamics today, focusing on Du Bois’s descriptions of the black racialized experience
and its relation to whiteness.
It is interesting, that despite Du Bois’s consistent position on the nature of race as
biological, that there are moments in which he appears to utilize an understanding of race
that is much more familiar to us today. For example, in the following Du Bois displays an
understanding of the nature of race that contains formative components of agency and
choice, and political interest, in his understanding of race: “We believe it the duty of the
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Americans of Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race identity until this mission
of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human brotherhood has become a
practical possibility.” I infer from his utilization of the terms “duty” and “maintain” that
there are at least aspects of participation-choice-agency-willingness involved in this
conceptualization, that race is not entirely deterministic (determinism typically being
associated with biological conceptions of race). I consider the following works by Du
Bois central to my comprehension of his theoretical output, which address the radically
changing circumstances of African and African diasporic persons over the course of the
early to mid-twentieth century in North America, in Africa, and throughout the rest of the
world: Black Folk Then and Now: An Essay in the History and Sociology of the Negro
Race published in 1939,103 and Africa in Battle against Colonialism, Racialism,
Imperialism published in 1960.104
Kwame Anthony Appiah, publishing in 1992, more than a decade before the
announced completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in 2003, began to consider
(as I see it, quite precociously) some of the then-present and potential repercussions of
human genome sequencing. As Appiah wrote about it then, rather than being feared as a
mechanism of the reproduction of essentialist racialism with its incumbent racism, the
then-hoped-for result of human genome sequencing was liberation from the tyranny of
hierarchical racial essences.
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At that time, though the HGP was not yet complete, there was enough evidence
coming from laboratories researching human genetic variation to say that there was only
a tiny fraction of variation in genomic composition among all humans, and that there is
more variation within those groups called races (as variously delineated) than there were
among them. In the chapter “Illusions of Race” in In My Father’s House: Africa in the
Philosophy of Culture,105 Appiah works from these data and related to establish the
illusoriness of race as a biological or genetic essence.
Appiah also utilizes in his argumentation the history of the concept of race, using
as evidence changing concepts of race over time and place, and particularly the
continuously fluctuating and inconsistent manners of naming, ranking, describing the
attributes of, and drawing boundaries among racial groups. To provide clear and easily
referenced examples of these constant changes, Appiah, along with many others, have
pointed to the categorization schema utilized in government census data, in particular
United States federal censuses.106 Appiah describes how the essentialist and hierarchical,
biologically innate, understanding of race (scientific racism) gained prominence over
time, arising in large part out of nineteenth century Western scientific and philosophical
ideologies.
In applying Appiah’s theoretical understanding of race in terms of genetics (even
as presented solely in In My Father’s House, though I will utilize many of Appiah’s
theories and concepts from other writings as well) to direct-to-consumer ancestry testing,
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it is clear that analyzing the ways that the boundaries are drawn between ancestralgeographic (as they are typically termed), that is, often racialized and ethnicized groups,
is adamantly required. To consider one practical example, the results provided by
different DTC ancestry testing companies to consumers varies significantly in the ways
that they present the differentiations among human groups and label them (the details of
some of these methodologies of grouping will be analyzed in the next chapter as they
come up in individual case analyses). That is, one consumer who takes several different
tests can get significantly different results, in part because of the variations in the ways
that those groupings are defined by the different testing companies. Indeed, one consumer
may get differing results from the same sample-test over time due to the ever-changing
algorithms utilized by testing services. All of this would point to the functionality of the
application of Appiah’s approach to genetic ancestry testing. For now, what might be
quickly noted is that what those groups are termed collectively also varies: e.g., 23andMe
uses “ancestry” but also highlights “geographic regions”; Ancestry currently favors
“ethnicity” and (unsurprisingly) also “ancestry”; African Ancestry, though they obviously
headline “ancestry” in their corporate name, currently emphasizes “roots,” “identity,” and
“legacy” in its marketing, and other terminologies present in the marketing of their
relatively more customized service include those of “tribe” and “clan.” (Also noted,
almost all services surveyed, even beyond these three, use the individual-personal “You”
and the possessive “Your” a lot, and prominently so. Of course, this is a long-time trend
in marketing generally.)
Returning to Appiah’s anti-essentialism with regards to race, his methodology is
to approach race in terms of its phenomenological properties (related to human
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experiences of race), and, rather than seeking to derive an essential or biological
definition from the phenomena perceived, aiming to understand its social construction.107
Fulfilling this methodology, Appiah argues that “race is a sociohistorical notion.”108
Applying this specifically to DTC ancestry testing in its current forms today, in order to
understand how the concept of race is functioning, it would be necessary to think of this
sociohistoriocity for persons in a variety of roles, from scientific researchers, to industry
leaders, to marketers and other employees and contractors, to test-takers, and so forth,
and to analyze how the concept of race does or might vary among people in those roles
vis-à-vis their being in those roles. The sociohistorical literature reviewed previously
provides much information (and analytical tools also) to inform and deepen these sorts of
analyses.
In The Ethics of Identity109 in 2005 and continuing in The Lies That Bind:
Rethinking Identity, Creed, Country, Color, Class, Culture110 in 2018, Appiah develops
many of these themes that were present in earlier works but is focused more intently on
ideas-concepts of identity, and not just in terms of race as is evidenced in the subtitle of
the latter of those two monographs (so memorable in its alliteration). To outline those
forms of identity as Appiah describes them: “creed,” religious life is characterized by
social practices and beliefs rather than (or more than) sacred scriptures; “country,” as it
arose from 19th century nationalism with its emphasis on the values of personal
autonomy, liberty, and independence, which were subsequently naturalized as innate
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values; “color,” race, as it also arose from the 19th century, but also from the rising
epistemic authority of the biology of race; “class,” determined to be incoherently and
inconsistently defined, and therefore conceptualizations sometimes more harmful than
helpful, as often claimed to be intended; and “culture,” Appiah’s category of greatest
scope, encompassing other aspects of personal and collective human identity, and
exploring ideas about the attribution of meaning to origin stories, and especially their
relation to who is determined to be an inheritor of the Western tradition, or not. Several,
if not all, of these types of identity as described by Appiah can be utilized in the study of
genetic ancestry testing—most clearly country and color, but also creed in terms of
certain geographic ancestral groups that (as defined by testing companies) are named
after designations for religious-ethnic groups (prominent example: “Jewish genetic
ancestry”).
Another selection from Appiah’s body of work that is relevant in considering
questions of the social nature or construction of race is Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du
Bois and the Emergence of Identity, published in 2014,111 wherein Appiah utilizes many
of the epistemological and ethical frameworks developed in previous works around
definitions-conceptualizations of identity and the nature-idea of race, examining them in
the historical and philosophical context of the works and influence of W. E. B. Du Bois.
Also interesting is Appiah’s early article from 1990, “‘But Would That Still Be Me?’:
Notes on Gender, ‘Race,’ Ethnicity, as Sources of ‘Identity,’”112 which puts into a more
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extended perspective the evolution of Appiah’s thought in these realms. His early
optimism that genetics might serve as an anti-racist educational tool appears to have been
tempered.
In 1998, in Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race,113 Charles W.
Mills explores related theories and concepts especially in two essays, “Alternative
Epistemologies” and “‘But What Are You Really?’: The Metaphysics of Race.” The first
of these two essays will be reviewed with a focus on Mills’s epistemology, and second
with a focus on his understanding of the nature of race. Then there will be consideration
of how these understandings in turn might be applied to genetic ancestry testing, and
what sort of knowledge, according to Mills’s epistemology, might be gained, not gained,
or ‘incorrectly’ gained by it, especially with regards to the nature-concept of race. Then, I
will reflect on how Mills’s epistemology and understanding of the nature-concept of race
as it might be applied to our understanding of how the systems of racialisms, including
racisms, is indeed reproduced by genetic ancestry testing, drawing an example from
Mills’s application of Marxist theory.
In “Alternative Epistemologies,” Mills addresses three primary categories of
epistemology that might be termed “alternative” (“alternative,” that is, to a Western
traditional understanding of epistemology that is historically-purportedly universal and
value-neutral with regards to social positioning): a) feminist epistemology (including
standpoint theory); b) a critique “parallel” to feminist critiques which have been put
forward by “black philosophers, who have argued that philosophy has not been immune
to the racism that has pervaded so much of Western thought about non-European
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peoples”;114 and c) Marxist theory. Included in each of these discourses are versions of
standpoint theory, arguing and advocating that members of subordinated groups have
(and should have) a privileged epistemic position with regards to their understanding of
the social structures of oppressions based on social group identities.
Mills argues against a postmodern understanding of knowledge, arguing instead
for a “situated objectivism,” that is unifying in the midst of pluralism, yet retains the
capacity to make normative claims. That is, according to Mills, social context does matter
in considerations of race, but relativism is to be avoided both for epistemological and for
ethical reasons. It is interesting to consider this in light of genetic ancestry testing. It
seems possible that a situated objectivism about the ways in which race (as a
phenomenological object) is manifest in genetic ancestry testing could be developed.
In Blackness Visible, Mills states that the task of constructing a black
epistemology is work that has yet to be completed. What arises immediately to mind
upon re-reading this is the sociological work of Patricia Hill Collins in Black Feminist
Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment in 1990,115 and
subsequently Kristie Dotson’s 2015 article about the development of a black feminist
epistemology, work Dotson characterizes as having been “inherited” from Hill Collins.116
Dotson’s outline for a black feminist epistemology interestingly, and very helpfully in the
analyses being undertaken in this research, incorporates both those things which would
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surely be construed by any epistemologist to be a proper subject of study, such as valid
criteria for determining and confirming what is called knowledge, but Dotson also
integrates into the definition-conceptualization of knowledge considerations of
community and morality, which have historically not been included, or have certainly not
been fundamental, and have even been explicitly excluded from Western philosophical
theories of knowledge. I have in my reading queue Patricia Hill Collins’s much more
recent 2019, Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory.117 I greatly appreciate how
between Hill Collins and Dotson, and among others participating in these discourses,118
there is such a dynamic interdisciplinarity of subjects and methodologies—and one of the
sort being put together in this review, humanistic (specifically, philosophical) and social
scientific (specifically, sociological)—and look forward to continuing to follow them.
In “‘But What Are You Really?’: The Metaphysics of Race,” Mills addresses the
metaphysical problematics that arise when we think about the ways in which race is real
as it is lived—how it is an ontologically valid category (and therefore racial identity a
valid concern)—despite its lack of an essential biological (or in the case of this research,
specifically genetic) reality. Regarding what is sometimes called “color blindness” or
“not seeing race,” Mills states, “That race should be irrelevant is certainly an attractive
ideal, but when it has not been irrelevant, it is absurd to proceed as if it had been.”119
Mills proceeds to discuss “horizontal” and “vertical” conceptualizations of race, pointing
out that ideas about race always involve hierarchies, even when disguised.120
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For Mills, understanding the ontology of race and the epistemology of race are
innately interrelated. The ontic character of race, the attribute of its reality, consists in
that it is known and experienced and how it is known and experienced. Accordingly,
Mills concludes that understanding the ontology and epistemology of race will lead to a
greater understanding of social dynamics, and vice versa. This is my hope and thought
also (along with, I imagine, most all other persons who do this variety of theoretical
work). Here I think of the social scientific literature about how racial concepts are
utilized in DTC DNA ancestry testing as has been reviewed, and how it might inform us
about the (social) realities of race, and from this, what knowledges and moralities we
might derive as, in part, constituting it.
In listing the criteria for racial identity, Mills includes: “ancestry” as culturally
relative and historically-entrenched (United States cultural-historical example: “one-drop
rule”); “self-awareness of ancestry,” which is both an ontological and epistemological
question as Mills frames it; and, “public awareness of ancestry,” which is tied to the
visible (or otherwise perceivable through the senses) phenotypical traits of people in
combination with how those traits are interpreted by individuals in their given
sociohistorical contexts.121 It is interesting to ponder how this “visibility” is expanded
and given greater complexity with the availability and easy-shareability of genetic
ancestry test results.
In Mills’s most widely known monograph and theory of the same name, The
Racial Contract,122 published in 1997, Mills establishes theoretical premises for many of
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the arguments in the essays in the Blackness Visible collection. In The Racial Contract,
arguments are presented that well establish that (at least) some of the central moral and
political philosophies in Western intellectual discourses (for example, Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant) are mistaken in that they
present race and ethnicity as though they were neutral categorizations, wherein in the
reality is that there is a “racial contract” in which white and non-white are not neutral
categories, but exercises of privilege and instruments of domination.
In short form, Mills’s theory is that persons who are not of white, European
descent were-are not party to the social contract so heavily theorized by Enlightenment
thinkers; non-white persons were-are excluded as persons. An application of Mills’s
method of theorization, as utilized in developing racial contract theory, might be useful in
societal-scale analyses of genetic ancestry testing (that is, in thinking about how it is both
an exercise of privilege, and how it is or might be utilized as an instrument of
domination), especially with regards to the pseudosynonyms and surrogates for racial
categories that are so often employed, including in more seemingly socially neutral
language such as “geographic ancestry.”
More recently in 2017, in Black Rights / White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial
Liberalism,123 Mills provides an analysis of the much more contemporary John Rawls’s
“ideal theory” as theory and as ideology. Mills provides a theory-vision for a new “black
radical liberalism” that would rethink and resituate Rawls’s theory (along with that of
Kant, Karl Marx, Du Bois, among others), and would incorporate black radical thought
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such as black nationalism in the United States, and African and African diasporic Marxist
traditions. Application of this approach might be illuminating, for example, with regards
to understanding some of the ways that the racial ideologies that underpin much of DNA
ancestry testing have long-reaching roots in the history of Western thought, and how
these ideologies have been critiqued from radical, oppositional perspectives both internal
and external to the so-called West or Global North. Another monographic writing of
Rawls applicable to the task at hand is Radical Theory, Caribbean Reality: Race, Class
and Social Domination, published in 2010.124
In order to show how it is that the theorizations presented by Linda Martín Alcoff
might be used in the development of the epistemologies of genetic ancestry testing, I will
situate Alcoff’s epistemology as Alcoff did, in the context of feminist theory. In the
collection Feminist Epistemologies, published in 1993,125 for which Alcoff served as an
editor along with Elizabeth Potter, Alcoff and Potter outline, in their coauthored
introduction to the volume, “When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology,”126 the landscape
of feminist epistemologies. Broadly (though not universally) construed, feminist
epistemologies bring into question what Alcoff and Potter term “epistemology
‘proper,’”127 which aims for a universal account of knowledge, ignoring the greater
context of society and the situatedness of knowers in that matrix of economic, political,
and other social factors. This given, Alcoff and Potter question whether or not such
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‘proper’ epistemologies might be adequately-appropriately-affirmatively applied to
subaltern knowers. Their answer is definitively no. There can be no perspectiveless
knowledge; no knowledge without the “specificity of the knowing subject,”128 referring
to Lorraine Code’s work on subjectivity.129 Even thinking thus far into this theorization,
there are signs that DTC genetic ancestry testing may not bear the weight of these
requirements; though its practice specifies knowing subjects, do its practitioners not also
frequently (or always) claim a perspectiveless knowledge, which, according to this
understanding, is not possible?
Alcoff and Potter delineate a number of important theoretical realms within
feminist epistemology, including: standpoint epistemology as further iterated in a chapter
by Sandra Harding,130 epistemic privilege as explained by Bat-Ami Bar On,131 and the
calls for the latitude to make (more) normative claims within standpoint epistemology as
described by Helen E. Longino.132 Lastly, it is important to note that Alcoff and Potter
here and elsewhere always state that feminist work is always political work—
“unabashedly political,”133 whether philosophical or otherwise—and that it is thusly
judged on the basis of its political outcomes.134 It should be emphasized that this is part
of the reason that there remains substantial, but decreasing, dis-ease among philosophers
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as a whole and feminist philosophers, so-called “proper” or “traditional” epistemologies
and feminist epistemologies, while acknowledging the universal-practical divide in
orientations and objectives which persists throughout the discipline-practice of
philosophy is also a major, and perhaps more enveloping, factor. Along with these there
is The “Racial” Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future,135 a volume of
interdisciplinary scholarship edited by Sandra Harding which I have referenced
frequently in thinking about what science is over the years, and Science as Social
Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry136 by Helen E. Longino, also
formative in my thinking and described briefly in the previous chapter. Also related to
this discourse, and focused particularly on conceptions of difference, are Iris Marion
Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference137 and Sander L. Gilman’s Difference and
Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness.138
In 2006, in Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self,139 focusing on race and
gender as forms of social identification, Alcoff argues that the visibility of these forms of
human identity is a crucial component of how they are perceived and understood, despite
ambiguities, and that this is furthermore confirmed by the existences of those perceived
ambiguities. For example, Alcoff points to the frustration elicited in some when they are
uncertain about knowledge of the gender or race of another person. The frustration that
arises points not to the lack of definition of those varieties of human categorization in the
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minds of those who are frustrated (perhaps utterly dualistic in the case of gender), but
rather a very distinct and clear definition of those varieties of human categorization, those
sorts of personal identities, that are being challenged.
This raises the question of whether or not these sorts of visual ambiguities with
regards to race might be ‘resolved’ by the results of a DNA ancestry test, or a genetic test
of any type for that matter. If knowledges of race and gender are, at least in almost all
circumstances, based upon visible, or presumed to be visible—as in on the telephone, or
as to those with limited or no vision, as researched by Obasogie—evidence, how might
that be overwritten or otherwise altered in this new era of increasingly available genetic
testing? What sorts of new visibility does DNA present? What do they mean?
Here it should be stated firmly—in the midst of a discussion about race and
gender—that an aspect of the methodology in this research project is to intentionally
avoid the conflation of different varieties of human identities; that is, to not draw
parallels nor congruities when to do so would be epistemologically or ethically invalid.
At the same time, the aim is also not to ignore investigating that which appears to be the
same or similar; always seeking at once great human universals and great human
particulars, and better and more meaningful understandings of their interrelationships and
interdependencies.
Reflecting on the manners in which genetic ancestry testing as a scientifictechnological-industrial-personal-social movement might reinforce potentially oppressive
racial ideologies, and according to Alcoff’s epistemology, it might not avert “the look of
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the Other,”140 but rather in many instances appears to draw it especially and specifically
towards others as Others, and in an essentialistic way.
In 2016, in The Future of Whiteness,141 Alcoff extends the arguments made in
Visible Identities, and applies them particularly to whiteness. Considering a “color blind”
world, or rather, and bluntly, addressing those liberals who might think that the best thing
to do in the name of racism is to disavow their own whiteness, Alcoff appeals to
understanding whiteness as real and unending, an integral part of human historical
consciousness, and concludes that rather than seeking to end it the aim should be to
analyze it and its problematics in order to achieve better understandings which could lead
to cultural-political reformation.
Two other collections relevant to this research in which Alcoff has participated as
coeditor are Identities: Race, Class, Gender, and Nationality,142 with Eduardo Mendieta,
published in 2003, and Identity Politics Reconsidered,143 with Michael Hames-García,
Satya P. Mohanty, and Paula M. L. Moya, published in 2006.
In summary, Alcoff’s epistemology may be interpreted in application to DTC
genetic ancestry testing in terms of the following: that it is not skeptical of a general or
universal account; that it does not account sufficiently for social contexts and definitely
does not account for the relative social status of knowers; that it is Western-ethnocentric
and it does not recognize subaltern (for example, postcolonial) knowledges about
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identity; and, that it claims to be perspectiveless by virtue of its epistemic authority as
science.
Before parting ways with a focus on Alcoff in this literature review, I would be
remiss to not make note of the powerful effect that one of Alcoff’s particular earlier
writings, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,”144 from 1991, has had on my thoughts
and communications since early on in my philosophical studies of the many and
intertwining social identities of human beings. The clear title of this piece says much, and
its contents always make me think two, or three, or more times about anything that I
might attempt to pronounce on behalf of another person, or group of persons, and
especially on behalf of a group of which I am not or might not be appropriately a member
or a representative. That being so, I also do not want to hesitate to do my best to speak for
others when it is morally urgent and necessary to do so.

On the one hand, there are so many who continue to ignorantly or stubbornly, and
often hatefully, hang onto disproven and immoral conceptions of race. Sometimes this is
the case, in part, because thinking in this way actually benefits them (for example,
socioeconomically), and sometimes it is also the case, in part, because they believe
thinking in this way is beneficial to them when it is not in so many ways. Essentialistic
racialism-racism persists in society; this is so manifest from my sociocultural-geographic
point of view.
On the other hand, “‘Race is a social construct,’ is a common refrain among some
contemporary scholars whose work focuses on the dynamics of experience around the
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idea of identity and, by implication, difference between people by race.”145 There is
significant variety among these humanistic critiques and the presentations of the theories
therein, however several features stand out as typical among the many. It is these
scholarly and theoretical discourses about what is often called the social construction of
race that will be surveyed here, setting aside for the moment the more colloquial (and
essentialist) usages of race that still need to be combatted through education and ongoing
conversations.
According to Bernard Boxill in Race and Racism,146 if race is to be understood as
a social construct, this stands in opposition to understandings of races as natural kinds or
biological things.147 It is an anti-essentialist stance, with a methodology that aims towards
understanding race in terms of its role in the lives of individuals and society. It examines
race in terms of its sociohistorical progression and takes it to be dynamic rather than
static. Moreover, social constructs of identity can be intentional (e.g., national) or
unintentional (e.g., some types of cooperative teams).148 The “progress” of race is not
entirely within the hands of the individual or small group, but it is in part, just as it is not
entirely within the currents of history. Boxill demonstrates that nations, and therefore
national identities can be intentionally or unintentionally formed. That is, some nations
appearing to arise from anciently longstanding cultural affiliations; other appearing to be
manufactured from the labor of humans organizing for a certain organization of
governance and societal structure. I often read this in its theoretical relationship with
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Benedict Anderson’s theory of “imagined communities,”149 which is coming up next in
this review.
“Despite these scholarly arguments, and also in the face of popular discourses on
‘being color blind’ or ‘not seeing color,’ [it is not correct] to infer that humans are
‘nothing at all’ in respect to the ‘object’ or ‘thing’ at the center of this discourse,” that is,
that race is not a thing. Race is a thing. It is a sociohistorical object. Boxill laid out the
historical theory that the invention of the non-Western races was the result of the
European elites’ invention of the “idea of biological race.”150 According to the “radical
constructionist account” of Paul C. Taylor, “Western races are social constructs…, things
that we humans create in the transactions that define social life.”151 They are
metaphysically or ontologically real, but not biologically (and thus not genetically) real.
These sociohistorically formed races, and hierarchical structures of white supremacy that
accompany them, are invented anew continuously in our social exchanges. An example
of this is what Taylor calls “race-talk,”152 social constructionist accounts of the nature of
race and knowledge about race must take into account the ways that racial ideologies
manifest in everyday life, such as language. Motivated not only by theoretical problems
to solve, but also by a morality oriented towards social justice, those who theorize race as
a social construct are often, ultimately, seeking explanatory power that will aid in the
procuring greater access to resources and opportunities for members of oppressed
populations.
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It is important to note here, lest there be the impression that there is nothing but
slight variations in agreement among philosophers, or those working in the humanities
more broadly, about how to critique race, here I will reference one volume which does an
excellent job of providing breadth and depth to a presentation of some of the differences
within this discourse about race, both of the fine and course variety. This volume is What
Is Race?: Four Philosophical Views,153 and it features contributions from Joshua
Glasgow, Sally Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, and Quayshawn Spencer. Although the details
of the differences in these four approaches will not be further explicated here, it is certain
in the mind of this writer that the differences in their approaches will certainly come up in
later analyses and reflections, whether in this dissertation or in the future. The
theorization of Quayshawn Spencer in particular, and having to do with a certain
approach to the philosophy of biology, will present an interesting challenge and I think
will be enlightening and helpful; but how so, I am not certain. Another philosopher not
yet mentioned, and whose work I find to be in relation, is Naomi Zack, from whom
“Geography and Ideas of Race,”154 and “The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the
History of Philosophy,155 might be especially helpful.
Though most of what has been mentioned so far with regards to social
construction theory has defined what race is not, examples what race is or includes or can
be according to this variety of theoretical model have not been so prominent, including
intentional, resistant, optimistic affiliations, Du Bois’s shared “impulses and ideals,”
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examples of which might include, for example among African and African diasporic
communities: Pan-Africanism (in its variety of forms), négritude, black nationalism, and
black power movements.
The urgency and ongoing call for continuance of this discourse is propelled
forward by the ongoing pervasiveness and depth of racism in a variety of forms many
places throughout the world. Here the distinction (as utilized by Mills, Appiah, and
others), or perhaps semi-distinction, between the terms “racism” and “racialism” is
useful. Racialism is the theory or belief that human can be divided into categorically
meaningful races that are derived from inherited biological traits, or essences. Racism is
the individual and systemic marginalizations and oppressions of members of other
racialized groups by virtue of their being members of (a) particular group(s) and includes
a hierarchical structure that delineates the relative superiority and inferiority of the
various races. Although these may appear to be ‘neat,’ distinct categories—and they are
useful—it is also important to bear witness to the evidence that racialism seems to always
manifest simultaneously with racism in some form. That is, when races are distinguished,
they are ranked. Nonetheless, the lack of (biologically deterministic) racialism does not
end racism, as it is, like race, a deeply rooted social thing.
Discourses about the social construction of race bear markers of parallels to
“Benedict Anderson’s social view of the twentieth century,”156 as developed in Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,157 published in 1983.
Theories of the social construction of race, though varied, share a number of traits in
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common with one another, including the questioning of naturalized or biologized (or
geneticized) conceptions of race. Similarly, in Imagined Communities, Anderson aims to
shatter the (naturalized) preconceptions of the reader about what nations and nationalism
are.
Although nations are known to have origins (for instance, they often if not always
have heroic origin myths of some kind), rather than being conceptualized as having some
sort of originating starting point or gradual formation, they are often-typically described
and understood by nationalistic persons and groups as extending eternally towards the
past, without boundaries in time, and often as having undergone little significant change.
Anderson explores this paradoxical aspect of nationalism, and part of the analysis
involves the conceptualization that ideas about nationality have become naturalized. This,
I would argue, bears resemblance to the conceptualizations put forth by theorists of the
social construction of race, which conceptualize race as having sociological origins that
have become epistemologically and ethically naturalized over time, resulting in the
conception that race is an utterly natural, inherent for of human identity.
Imagined Communities provides an epic (and in that sense both impressive and
inspiring but inevitably erring in some of its details) account of the historical origins of
nationalism, both globally or universally construed, and particularly with regards to the
emergence of European nation-states. In it, Anderson argues that nations are socially
constructed, that is, sociohistorical things; that a nation is "an imagined political
community.” As such, national identities or nationalities may also be counted as political
things or more broadly as social things.
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Applying Anderson’s conceptualizations of nations and nationalities, I think it can
be argued, that, in the context of direct-to-consumer DNA testing, there is grossly
insufficient explanation to consumer-test-takers as to the meaning of those ancestralgeographic groupings that carry names synonymous with national identities (and
languages, also). At a minimum, present-day and historical national boundaries are being
conflated with racial and ethnic categories, which often already infused with misleading
biological definition, and subsequently genetic ancestral categories. I would argue
furthermore that Anderson’s historical account and analyses show that indeed even
seemingly-superficially equivalent sorts of categories such as French and German today
display characteristics that prove them to be of different kinds. I anticipate that both
Anderson’s theory of nationalism, and many of the particular examples he uses to
advance it, will be useful in demonstrating, at the least, many of the ambiguities involved
in the pseudonational (and linguistic) categories applied to people, as genetic, as a part of
direct-to-consumer DNA ancestry testing.
In this realm of consideration several other humanistic theories come to mind as
they also, in their own distinctive manners, aim to de-mythologize race, nations, and
other social groupings of people that have become over time epistemologically and
ethically naturalized in so many different cultures and so many different ways. These are:
V. Y. Mudimbe’s The Invention of Africa158 and also The Idea of Africa;159 Appiah’s
discussion of Africa as a colonial invention, the African world as a myth, and the ongoing
postcolonial aspects of the structures of African societies; Edward Said’s famous 1978
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description of the Western formation-formulation of the “Orient” and “Orientalism;”160
and also Anderson’s later work in Culture and Imperialism in 1993,161 which makes
similar arguments and derives similar concepts as are found in Imagined Communities,
but aims to be more encompassing in terms of non-European contexts and sociohistories,
including a focus on the effects of European imperialisms and colonialisms outside of
Europe.
Anderson and Said, writing in English, and Mudimbe, writing in French and
English, are also united with intellectuals Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, both writing in
French, in reflecting on and reacting to manifestations and the repercussions of
colonialisms and nationalisms, which are sociohistorical designations associated with
certain sorts of human actions and subsequently forms of human group identity. French
state-national-imperial colonialism in particular, among the European colonialisms, is
strongly associated with nationalism in its policy of what was called “assimilation.” In
comparison to the general British colonial approach of not allowing persons and groups
of persons indigenous to colonized territories to become British citizens, the French
policy of assimilation purportedly aimed at the ideal of transforming persons and groups
of persons in French colonized territories into French citizens, so long as they abided by
French law and custom including language and education, and, at least in the ideal, strove
to be French in every way. Reading Césaire, Fanon, Said, Mudimbe, and Anderson
among many others—as well as watching films and taking in other representative
artforms—has been hugely helpful in broadening and deepening my understanding of
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what is meant by colonialism and postcolonialism, both in contemplating the ways in
which it appears similar whenever-wherever it may be manifest, and in at the same time
attempting to understand and appreciate the ways in which it is differentiated
sociohistorically within these broad designations, always varying in its manifestations
according to circumstances and varieties in will. In terms of attempting to grasp the work
of Césaire not just as a social theorist but as the poet that he was, I have studied a
beautiful side-by-side bilingual edition of the 1939 Notebook of A Return to the Native
Land,162 which was helpful in trying to grasp some of the poetics of Césaire’s work in its
original language, though my French is limited. Also, very helpful in its integrative
approach to these artistic-philosophical-political movements, is The Black Surrealists163
by Jean-Claude Michel.
Anderson’s view of the twentieth century is also united with Césaire, Fanon, Said,
and Mudimbe, in that the social constructivist approach of each (as they might be
described; though the methodology and theory of each is so different) aims to elucidate
how societal constructions and related human forms of self-identity and identification-byothers are dependent oftentimes on misleading narratives of many different kinds. “My
family has always been French,” and “My family is all white,” are both conceivable
utterances for those who are believers in such (when interpreted too simply without
sociohistorical contextualization) misleading narratives. A question that remains with me
is this: The desire to build something anew from the rubble left behind by conceptual
deconstruction bursts from the page in Césaire, Fanon, Said, and Mudimbe. I do not
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detect the same level of passion for creation in my reading of Anderson, but I expect that
Anderson too seeks to build also, but perhaps not so emphatically and only after very,
very thorough deconstruction.
In Peau noire, masques blancs,164 which has been translated into English as Black
Skin, White Masks,165 Frantz Fanon, writing in 1952, offers a psychological and
philosophical account of the colonial, colonized and racialized (and also gendered and
sexualized, although that must be set aside for just a brief moment), experiences founded
in life in North Africa, particularly Algeria and Tunisia, and in France, during and prior
to the period wherein anticolonial political independence movements and related wars
were occurring throughout the African continent. As a psychologist by training and
practice, and a political activist and instigator, Fanon’s passionate accounts of experience,
his own and that of his patients, and others, are existential in character, and the analyses
presented in his writings are in conversation with those of Jean-Paul Sartre and other
leading contemporary Francophone philosophical thinkers in Africa and in Europe.
As Appiah points out in the forward to a 2008 English translation of Black Skin,
White Masks, although we might find some of Fanon’s psychological theories
questionable or unscientific today (and, I would say also, some of his ideas about gender
and gender relations), there is insight to be found in Fanon’s “development of a political
philosophy for decolonization.”166
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In the development of a philosophy for decolonization, Fanon provides several
definitions of race, which can, in today’s terminology, be quite directly applied to
discourses about human social identities. For example, “What is called the black soul is a
construction by the white folk.” This quote from Fanon appears to, in a manner, run
parallel with Anderson’s conception of the formation of national identities by those
holding social positions with greater access to resources and opportunities relative to
those who ultimately become the subjects of nationalism. Fanon continues this discourse
in L’an V de la révolution Algérienne167 (A Dying Colonialism168) in 1959, and in Les
damnés de la terre169 (The Wretched of the Earth170) in 1961. Pour la révolution
africaine: écrits politiques171 (Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays172) was
collected and published posthumously in 1964. All of these works should inform analyses
of genetic ancestry testing, especially with regards to racialism, nationalism, and
colonialism.
Although Aimé Césaire is not writing poetry in Discours sur le colonialism173
(Discourse on Colonialism174), the impact of its prose is not without the passionate and
unapologetic qualities of his poetry. In it, Césaire shouts for decolonization, stating
forcefully that Europe cannot “justify itself” with regards to the irrational and
disorganized systems of colonialism and capitalism. Whereas Europeans have labeled
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those who live in “the colonies” as “barbarians,” Césaire declares that it is the Europeans
have succumbed to barbarity. As such, and in response to such force, to decolonize must
be to brutalize. The oppressive must be thrown off.
It is interesting that despite being considered one of the originators of the
philosophical and political ideology called négritude, not all of Césaire’s writings appear
to contain the essentialism that has often been critiqued as being a feature of négritude.
Césaire’s conception seems far too dynamic for that. Négritude, the word being French in
origin, may be thought of as a social movement and a correspondent ideology (or
ideologies) that affirms the positive values of Black consciousness, which was originally
developed in the 1930s and 1940s by intellectuals of African descent living and working
in France. Négritude can be thought of as a resistance to colonialism by intellectuals of
Africa (particularly so-called Francophone Africa, those regions claimed and exploited
by France as colonies, wherein French became a dominant language) and the African
diaspora, but also, as is emphasized by Reiland Rabaka in The Negritude Movement,175 it
might be understood as part of an ongoing process of both creativity and resistance
beginning (at least) with the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, and continuing through the
writings of Frantz Fanon and beyond.176 In other words, négritude is a reaction in the
sense that it certainly responds to the colonial and post-colonial situations, however it is
also an action of its own accord in the sense that it flowed from previous intellectual and
artistic traditions of Africa and the African Diaspora.
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Donna V. Jones in The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy: Négritude, Vitalism,
and Modernity,177 analyzes Césaire’s ambivalence toward fully embracing an essentialist
conception of African identity as follows: “Yet Notebook reveals against manifest
authorial intention some ambivalence about simply being fundamentally black, for
Césaire rejects so many black identities, one persona after another, masks that his own
Antillean displacement and Nietzschean radicalism disallows him unlike Senghor, from
ever wearing comfortably.”178
Returning to Fanon, in Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience,179 Ato Sekyi-Otu argues
that trends in the interpretation of the writings of Fanon have tended to be
problematically decontextualizing in such a way as to disregard the histories and
discourses in which Fanon’s work is embedded. Rather than emphasizing Fanon as
psychologist, philosopher, or more broadly, social theorist, Sekyi-Otu makes persuasive
arguments for reading Fanon within a dialectical context,180 a humanistic context,
dramatically conversant with the political context of the histories of African revolutions
for independence, particularly the battle for independence in Algeria, by which Fanon’s
works were informed and in which Fanon was deeply, personally involved in intellect
and in body.181 Moreover, Sekyi-Otu addresses implicitly postmodern or globalist
readings of Fanon, and issues regarding problematic translations of Fanon, which SekyiOtu argues may be proven to be badly misleading.
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In order to defend these theses, Sekyi-Otu establishes a methodology for
“rereading Fanon,” which Sekyi-Otu describes as a “post-independence hermeneutics.”182
Throughout this focused and intense monograph there is an “anti-psychologistic”183
interpretive stance that takes Fanon not as psychologist nor as philosopher proclaiming
exclusively or principally theoretical ideas,184 but rather Fanon as a contributorparticipant in a complex and endlessly-dynamic political dialectic in which efficacy and
engagement are of central importance (as is clearly the case with Césaire and Mudimbe
also, though their writings are not the subject of Sekyi-Otu’s re-interpretation). Sekyi-Otu
engages contentiously and repeatedly with the writings of Homi Bhabha that emphasize
the (of course, present) psychological orientation of Fanon’s work, but also what SekyiOtu views as Bhabha’s (errant) ripping away of both universal ethical proclamations and
political situatedness from Fanon.185 According to the interpretive framework that SekyiOtu is presenting, Fanon’s theorization is not quite as postmodern-postcolonial as Bhabha
interpreted it to be. In contrast, Sekyi-Otu emphatically points out the ways in which
Fanon is deeply and perhaps most primarily a “humanist,” interested in “human
things,”186 and squarely aimed at liberatory ends for (post)colonized persons and
communities.
The central chapters of Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience continue this “rereading
of Fanon,” and furthermore detail some of the consequences of this mode of
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interpretation. In “Immediate Knowledge,”187 Sekyi-Otu delves into the problematics of
reading Fanon (solely) within the dialectical materialist tradition following Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels, and argues that what Fanon accomplishes is an “evident parody” of
this manner of thinking; rather than confirming the theories of Marx and Engels,
according to this method of rereading, Fanon demonstrates history to be antidialectical.188
In “Immediate Knowledge,”189 Sekyi-Otu addresses (among other themes) the
metaphysical repercussions of this interpretive methodology dealing particularly with the
ways in which concerns and conceptualizations of race interplay in dynamic ways as
reactions to the (post)colonial context. “Bewildering Enlightenment,”190 deals similarly
with the issues of nationalism that in great measure follow from discussions of race
within the African postcolonial context. In this chapter Sekyi-Otu interestingly and
repeatedly utilizes G. W. F. Hegel as an interlocuter, taking into account (and defending)
this manner of utilizing Hegel in such a way despite “the monumental racism and sexism
of his [Hegel’s] metaphysics and philosophy of history.”191 Lastly, at the end of the
chapter entitled “Political Judgment,”192 Sekyi-Otu, very interestingly for this reader at
least, cuts across the dialectic in which he himself is participating, and addresses the ways
in which all of the aforementioned discourse does not fully take into account the
problematic situations of women in (it appears to him) all cultural milieus.
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The epilogue of Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience summarizes and synthesizes the
numerous strands of interpretation and investigation that have been presented,193 and
concludes on a note that, according to Sekyi-Otu (and I agree) is quite fitting for a book
on (re)reading Fanon—namely, the recollection of Fanon as a political, humanist, and
particularly-situated creator of utterances which are both reflective of and reactive to the
endeavor of African political independence. Sekyi-Otu argues, “as the African world
searches for new ways to recover the promise of freedom and community squandered in
three blighted decades of postcolonial independence,”194 it is fruitful to continue to look
to Fanon, and to “reread” him, understanding the promise that he saw and garnering
inspiration from his writings.
I have provided this quite detailed review of Sekyi-Otu's (re)interpretation of
Fanon because it has been deeply and multiply influential in my understanding of
Fanon’s contributions to the discourse in which I am now participating. Fanon is one of
the intellectuals whom I encountered early on in this journey thinking about humanity
and its many forms of identity-identification, and, having been familiar with several of
Fanon’s works for some time, I have come to more than one way of thinking about how
Fanon’s psychological-philosophical-social-political theory might inform better
comprehension of human social identities. And although I can’t say that Sekyi-Otu’s
(re)interpretation of Fanon has completely reformed how I understand Fanon’s work, it
has profoundly influenced it, and in turn influenced my thinking about what identity is in
its relationship to individual persons and in its relationship to communities of persons.
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It should also be noted here that an important aspect of my especial interest in the
work of Fanon has to do with its relation to existential discourses. Ultimately what I find
when I think about Fanon is that he is deeply concerned with the experience of human
existence, and this founding is redoubled by Sekyi-Otu’s (re)interpretive theory which is
accordingly titled with “experience” highlighted and grammatically indicated as the
primary object of study. When I read and think about all of this it inevitably is taken in
combination with my longtime reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s, L'Être et le néant: Essai
d'ontologie phénoménologique195 (Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on
Ontology),196 as well as my more recent encounter during my doctoral studies with
"Orphée Noir”197 (“Black Orpheus”198). "Orphée Noir” is the preface to Anthologie de la
nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache (Anthology of Negro and Malagasy Poetry in French),
edited by Léopold Sédar Senghor.
Jean-Paul Sartre’s articulations of the (existential) dynamics of experience are not
easy for me to summarize or interpret though I have read and considered them much and
over a long period of time. Nonetheless, here I will attempt to briefly outline Sartre’s
conception of the relationship between experience and existence, as I understand it
presently, and insofar as it seems necessary to relay this aspect of my thinking as it will
surely be applied in future analyses.
Consciousness is an activity of revealing. Consciousness is always intentional.
The conscious being experiences being-for-itself in its own “oblique” reflection, which is
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a negation of the world. We experience consciousness as embodied. We have
consciousness of our being, consciousness of our body, as the nexus of our experience
(location of consciousness) in the world. In order to understand the world and being-initself (nonconscious being) that is present in it, we take a phenomenological accounting
of our experiences. We are careful to avoid essentializing as we confront being directly in
our existence-experience. Reality is our experience, not our experience of it.
Sartre composed "Orphée Noir” in 1948 as the preface to Anthologie de la
nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache, edited by Léopold Sédar Senghor. Notable in this
short work with regards to his conception of the relation between race and identity is his
discussion of the “gaze.” “Today, these black men have fixed their gaze upon us and our
gaze is thrown back in our eyes.”199 The “us” here are white European intellectual men
feeling confronted by the philosophies and arts of the (men of the) négritude movement
and other African and African diasporic intellectual discourses. The gaze is an action of
objectification and alienation, instigated by the white intellectuals, and reflected back
towards them by the force of the Black intellectuals’ resistant, reciprocal gaze.
Sartre also writes of the poetry in the volume, “If, however, these poems give us
shame, it is not with that conscious purpose: they have not been written for us. All those,
colonist and accomplice, who open this book, will have the sensation of reading as
though over another’s shoulder, words that were not intended for them. It is for black
men that these black poets address themselves; it is for them that they speak of black
men.”200 The dynamics of racial experience Sartre is describing is what might today be
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described as the solidarities of anti-racist thought and action among Black postcolonial
poets and other intellectuals in these movements and with their audiences.
Last, it must be noted that Sartre’s “Black Orpheus" is an anti-capitalist piece as
well. Sartre concludes in it that, although Black workers share many causes for grievance
with some classes of white workers, and that all workers must ultimately unite, that the
Black man must, due to his experience of this world, first and foremost identify himself
as Black as that is the source of his pain whether directly through the oppressive
mechanisms of racism, or secondarily economic circumstances which more often than not
are an ongoing legacy of that racism.
Sociohistorically, in the context of the French colonial period, the social
interrelations between a member of the French intelligentsia (e.g., Sartre), and agents of
anticolonialism against the French empire (e.g., Fanon) is a tangled web to unweave
enough to comprehend in its constituent parts. Most broadly construed, I envision it as a
part of the transition from colonial to postcolonial, and correspondingly from modern to
postmodern (Appiah writes about this). Philosophically, all three have a
phenomenologically oriented ontology. Reality is understood as it is experienced; no
essences (or other information or guidelines that we need to derive categories) are hidden
from our perception.
To return to discourses more contemporary, here I will again note how Kimberlé
Crenshaw’s theorization of intersectionality has invariably influenced my work, and I
especially appreciate how its prominence has brought it into usages outside of academic
discourses. I also think of bell hooks and Angela Y. Davis in whom I earlier encountered
varieties of thinking that forced me to reconceptualize my ideas about womanhood and
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feminism in the face of the overt and subtle racisms of what I had been taught prior. I am
thinking especially here, and as may be applied in this variety of analyses, Davis’s
Women, Race & Class,201 and bell hooks Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and
Feminism.202 More recent in the oeuvre of hooks and highly relevant is Belonging: A
Culture of Place203 and Appalachian Elegy: Poetry and Place.204 For Crenshaw I refer to
the earlier Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement,205 and
the more recent compilation On Intersectionality: Essential Writings.206

Before concluding this review of the literature, though it is of course inherently
incomplete (and is revealing to me of the situatedness-limitations of my knowledgescope), a few theories having to do with interpretation and language will be inserted, as
they invariably also inform my thinking and are apt to application in this project. One of
these is Stuart Hall in Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying
Practices.207 It is also interesting to note how Hall’s work interrelates with that of bell
hooks, including their work done together as evident in “Dialogue between bell hooks
and Stuart Hall.”208 I have also read and taught with great interest the works of bell hooks
on representation, particularly of film and of other cultural artifacts of widespread
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interests, as for example may be found in Reel to Real: Race, Class and Sex at the
Movies209 and Black Looks: Race and Representation.210 And, although I did not
originally read the work of Alcoff with the focus of representation in mind but rather
identity, in Visible Identities, and insofar as Alcoff is working with what may be seen and
is therefore presented and represented, this theorization seems quite relevant in thinking
about representation, also.
With regards to language and its interpretations, Pierre Bourdieu’s
conceptualizations in Language and Symbolic Power211 have been a longtime influence,
as well as the ordinary language theory of J. L. Austin, to which I was first introduced
through How to Do Things with Words.212 More recently, and with greater concentration
on how human identities are always intersectional, I have been informed by the
introductory-survey text Language and Gender213 by Penelope Eckert and Sally
McConnell-Ginet, and the focused studies of Miyako Inoue about a number of aspects of
human identity which have been, historically and contemporarily, utilized as formative
factors in Japanese languages, including gender and social class, in Vicarious Language:
Gender and Linguistic Modernity in Japan.214 It should be noted here that again
disciplinary lines have been crossed, somewhat unintentionally, in my research; while
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Bourdieu’s and Austin’s works are often taught as philosophical texts, the scholarship of
Inoue, Eckert, and McConnell-Ginet falls primarily within the discourses of
sociolinguistics (though all are interdisciplinary, too). Overriding this is the fact that my
studies are confined largely to the English language, with readings in other languages
being very limited, especially with regards to texts written in languages that originated
outside of western Eurasia, which I usually encounter in translation only. Again, this is
showing of my cultural-geographic perspective-standpoint, which I aim to keep in
awareness as I study, reflect, and communicate, both to learn from and to revise as is
possible.

It has been the case in this literature review that I have been unable to cover all
that might be covered because completing such a task is inherently impossible, but also
due to my own limitations of capacity and those of the time and space available. With
regards to social scientific literature having to do with the science of genetics, and
especially that which has DNA ancestry testing as its particular subject, I continue to aim
at comprehending the breadth and depth of these scholarly discourses and to stay as
current and as informed as I can. This literature from the social sciences is diverse,
complex, and so significant in the work that I aim to do. However, this social scientific
literature may also be understood to be somewhat, or rather much more, contained than
the literature from the humanities that I attempt to take into account in my analyses and
communications. This of course is due in part to the far more honed-particular topical
focus of that which I am seeking knowledge about in the literature from the social
sciences. It is also to do with the fact that, seeking a degree in the humanities and having
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studied it for many more years, there is so much more that I have to draw on from that
intellectual-artistic-experiential realm, and following that state of being a more
comprehensive but admittedly vaguer definition of what all might be entailed. What
comparative humanistic theory does not have something to do with who human beings
are in relation to one another, that is, something to do with their social identities?
With that left as an interminable and wonderful problematic to address, and from
which to learn during analytical practice, now is a good time to move onwards, to apply
what has been gained in this review of literature—both from the humanities and from the
social sciences—in the analyses of individual-personal narratives-cases drawn from real
life experiences of DNA ancestry testing.
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CHAPTER THREE
HUMANISTIC ANALYSES: EPISTEMOLOGIES AND ETHICS
OF GENETIC ANCESTRY TESTING
This dissertation began with a series of brief narratives, stories told about human
life, each having something to do with human experiences of DNA ancestry testing. Each
also had something to do with human identity.
Since that introduction, it has been established that genetic ancestry testing should
be construed as a recent and ongoing movement in humanity, of substantial proportions
and with significant consequences of many kinds, and with immense potentialities that
are yet unknown. Following this, and in order to comprehend such a movement as best as
possible, it must be considered not only in its scientific, technological, and industrial
aspects (which have their own intertwining significances), but also in its aspects that are
both individual-personal and communal-social.
The literature of the social sciences informs, both pragmatically and theoretically,
about many aspects of this contemporary movement in humanity, spawned from the
advent of the science of genetics. These social scientific discourses are diverse, have been
ongoing since at least the 1970s, and continue to provide crucial and fascinating insights
into this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement. The literature of
the humanities provides an ancient and bottomless well of ideas by and about humans in
their conceptions of themselves and in relation to others, as individual persons and as
members of groups-communities. Herein this is termed “identity,” construing this
167

concept or set of concepts broadly and from a humanistic perspective (as described in the
Introduction), but also keeping in mind simultaneously that this term is being used
contemporarily in hot political discourses as a part of what is sometimes described as
“identity politics.” The focus in this chapter is philosophical, with epistemological and
ethical questions and problematics foremost in mind; important current political debates
and considerations will be reintroduced into this dissertation in Chapter Four.
In this analytical chapter, Chapter Three, the modes gained—conceptualizations
and theories outlined in the literature reviews in Chapter Two—will be applied in caseby-case analyses of these human stories that have been told. These narratives, among so
many others,215 have inspired me in my research, driven it forward, and, in accordance
with the methodology and intended outcomes of this research, have kept me and it better
grounded in human experiences, at least as they are reported or narrated, and insofar as I,
from my own perspective-standpoint, may understand them. Though the formal goals of
this research project are greater conceptual and theoretical clarity, the human-ness of the
work and its potential pragmatic helpfulness towards good ends, are constantly in mind.
Four narratives have been selected for detailed case analysis, the variety of which
enable the employment of a number of different analytical modes, and therefore a number
of different kinds of possible conceptual insights into these human narratives and the
interesting philosophical problematics that can be detected within them. Each of these
narratives is focused on an individual person and their reported experiences of genetic
ancestry testing.
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In short form, the aim is to accomplish an interdisciplinary, humanistic,
comparative inquiry into the epistemologies and ethics of genetic ancestry testing through
the analysis of narratives-cases, each drawn from real life experiences of DNA ancestry
testing. How might we interpret the significances of these stories that we tell each other
about our genetic compositions and our human ancestries?

In order to analyze each narrative, first it is described, then it is surveyed in order
to determine those varieties-types-kinds and conceptions of human identity that are most
superficial or obvious in it, for example, those which are explicitly stated. Varieties of
human identity will be engaged with constantly both in their concepts-senses as means of
self-identification, and in their concepts-senses as means of identification-by-others.
After examining those concepts of human identity which are (at least to this
analyzer) most obvious in it, each case analysis will work towards those identitiesidentifiers-identifications which require more refined or distinct analytical modes—
theories and/or terminologies—for greater comprehension. Questions being considered in
these analyses include: What ideas about human groups are being employed? What types
and schemata of categorization are being used for those groupings? What epistemologies
and ethics are being utilized in the delineations of the groups-categories? When
considering individual-personal senses-concepts of social identity, what are thought-feltexperienced-reported to be unifying factors? What is the sense of belonging? Or lack
thereof? What varieties of othering or exclusion are occurring? To get to the core of what
is being examined in these analyses, what sorts of knowledges and ethics did this DNA
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testing experience obscure? What sorts of knowledges and ethics did it, or might it,
enable?
Appreciating the breadth and complexity of these questions—and what I argue is
their sweeping collective significance, both conceptual and practical—for each narrativecase, rather than attempting to answer this long list of questions in what would inevitably
be a superficial manner, more narrowly defined questions are developed and explicitly
stated. These targeted questions are formed in response to what I consider to be some
fundamental problematics having to do with identity which might be brought out in each
particular case through its humanistic analysis, and also are very much inspired by,
inherited from, and respondent to the theoretical modes, and the scholars who created
those modes, which are to be applied in each case.
There is an attempt in each narrative case analysis to remain focused so that each
may, at least in a sense, stand on its own informatively and argumentatively, and so that
each might be communicated independently. However, those goals and purposes stated, it
is certain that insofar as the theoretical trajectory of this research project points overall
towards a more integrative understanding of this important movement in humanity, the
analyses are and should be understood and interpreted as interrelated.
The overall methodological approach of this research project, as has been
described previously, is one that aims towards the simultaneous appreciation of that
which is individual-personal and that which is communal-social—that which is particular
and that which is universal in humanity—never forgetting one in the midst of the other.
In this particular chapter, the narratives chosen, and the analytical methodologies
employed, are intended to facilitate and to stimulate the exploration of many of the
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epistemological and ethical questions and problematics that have been noted in previous
chapters. It is hoped and expected that some answers and solutions will be determined
along the way—undoubtedly partial and perhaps tentative—but it is equally hoped and
expected that more questions and problematics will arise. The conclusions, as bolstered
by this analytical approach and methodology, aspire to be both critical and constructive.

These individual-personal narratives are, as has been demonstrated herein and in
many other texts and many other creative works, elements of greater human societal
discourses about the science-technology-industry of genetics and about the relationships
among individual human persons and among groups-communities of humans. All are
woven together with one another. Here the method is to inspect closely just a handful or
so of these strands and the ways in which they are woven, as a means to better
understanding the greater tapestry of human discourses, knowledges, and moralities. In
attempting to isolate each strand-case there is a reaching for a deeper, more detailed
understanding of its particular intricacies, the singular-personal manifestation of
humanity in it, but also of how it is formed-connected with the rest, through concepts of
identity. As in the meditation in Chapter One on what is DNA, the conclusions and
comprehension towards which this inquiry aims are both microscopic and macroscopic.

Analysis of Narrative Case I: Jasmine
This epistemological and ethical inquiry into human identity begins by returning
to the following passage from the Introduction:
DNA ancestry reveal videos posted online by untold numbers of individuals contain
heart-wrenching jump cuts resulting from the abrupt turning off of the camera to make
urgent phone calls. In one video, the young, Black test taker had just opened an envelope
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to a report that showed no African ancestry. Another video comes to a similarly abrupt—
but more felicitous—end, when the report received contains long-sought information
about African matrilineal origins. Though for very different reasons, in these instances,
just two among so many, the individuals in question upon receiving their test results
appeared to feel the intense need to call immediately upon persons very dear to them in
order to emotionally process and better apprehend the information just received.

This analysis will focus on the genetic ancestry testing narrative of Jasmine, the
first individual described in the passage. Jasmine was participating in the making of what
is often referred to as an “ancestry reveal video.” In the video narrative being analyzed
here, presumably, and believably, when Jasmine started recording, she did not know the
contents of the report sent to her by African Ancestry. Her deep surprise, shock even,
upon reading it was relayed intensely to this viewer.
In the video, Jasmine begins by saying hello and introducing herself in the concise
but friendly manner common for the communications medium, YouTube. While many
ancestry reveal videos contain screenshots and screenshares of genetic ancestry reports
received via email or accessed by test-takers through corporate websites or other
proprietary software applications, Jasmine chose the drama of opening a paper envelope.
As implied in the narrative as written herein, when Jasmine opened the envelope and
started reading the report, her demeanor changed almost immediately from happily and
curiously excited towards the pensive or even confused, with anger or sadness seemingly
present as well. Before pausing the recording to call her mother (causing that dramatic
jump cut in the video), Jasmine did share with her audience, very briskly and with
apparent agitation, the gist of the report’s contents. As Jasmine put it, the report stated
that she had “no African ancestry.”
Jasmine identified herself in the video as a Black woman, and as an African
American. Jasmine did not state that she expected the report to contain information about
her African genetic lineage; this was a (culturally contextualized) given that did not
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require explicit statement. To be more precise about the envelope’s contents, Jasmine told
her audience, upon that initial reading, that the report said her lineage was “all
European.” She said that there was no mention of Africa at all. This is what drove her to
the phone, to call Mom. Jasmine was turning to a trusted, caring, source of information
outside of the report to make sense of what was in that envelope.

Leaping forward to summarize succinctly Jasmine’s epistemological experience
as portrayed over the duration of the video, there were at least two varieties-sources of
knowledge that Jasmine utilized to make sense of this test result. Jasmine’s primary
question: How is it that an African American person might take a genetic ancestry test
and end up with a result that indicates no African ancestry?
The first variety of knowledge that Jasmine sought (immediately and
passionately) was knowledge from her mother, about family history. The second variety
of knowledge that Jasmine sought was a better understanding of how genetic ancestry
testing works, and in particular about the type of test that she took. Jasmine sourced
information to boost this second variety of knowledge by conducting a variety of online
searches. The exact sources of these online educational references were not disclosed, but
Jasmine described their general contents, and what she had learned from them, in her
video narrative.
This second variety of knowledge Jasmine sought out, scientific knowledge about
how this particular type of genetic ancestry testing works, will be addressed first, as it is
applicable in so many cases similar to Jasmine’s. It also can be explained relatively
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easily, and some of its problematics addressed relatively simply. As Jasmine said to her
viewers at the end of the video, “This should have been explained upfront.”

The type of genetic ancestry test taken by Jasmine was an mtDNA test. African
Ancestry currently markets this variety of test under the name “MatriClan Test Kit.”216
Many other companies offer this variety of testing as well. As described in greater detail
in Chapter Two, mtDNA tests enable what is often referred to as “matrilineal genetic
testing,” because the genetic material sequenced in this type of test—which is located
outside the nucleus as part of the mitochondria—is inherited from the ovum only, from
the biological-genetic mother. During reproduction it is not combined with genetic
materials from the spermatozoon, from the biological-genetic father, as is the case with
the genetic material inside the nucleus (which make up the more famous 23
chromosomes of humans). Therefore, mtDNA does not change from generation to
generation unless there is a mutation. Your mtDNA (excepting any possible mutations) is
identical to that of the ovum from which you were, in part, generated.
Due to these features, it is possible for mtDNA to be traced generationally (and
grouped) in a simpler and more straightforward manner than DNA inside the nucleus,
over both the short and the long term. Genetic scientists group living and deceased
humans into populations called mtDNA haplogroups (also known as “maternal
haplogroups”) based on the similarities and differences among the sequences of the
nucleotides in their mtDNA. (The differences in these haplogroups are generated as
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mutations occur in the nucleotide sequences and accumulate over time.) mtDNA
haplogroups are denoted scientifically by alphanumeric codes, as described in Chapter
One, however these codes are not usually what is emphasized to consumer test-takers.
Rather than being presented with mtDNA haplogroup codes in their test results reports,
most test-takers are predominately presented with, and are generally seeking, data in a
form that corresponds to terrestrial geographic areas and human cultural or ethnic groups.
When Jasmine at first concluded that the report meant that her ancestry, according to this
test, was “all European,” it is because the mtDNA haplogroup into which her (mtDNA)
genetic material was categorized is correlated with some population (maternal lineage) of
humans associated with the geopolitical area known today as Europe. There was,
consequently, no mention of Africa in the report.
What Jasmine did not, at first, know, was what a tiny fraction of her many
lineages the test was taking into account. Given how mtDNA ancestry tests work, the
final outcome, the assignment to a maternal haplogroup, is reflective solely of one’s
singular maternal line; that is, the genetic material being examined is tracing what one
received from one’s biological-genetic mother, which was received from her biologicalgenetic mother, which was received from her biological-genetic mother, and so forth,
back to ancient and even prehistoric times.
To bring the analogy closer to home in time, consider the portion of your ancestry
contained in your mtDNA when accounting for just five generations. One generation
back (as pertains to your ancestry from your genetic parents’ generation), your mtDNA is
inherited from just one-half of your ancestral tree. Two generations, one-fourth. Three
generations, one-eighth. Four generations, one-sixteenth. Five generations, one-thirty-

175

second. In other words, if you consider your human ancestry back just five generations,
your mtDNA is traceable to just one particular great, great, great grandmother, and none
of your 31 other ancestors.
Now expand this exponential calculation backwards over hundreds, thousands,
and tens of thousands of years. Any new knowledge that Jasmine, or any mtDNA
ancestry test-taker, might gain through this type of test pertains only to this singular,
maternal, line of descent, no matter over what period of time. All other ancestral lines,
both maternal and paternal, are not included. This is what Jasmine thought could have
been explained better during the experience of registering for and taking the test, and
definitely before reading the results. And Jasmine is not alone.
It should be interjected here that African Ancestry does at present explain how the
two types of tests that they offer work (both the matrilineal and the patrilineal genetic
ancestry tests), and I would assume that they did offer such explanations, in some manner
and to some degree, at the time that Jasmine took the test. That being the case, their
explanatory statements, along with that of other companies that offer similar services,
could use significant improvement, and should be placed more prominently in marketing
materials and in all ancestry reports. One thing that has pointed me towards this position
is that, although I cannot speak statistically to the commonality of this sort of experience,
I have come across so many of these human narratives, via video and audio and written
materials, about mtDNA tests, where the test-taker featured, at least initially, was very
confused and frustrated by unexpected results. This is also the case with Y-DNA tests,
also known as paternal genetic lineage tests, which operate differently in terms of what
genetic materials are sequenced, but the results of which contain in parallel information
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about a singular line of genetic heritage. Phrases like, “DNA Surprise,” “Ancestry
Shocker,” and “WTF” are not uncommon in titles. Sometimes the test-taker’s emotional
upset, or even state of emotion that should be described with words that indicate much
greater intensity and significance, does not subside by the end of the video, article, or
other text. Thankfully, in Jasmine’s case, and due to her prompt questioning and seeking
of knowledge, it did.
Viewer-listeners of the video were able to see and hear Jasmine as she described
this freshly learned information, that this variety of genetic ancestry test takes into
account only one singular and particular line in the immense tree that represents her
ancestry. This knowledge appeared to make Jasmine feel at least partially relieved of her
previous anxiety or concern; she now knew that the test results should not be interpreted
as signifying that she has “no African ancestry,” but rather that this test traced only one
singular line of (all maternal) ancestry, and that that one particular, singular line of
ancestry was associated with Europe rather than Africa.
Jasmine gained this scientific knowledge and communicated it in what appeared
to be a matter of minutes. Jasmine’s understandable frustration was that the information
required to prompt this new scientific knowledge was not made available in a more
upfront manner, that it was not communicated by the genetic ancestry testing service with
clarity and greater emphasis. It appears that some good measure of Jasmine’s surprise and
upset could have been prevented with relative ease—perhaps a well-designed graphic of a
genetic family tree, with that one line of descent highlighted in bold, featured
prominently on all test-related materials.

177

With this new scientific-theoretical understanding in place, Jasmine now has a
revised way to interpret the data that she received from African Ancestry. Rather than
understanding the assignation of an mtDNA haplogroup as representative of her geneticgenealogical ancestral identity as a whole, Jasmine now relays to the viewer that the
nature of the information provided in the report is far more limited in its scope.
Jasmine’s revised interpretation of the report is now this: At some point along the
line in her maternal genetic lineage as it points towards the past, one comes to a single
woman who is (at least according to this categorization method and schema) European in
origin. At what point along the line this occurs cannot be known with the given
information. The moment could be in the far distant past, very close to the present, or
anywhere in between.

Having examined the epistemological change that we can perceive in Jasmine’s
understanding of her test results that have to do with scientific knowledge, we come to
the second variety of knowledge gained over the course of this narrative, which was
indicated previously: familial knowledge. This beckons our analysis back to that
moment-aspect of time-life not captured in the video, Jasmine’s phone call to her mother,
and also to the possible connection between that familial-historical knowledge changedgained and the scientific knowledge changed-gained.
After the jump cut, when Jasmine un-paused the video recording, she told her
viewers-listeners what she had learned during that phone call. According to her mother, it
was known, through family history, that either her great, great, great grandmother, or her
great, great, great, great grandmother was white. This white (singularly) matrilineal
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ancestor was said to have lived in America. No more detail about the family history that
might have been relayed by her mother was shared by Jasmine in the video.
Jasmine concluded from this conversation that this ancestor of whom her mother
was speaking was probably the source of the European matrilineal heritage that showed
up in the (mtDNA) genetic test that Jasmine had taken. Is the result of Jasmine’s
(probabilistic) inference true? Very possibly, it is true. It is also possibly the case that this
lineage of mtDNA labeled “European” initiates from a different woman who lived at
some other point along the timeline of Jasmine’s matrilineal lineage. Regardless, it is
notable that the receipt of this familial-historical information too appeared to result in a
significant change in thinking for Jasmine.

Now, what is epistemologically interesting here is that, while it might appear
superficially to be the case that all that has been discussed so far (aside from the familial
knowledge gained) are scientific facts of the empirically-verifiable variety—or, as one
might say, what Jasmine learned about her test results might be summed up with a
science lesson (or, as noted, a good graphic might do the job)—this is not the case. Upon
closer examination, or, more specifically, upon taking the social-ness of this type of
(scientific) knowledge into account—seriously and with care—we perceive that the
boundaries between the group assignations being made are not so clear or simple, or,
more specifically, are structured by lattices of (social) ideas about race and geographicpolitical origin.
To examine more closely the concepts of (kinds-aspects of) human (social)
identity that are present in this narrative, it is helpful to list those identities-identifiers that
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are stated explicitly by Jasmine: Black woman, African American, African, European,
mother, grandmother (great grandmother, etc.), white woman, and American. This list
includes identities-identifiers that might be tagged correctly as concepts that connote
race, sex, gender, ethnicity, nationality, native and/or ancestral geographic origin, and
familial relation, among other varieties of identity, and it is inclusive of concepts of
human identity both as means of self-identification (in this case, by Jasmine, and also her
mother as reported by Jasmine) and as means of identification-by-others (in this case, by
African Ancestry, and more broadly in this social-political-cultural-scientific context).
Indeed, there is mostly agreement among these perspectives on group identities (selfascribed and other-ascribed), but where there is a perceived lack of agreement, that is
where discomfort and questions arise, sometimes even great personal emotional turmoil
and social crisis. That is the moment that it typically becomes clear why these
problematics are so important in individual persons’ lives—and why they are important
to analyze and discuss, rather than being taken at (what appears to be) face-value.
It should also be emphasized (emphatically) that all of this is not to say that these
concepts, these types of identities-identifiers, are discrete and clearly delineable from one
another in human life as it is lived-experienced, whether their definitionsconceptualizations are agreed upon or not. On the contrary (and even when definitions
are agreed upon), they are intricately interrelated. These concepts we analytically
distinguish from one another, and name, and call “identities” or “forms of identity” or
“types of identity,” are not manifest in lived experience as separate varieties of
experience. It would be a mistake to conflate these concepts with lived experiences, and
specifically those aspects of these concepts which might be (mistakenly) interpreted to
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indicate that they are anything but simultaneously manifest in human life and
interdependent in their existences. It is not as though any person experiences, for relevant
example, their race or racial identity and gender or gender identity separately. It is an
abstraction, and perhaps a creation or construction as well, to separate them.

Holding, and hoping, that this process of conceptual abstraction-delineation of
forms of identity is not (always) futile or harmful (that is, that there are some instances in
which reflecting on these varieties of identity in isolation from one another is indeed
useful, if only for practical reasons, and towards reasoned moral ends), our focus in this
analysis will remain focused primarily on how and what concepts of race are manifest in
this narrative.
To continue with this focus, in addition to considering that which is explicitly
stated, it is also useful to consider what is assumed or implied, but not stated explicitly, in
the video. In this manner it is possible to examine the social-political-cultural contextgroundwork of the narrative by way of making note of what is absent—what is assumed
to be believed-known by all parties, or at least among audiences likely to be watching the
video. As previously noted, Jasmine did not feel compelled to explain to her YouTube
audience why she as a Black woman and an African American would be upset upon
reading a scientific report that did not acknowledge her African ancestry.
There is a clear and presupposed, shared assumption among Jasmine and her
audience that the terms “Black” and “African” are related. There is likewise a (culturallyeducationally) shared assumption that the terms “white” and “European” are related.
And, in this epistemological context of genetic ancestry, there is even a interchangeability
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in the usage of these racial and geographic-political identifiers. As pairs of terms, they are
used oppositely, though not in a completely oppositional manner. In this narrative, Black
is interchangeable with “of African descent,” and white is interchangeable with “of
European descent,” and Black does mean, in some way, not white, but the inclusion of
one (or some) line(s) of white or European ancestry does not negate one’s present-day
Black or African descendant identity.
Therefore, in this narrative, it might be said that total (or 100%) African descent is
not required insofar as the concept of Black and African American as a racial identityidentifiers are concerned. Furthermore, I do not think that it is a stretch to presume that
Jasmine did not assume total or 100% African ancestry would be the result in her report.
But Jasmine did, according to her statement, expect Africa to be referred to in some way.
Perhaps what she expected was a list of percentages, as is found in reports resultant from
other types of direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry testing (and as will be analyzed in
other individual-personal narrative cases), with the continent of Africa or some
subdivisions of it making up, at least, some significant part of that list.
As for how the concept of white as a racial identity-identifier might be construed
from this narrative, it is evident that the rules are not similarly structured (pointing again
towards the non-genetic reality of race). This is to be expected given the sociohistorical
origins of these racial identities, of these (colonial and capitalistic) ideas about races
among humans, of Black and of white. To examine more closely how they are
functioning in this particular case with regards to whiteness (I utilize this term in the
manner of Linda Martín Alcoff,217 whose work was a part of the literature review and
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will arise again in this chapter’s analyses), it is necessary to consider Jasmine’s geneticgenealogical ancestral origin story as it is being reported in this narrative.

Considering again that long singular line of Jasmine’s mtDNA ancestry as it
might be traced backwards in time—highlighted boldly against the backdrop of the
uncountable other branches that comprise Jasmine’s ancestral tree—it was envisioned
that, at some point along that exclusively matrilineal branch, one encounters a European
or white woman. (According to what we know of Jasmine’s mtDNA test results, it is not
known whether that point is close in time or very distant. According to the additional
familial knowledge gained by Jasmine through conversation with her mother, that point is
likely just a few generations back, within the reach of her family’s oral history. Neither of
these varieties of knowledge, scientific nor familial, exclude the possibility of white or
European ancestors in other branches of the tree.)
Focusing in on that point which represents this white woman in the (singularlyexclusively) matrilineal branch, we see that this is an inflection point in terms of (social)
racial identifiers; here they do not, as in other places along the line, remain steady
between succeeding generations. Looking at this point (q), which represents a person
whom Jasmine’s mother described as a “white woman” (and whom the report indicated
was “European,” if these sources of data are correctly correlative), we might follow the
highlighted line backward in time to a point which represents this white woman’s mother
(p). This woman must also be (according to this schema and understanding) a white
woman. Now, returning to the initial point of focus (q) and traveling forward in time
(towards the lifetime of Jasmine) we see a point that represents q’s daughter, r. This
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woman is (according to this schema and understanding) a Black woman. In one
generation the racial identity-identifier-identification changes from one to the other, in
this instance from (simply) “white” to (simply) “black,” this in this insipidly hierarchical
system of racialization.
What is this schema and understanding? In short form—and from a matrilineal
perspective—it is that Black mothers always beget Black children regardless of the racial
identity of the father, whereas white mothers only beget white children if the father is
also white, and consequently, and with regards to Black racial identity, white mothers
beget Black children if the father is Black. If one were standing at too far of a distance
from humanity, not taking into account the sociohistoriocity of the question, it might
seem that it is the case that Black racial identification is the societally dominant, more
socially powerful, form of human racial identity in the hierarchy of racial identifiers. That
perhaps, parallel to the case in patriarchal-patrilineal cultures, wherein a child’s familial
identity-identifier is typically received from the father rather than the mother, that the
racial identity-identifier of a child is received from a Black parent rather than the white
parent in a display or signifier of superiority and power. But this analogy, of course, is
fully flawed and misleading in its explanation of how race and racism operates, and
demonstrates one of the myriad ways in which types of human identity (in this instance,
race and sex-gender) cannot be assumed to operate in parallel fashion.

This asymmetrical, socially hierarchical, defining of Black and white racial
identities may and has been explained many times in terms of the “one-drop rule” and
definitions of whiteness as purity. (How “purity” is enrolled over and over again in
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discussions-actions having to do with race, and also other forms of identity as manifest in
the practice of DNA ancestry testing, cannot be understated.) It is also a dualistic or
perhaps rather a polarized system, insofar as, although races other than these two are
acknowledged in their existences, these are the two ends of the pole, with whiteness
always pointing itself upward, and (purportedly) clearly defined lines in-between.
It is at this point in the analysis that looking towards particular philosophical
theories about the nature of Black and white racial identities, and other intersecting forms
of human identity, both racial and otherwise, is most helpful in advancing
comprehension. This will be accomplished by first relaying an analysis of the “one drop
rule” as provided by Charles W. Mills, and as will be demonstrated is most relevant in
this case analysis. Also incorporated is some of the social scientific work of Duana
Fullwiley about the contentious correlations among genetic scientific approaches and
social understandings of human identities, especially Fullwiley’s conception of “the
enculturated gene.” Then, with an anti-essentialist (and therefore anti-geneticallyessentialist) stance in place, there is the beginning of a seeking of a new foundation for,
or ways of, understanding the realities of race as they are manifest in this scientifictechnological-industrial-personal-social movement.

The “one-drop rule” as an academic discourse that attempts to encapsulate the
hierarchical, racist, asymmetry in concepts of Black and white, points towards the
sociohistoricity of race, and thus can enable the understanding of race as something other
than an essence, which in the context of this genetically-inspired analysis might be
equated with an empirically verified-verifiable genetic fact about human beings.
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In “‘But What Are You Really?’: The Metaphysics of Race,”218 Charles W. Mills,
while developing an anti-essentialist ontology of race, mentions these discourses about
the “one-drop rule,” emphasizing how it is a rule that is not only culturally relative on the
basis of it varying in different places and at different times, but also in that it is
unmistakably and almost uniquely particular to the United States of America, that place
that is sometimes called just “America.” Mills writes, “Indeed, as commentators often
point out, the U.S. one-drop rule for determining membership in the ‘black’ race—that is,
any ‘black’ blood makes you black—is practically unique even in this world. Many of
those categorized as blacks in the United States would be categorized as
browns/mulattoes or even whites in the Caribbean and Latin America.”219
It might also be pointed out that even variation within the ”one-drop rule,” (and
even within the geopolitical boundaries of the United States), both in different places and
at different times, also points towards the correctness of an anti-essentialist mode for
understanding race. The “one-drop rule” was never held so steadfast and all-important as
its name appears to signify, or as its white supremacist proponents evangelized.
In this passage and the surrounding text, Mills, in order to make his antiessentialist argument, brings out a variety of ways in which the one-drop rule might be
and has been understood, showing how it is an essentialist sort of understanding about
human beings and their identities that ultimately defines race-races in terms of (a
hierarchy of) natural essences, and furthermore, how that sort of understanding is (in
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contrast to its often natural-empirical appearance and presentation) sociohistorically
formed. It is not natural; it has been naturalized.
In addition to giving particular contrasting historical examples, such as the ones
cited here having to do with the Caribbean and Latin America, Mills asks his readers to
reflect creatively upon how science fiction writers sometimes engage with this topic—for
example, creating scenarios in which this human racial hierarchy poled by Black and
white (or rather, by White and black) is inverted or otherwise upset—in order to prompt
their readers-listeners-viewers-experiencers into considering these issues in a new way,
comfortably and entertainingly (and often beautifully) encapsulated by the realm of
fiction.
If we follow this ontology, and associated epistemology, as it is relayed and
analyzed by Mills, it is possible to perceive how closely (at least) these two key aspects
of the idea-concept of race are interrelated. Mills establishes not only that (a) race is a
social idea having origins in time-space that can be described historically, and that (b) the
concept of race is essentialist, but also that (a + b) these two aspects of the concept of
race are inextricably tied to one another. A primary characteristic of that connection is
that racialism-racism, as historically formed, is part of a realism of the sort that “is
associated with a belief in natural kinds with defining essences.”220 In this sort of
essentialist-realist mode of belief-understanding, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive how it is that things are changing over time (that is, in part, their
sociohistoricity), and thus how it is that things that seem to have always been so may not
have always been so (and may not even have been for all that long). These
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contemplations will be resumed in the Conclusion where the analyses undertaken in this
chapter will be considered integratively in their philosophical implications.
Therefore, race is demonstrated—in this U. S. sociohistorical context, and
according to an analysis of the one-drop rule—to have been essentialist in its origin and
its ongoing, but varying descriptions. Simultaneously, however, it has been shown that
race cannot (logically) and should not (ethically) be described in this way, not only due to
essentialist racialism and racism so often operating in tandem, but also because this
description is internally non-sensical. Race cannot be an essence, a “natural kind” of the
sort sought in natural scientific research and critiqued in philosophy of science, if so, it
would not be so easy to show how it varies over place and time according to culture.
Following, to think of race in terms of purity is also lacking logic; as there are no static,
delineable “kinds” of any sort (natural, sociohistorical, or otherwise) against which such
purity might be measured. Race is rather a sociohistorical, contingent, idea about humans,
by humans. Much more about this might be said, and some will be, in survey form,
before concluding this analysis. To say that race is sociohistorical is indeed just a
beginning—to determine more precisely what it is and has been is a far more
multifaceted endeavor.

Returning our attention again to Jasmine’s case, it is perhaps now even clearer
how it is that the narrative is dependent on what might be called “one-drop thinking” and
concepts of purity in human group categorization. (I term it here “one-drop thinking”
rather than the “one-drop rule” to emphasize it as an epistemological state characterized
by fixation on purity rather than an inflexible regulation.) This is evident when the
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narrative is examined in terms of the epistemological changes in both the scientific and
familial realms described previously.
What is occurring in the scientific realm can be analyzed utilizing some of the
modes gained from the survey of the social scientific literature in the previous chapter
(Chapter Two). Since it is the case in the narrative, according to the ancestry DNA test
taken, that Jasmine’s mtDNA lineage is “European” in origin, we might ask—knowing
the great conceptual distance-difference between what is mtDNA (a molecular structure)
and what is European (a contemporary geopolitical designation, considered as a form of
human identity in this analysis), how might this relation be well-described and
comprehended?
It was noted in the literature review that Duana Fullwiley especially seems to
have a real way with words when it comes to describing this relation. Two of these
elegant descriptive phrases include “the molecularization of race”221 and “the
enculturated gene.”222 While the anthropological studies Fullwiley is relaying in the
course of turning these phrases is focused on the biological reification of race in the
context of specifically medical research and practice, it might be more broadly applied to
genetics, and then reconsidered within the context of this humanistic analysis of DNA
ancestry testing.
The phrase “the enculturated gene” is especially useful in a broad variety of
analyses insofar as it does not have to do with race in particular. In thinking about

221

Fullwiley, Duana. “The Molecularization of Race: Institutionalizing Human Difference in
Pharmacogenetics Practice.” Science as Culture, vol. 16, no. 1, Mar. 2007, pp. 1–30.
222
Fullwiley, Duana. The Enculturated Gene: Sickle Cell Health Politics and Biological Difference in West
Africa. 2017.

189

Jasmine’s (single-line) maternal lineage as European, a question is, do we perceive this
sort of enculturation taking place? I argue yes. European as a descriptor of a human, one
that is taken to be of such importance and significance that it is called an “identity” (that
is, an aspect-concept of who we are in relation to one another as human persons) is surely
bound up in ideas that proceed from the geographic, to the cultural and political.
To begin with the apparently simpler, the geographic, among the continents, as
typically counted in English as being seven in number, Europe and Asia are curiously
differently defined in terms of their boundaries as compared with the other five. Africa,
Australia, North America, South America, and Antarctica—as large swaths of earth
surrounded by water, not including those smaller bodies of land around them, such as
islands, that are often marked as parts of continents on geopolitical maps—have
boundaries that might be discerned by just about anyone looking at a globe un-labelled by
political borders. But how might a politically uninformed spectator looking at that same
un-labelled globe count the continents? Would they see this range of land—called with
separation indicated “Europe and Asia,” sometimes together as “Eurasia”—as one or as
two (or perhaps more)? I would think as one, considering the all-surrounding water as
defines the other continents, but if somehow as two, then where would the line betwixt be
drawn?
The uncertainty and political character of the Asia-Europe boundary became very
apparent in public debate in the United States in recent months with regards to the war
that is currently ongoing in Ukraine. Early on in news and government reports, and other
widely distributed and received sources, there was—as was critically pointed out at the
time by some commentators—a strong emphasis on communicating to the reader-viewer-
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listener-audience that Ukraine is, in fact (as it was stated), a European nation or country.
Critics (of whom I am aware) who noted the emphatic way that this conceptualizationidentification was propagated over and over again did so in order to point out imbalances
in the ways that war and human suffering are reported on a global scale. These critics
point towards the ways that conflicts-wars-violence in other regions of the world (as it
turns out, any place other than Europe, due in large part to the history of European
imperialisms and colonialisms) habitually receive less attention and are generally
described as less atrocious than similar or even lesser-scale actions of violence taking
place in Europe.
But why did the propagandists and their repeaters have to work so hard to
emphasize to U.S. audiences that Ukraine is “in” Europe (and furthermore that it is an
independent nation-state within Europe that is European in its cultural character)? It is
because they were fighting a steeply uphill battle. Although one strong element, also
noted by commentators, is the racial whiteness of the majority the Ukrainian citizenrypopulation-people, also surely at the core of this is an idealized American political
imagination which continues to be (re)generated in significant part with the concept of
American and European identities standing allied in almost direct opposition to the
concept of Soviet identity. Embedded in this “Western”/USSR dualistic schema of
identification are elements-stereotypes ranging the gamut of culture and politics,
including, perhaps most centrally, an economic division between the proponents of
capitalism and the proponents of socialism. (Here I do not mean to imply that these two
economic frameworks are in practice/historically diametrically opposed, but rather that
they are perceived or put forward in this way within the context of this post-/neo- “Cold
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War” ideology. Difference is exaggerated and given the appearance of the absolute, even
naturalized at times.) This leads to significant epistemological resistance among many
Americans (U.S.) to the idea that a former Soviet state has its location Europe.
All of this is such recent history, not even a century long, and yet, it too, I would
argue, is embedded in the categorization schema of Jasmine’s ancestry DNA test.
Although part of this analysis has been to show the manner in which this test does not
demonstrate that Jasmine’s identity is “European,” insofar as it might be demonstrative of
European identity (in a limited capacity, along that single maternal line), what does that
mean given the previous line of questioning about the problematics of defining Europe
both geographically and culturally-politically-historically? Furthermore, this is just a few
example problematics among many associated with the boundaries of large geopolitical
zones and their various subdivisions. Also to mind comes Edward Said’s understandingtheory of “Orientalism,” and V. Y. Mudimbe on “the invention of Africa” and “the idea
of Africa.” When combined (and I’m thinking of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined
communities” in combination with this as well) the Eurocentric conceptualization and
compartmentalization of the world is evident, from a number of geopolitical and more
broadly cultural perspectives. (These theories will arise again in the next narrative case
analysis.) The question remains, is this Eurocentricism of geopolitical boundaries an
important aspect of what is going on in this scientific-technological-industrial-personalsocial movement? So far, the evidence indicates that it is.
The gene, in Fullwiley’s terminology, turns out to be very much enculturated in
Jasmine’s case, and enculturated specifically with a Eurocentric ideology. In this
narrative, the genetic test results have been demonstrated to be embedded with ideas of
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racialism-racism (in the forms of “one-drop thinking” and purism), and ultimately a
geographic ideology that appears unconcerned with distinguishing among the boundaries
of political power and the physical features of the planet (and, consequently, its people).
Nothing even remotely resembling “decolonization” as conceived by Frantz Fanon is to
be found, and perhaps its opposite is in action.

Although I have utilized Fullwiley’s conception of “the enculturated gene” in
order to prompt and deepen a discussion about geopolitical (in this case, pseudocontinental) identity as it shows up in Jasmine’s case, this conception is also applicable to
race, though differently, and that is in fact its originating conceptual realm in Fullwiley’s
earlier work wherein she refers to the “molecularization of race.” To incorporate a
personal-historical aside that relates, I am certain that whenever it was that I learned of a
disease called “sickle cell,” that I simultaneously learned that it was a “black disease.”
Fullwiley’s study, encapsulated in her monograph, The Enculturated Gene: Sickle Cell
Health Politics and Biological Difference in West Africa, demonstrates not only how
errant this simple originating idea is from a global perspective, but also, through the
creation of an ethnography focused on how this disease manifests in human life in Dakar,
Senegal, shows how even within this relatively broad category of disease called “sickle
cell” that there has been measurable bias in its study to the great detriment of those
suffering from the disease in some places more than other. In other words, Fullwiley
shows the manner in which there is both epistemological and ethical effect to how genes
are thought about, studied, and applied in actual medical practice.
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Fullwiley is theorizing on the molecular and social levels (and examining the
possible interconnections between these two levels), and, as that is what is required in
these analyses as well, applying her theory as a model or mode for understanding DNA
ancestry testing has been very useful. In her work, Fullwiley identified ways that sickle
cell disease, defined genetically as certain sequences of DNA, interrelated (and
interrelates) multitudinously with the complex sociopolitical environment of Dakar and in
West Africa more broadly. In parallel, what we are continuing to inquire into here is how
it is that the identifying polymorphisms in Jasmine’s mtDNA became associated with
identification as European, and also as white. What does this mean about our knowledges
of racial identity? What does this mean about our knowledges of geopolitical identities
(often conflated with geographic ancestry in the context of this movement)?

Some important questions and answers have been highlighted in this analysis,
utilizing especially the theorizations of Charles W. Mills and of Duana Fullwiley, but that
is not to say that there is not so much more analytical work that might be done. Reflecting
back upon the many potential sources of models or modes of understanding the
intricacies of these forms-aspects of human identity as outlined in the literature reviews,
there are so many possibilities, I believe, for continued fruitful work.
How might, for example, and continuing with Mills, we think about “the racial
contract” as operational in this narrative? There are those persons and groups who in the
position to affect how these lines (boundaries between human groups) are drawn and
those person and groups who are not, and to varying degrees and in varying ways. Testtakers and test-makers are not equal in their contributions to these determinations; they
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are not all party to the contract. At the same time, these tests are purportedly universal in
the sense that they is called and advertised as scientific; the contract purports universality.
This tune rings familiar.
Another great chasm left by this (so far thoroughly anti-essentialist) analysis is: if
race is not an essence, then, what is it? We know that it is a mistake to say that it is
nothing. While it is (at the moment) beyond the scope of this case analysis to consider the
breadth of answers to this question that have been proposed over time, this absence might
at least be partially remediated by the giving of a few examples.
It has been demonstrated that, in the instance of Jasmine’s genetic ancestry test,
essentialist ideas of several varieties are at play. It has likewise been demonstrated that
these essentialist ideas are scientifically errant and stand, in part, on a capitalistic and
white supremacist foundation of disregard for human life as anything other than a
resource. But there are other aspects of the concept of race that are present as well when
we look beyond the test results and pay attention to Jasmine’s shaping of her narrative.
When Jasmine speaks of herself as a Black woman, it is an affirmation conveyed
with a sense of purpose. When Jasmine begins to ask questions about the results of her
test, and also about her racial identity, it is with epistemological agency and moral
purpose; she is seeking knowledge about something which she values. I think now of, for
example, the discourses of négritude, Afrocentricity, Pan-Africanism, Black Power, each
reaching in different ways to define Black, African, and African diasporic identities in
affirmative, constructive ways rather than solely deconstructively or as problems.
To focus, briefly, on négritude—both as concept and as social movement, as
theory and the simultaneous application of it—it was widely-considered to have
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originated with Aimé Césaire of Martinique, and further developed by Léopold Sédar
Senghor of Senegal, Léon Damas of French Guiana, along with many other intellectuals
of varying disciplinary and creative backgrounds and interests. Ali A. Mazrui describes
négritude as “a celebration of African identity and uniqueness,” emphasizing the process
of identity formation and preservation inherent in the concept, and also the exciting and
celebratory aspects of the movement. 223 Mazrui also writes that although Césaire is
credited with coining the term, it is in Senghor that he finds its greatest proponent,
especially in the artistic-aesthetic realm. Hannington Ochwada discusses the ontology of
Senghor’s négritude, describing it as having a binary constitution composed of both the
“old” Africa and the “new,” modern Africa in the process of being formed.224 This very
much aligns with the affirmative aspects of négritude previously mentioned.
Broadly speaking (and as noted previously in the literature review), négritude may
be defined as an ideology or set of ideologies that affirms the positive value of Black
consciousness and Black identity. It can be thought of as a manifestation of resistance to
colonialism by intellectuals of Africa and the African diaspora, but négritude also, as is
emphasized by Reiland Rabaka in The Negritude Movement, might be understood as part
of an ongoing process of both creativity and resistance beginning (at least) with the work
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of W.E.B. Du Bois, and continuing through the writings of Frantz Fanon and beyond.225
In other words, négritude is a reaction in the sense that it certainly responds to the
colonial and post-colonial state of affairs, however it is also an (proactive) action of its
own accord in the sense that it flowed from previous intellectual and artistic traditions of
Africa and the African diaspora, and I might also add the never simple ongoingness of
human-beings-in-the-world making and creating things. (Also notable is that the word
itself is, according to many scholars, a manifestation of resistance since it involves the
embrace of a term or group of terms that had historically been used in an alienating and
derogatory manner.226)
Furthermore, continuing to probe some of those various complexities in this case
that might not be in agreement with, or might even resist, the dominant narrative of race
as defined along the lines of essentialist conceptualizations and “one-drop thinking” (as I
am arguing is often displayed in and encouraged by genetic ancestry test reports), and
based upon what Jasmine provided in the video, we do not know what Jasmine might
reply if asked, for example, about the racial identities of those women whose lives made
up those generations in-between Jasmine and the white matrilineal ancestor that her
mother told her about. What, for example, might she reply if asked about the racial
identity of the woman who was the daughter of that “white woman”? Would Jasmine
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identify that ancestor as Black, as biracial, multiracial, of mixed ethnicity or race, or
using some other terminology of identity or combination of identities-identifiers? We do
not know. Considering these possible replies, however, also shows further room for
analysis of what race is or might be (not just what it is not) in this and in similar narrative
cases, and how it is never simple. (The list of ways in which ethnicity and race cannot be
described in genetic terms continues to grow and multiply.)

This all is to emphasize that, according to many humanistic and social scientific
ways of thinking, to analyze race in a dismantling way is not enough, and that
furthermore, it is an incorrect mode when employed in isolation, in both epistemological
and ethical terms. To reiterate a quote from Charles W. Mills included in the literature
review, “That race should be irrelevant is certainly an attractive ideal, but when it has not
been irrelevant, it is absurd to proceed as if it had been.”227 The primary aim may be to
dismantle white supremacist (colonial, patriarchal) social structures, but at the same time
racial identification is an aspect of human life-identity that for many persons and
communities, and with intention and good will, extends far beyond the concepts and
actions of inhumanity and exploitation with which it began in a historical sense. This is
also so true of many other aspects-forms of human identity and ways of being-in-theworld, and that especially cannot be forgotten in its necessity as a component for social
change. Again, I think this all supports the claim that humanistic approaches are highly
valuable, even necessary, in analyses done to better our understanding of experiences of
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DNA ancestry testing, and more comprehensively this scientific-technological-industrialsocial movement.

Analysis of Narrative Case II: Aurelie
The second personal narrative case to be analyzed herein is that of genetic
ancestry test-taker Aurelie, one of 67 total participants in a professionally produced series
of minidocumentaries by momondo. Individual videos featuring the narratives of six out
of the 67 participants are posted on momondo’s YouTube channel.228 (It might also be
noted that these videos are posted again on Ancestry’s corporate channel, 229 dated
individually approximately two weeks after the videos on momondo’s channel.) The
video focused on Aurelie’s “journey” is one of these six. It is titled, “The DNA Journey
feat. Aurelie.”230
There is an introductory video231 made for the series which introduces it to the
audience in a highly provocative way, emphasizing the emotional reactions of the
participants. Shallow focus brings attention to faces and small gestures and other
movements. In the midst of a montage featuring close-ups of test-taker’s emotional
reactions—some with mouths open and stunned eyes, some with tears—the first words
the viewer is presented with are, “Would you dare to question who you really are?”
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Each of the videos focused on individual test-takers is about three minutes in
length, and begins with the same motto, written starkly in white, all-capital letters
centered on an entirely black background, “To celebrate diversity in the world // We set
out to find it in our DNA.” Already we find in these brief, bold statements that
connections are to be drawn between the socially macroscopic and the individually
microscopic.
Here I think of how often it is that the terminology of “diversity” is included in
discourses about “identity” to indicate a combination or amalgamation of different typesaspects of human identity, including race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender,
sexuality… the list is long and important. We continue to ask the question, can (all that,
or even some good measure of it) be found in the patterns of sequences of nucleotides?

Immediately following the motto, the image and sound cuts to Aurelie singing, in
French, “La Marseillaise,” the national anthem of France. She sings with gusto and a
broad smile that spreads to her eyes, raising a fist to accentuate the highest note in the
melodic line.
The stage is set for drama. The majority of the video footage seems to be shot in
one large room, designed with warm, comforting tones of wooden beige and golden
brown. It looks like a room designed for small conferences or large meetings, and it is set
up in two different configurations over the course of the video. The music underscoring
the action is slow-moving, minor, and features at the high end of the tonal spectrum
echoing human-ish sounds that might be singing, but we cannot be sure. I can’t help but
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think of the soundtrack to Aguirre, der Zorn Gottes232—not quite so dark, but curious,
heavy, and expectant.

In the first portion of the video, Aurelie is seated at a table with two interviewers
facing towards her. The scene almost looks like a job interview. In this portion of the
video, Aurelie is asked direct questions about her knowledge of her ancestry, and also
about what she expects will be the results of her genetic ancestry test. This portion was
(we are informed) recorded in a separate session weeks before the second portion, and
before Aurelie receives the results of her genetic ancestry test.
In the second portion of the video, there are many more people present in the
room. The long, rectangular table where the interviewers-hosts sit is still present, but
Aurelie is not seated with them. Instead, we might notice in the far background that
Aurelie is seated in the midst of a group of people (consisting of herself and the other
program participants), lined up in three tiered rows of theatrical-style seating along the
back wall. This is the “reveal” portion of the video, wherein the participants find out the
results of the test taken and are guided through discussing those results by the
interviewers.

As, it appears, with many of the test-takers, Aurelie lives in England. Over the
course of the initial interview (that which took place prior to Aurelie receiving the test
results), Aurelie gives (with specific prompting) a number of indicators about how she
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perceives her own identity and that of others in her family. (It will be kept in mind that
this three-minute video was undoubtedly brought into its final form through a process of
careful editing, and that therefore we do not know what else might have been said by
Aurelie, the interviewers, or others present, nor the precise sequence of the statements
and other actions, before, during, and after the recording of the video.)
Aurelie states, “I live in London now, but my family is all from France.” To give
visual evidence of the second portion of this statement, the video shows Aurelie holding
up a vintage photograph featuring two elegantly dressed people seated at a dining table,
“Those are my grandparents on my mum’s side, quite awhile ago. Very French.”
The interviewers do not probe this reply (so far as we can tell in this concise
video), for example, by asking Aurelie what all comes to mind when she thinks about
what is “being French,” (note: one of Aurelie’s preferred modes of expressing this
relation is with forms of “to be”), or what is “French-ness,” or what is “French identity.”
It is possible that Aurelie might have replied anything from language to dress, to other
mores and customs, and with a variety of emphases. The narrative presented in the video
guides us directly to “nationality.” One of the interviewers inquire, “If you could be any
other nationality except French, what in your imagination would you like to be?” (Here
and in other quotes from the video, italic emphases are added for conceptual clarity and
are not indicative of a speakers’ emphatic vocal tone.)
Aurelie replies, “I don’t know, I quite like Italians, because, you know, they’re
super fiery and crazy and loud… I’d also quite like to be British, being, you know,
obviously, in London and I really have a great love and respect for that culture, so that
would be interesting.” She says this all with a dynamic smile and small, but passionate

202

body gestures; Aurelie comes across as a person who’d be fun to be around, and she
seems very engaged as a participant in this process.

After this initial dialog focused on ancestry as it is understood by Aurelie pretesting, the video quickly moves into the core action. The interviewers ask, “Aurelie, how
do you feel about going on a journey based on your own DNA?”
With just the slightest bit of perceivable, but curious, hesitancy, Aurelie answers,
“Um, yeah, I feel very intrigued I think.”
Aurelie spits. The interviewers announce to Aurelie and the listening-viewing
audience, “The story of you is in that tube.”
When Aurelie is asked to say what she expects will be the results of the test, she
seems to answer without hesitation and with certainty. “I think it’s going to be quite a
boring story… It’s going to be, oh yeah, you’re French, and wait, your grandparents are
French, and wait, your great, great, great grandparents are French.”

Another white-on-black intertitle appears on the screen. It reads, “2 weeks later.”
The group of participants files into the tiered rows of seating, set quite far back from the
interview table. Some adults have children seated with them.
“Aurelie. Sit down.” Aurelie is commanded rather sternly, or at least bluntly, by
one of the interviewers. The smirky tone of the command does remind one of “reality
TV”-style game show hosts working to keep the drama going. Aurelie comes to the table,
again smiling as before. After initial brief, pleasant greetings, Aurelie sits down to join
them, and the conversation among the interviewers and Aurelie begins. The interviewers
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ask Aurelie if she is nervous, and if she still wants to find out “what’s in that envelope.”
Aurelie replies in the affirmative to both questions. “100%” she says.
Aurelie is then handed the envelope containing the test results and asked to read
aloud. “Oh my god, wow, shit, I didn’t expect that” is the first utterance we hear. Some of
the participants in the audience chuckle softly. Aurelie appears filled with emotions and
whirling thoughts, at least one aspect of which is incredulity.
“I’m 32% British!?,” she exclaims in a questioning tone rising up at the end.
Much bigger laughs arise from the audience (sounding generally kind).
A close-up of the printed report fills the screen. The percentages, labeled with the
title “Ethnicity estimate,” are listed as follows: “Great Britain – 32%, Italy-Greece –
31%, Ireland – 17%, Spain-Portugal – 14%, Germany – 3%, Eastern Europe – 1%,
Finland-Russia – 1%, Scandinavia – 1%.”
As Aurelie reads the list, she says, “This is not me, you guys,” still smiling with a
little lilt, but with increasing apparent anxiety. Her smile which previously seems so
genuinely reflective of her personal feelings, now seems to be covering something up.
The big moment for Aurelie comes, “Hold on where’s French?!”
“There isn’t any French,” one of the interviewers answers.
In response Aurelie remains silent for a moment, looking back and forth
quizzically at the two interviewers.

After another cut, the video changes its tone. It feels, in that moment, that there is
a significant moment of time—of Aurelie’s experience—missing from the video. The
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raw, ambivalent emotion previously witnessed has calmed into some decision. Aurelie
has, at least, had a moment to reflect.
“I’m really happy actually,” says Aurelie.
I was surprised at this response the first time I saw the video.

Before the final sales pitch (there is one coming), the video gives time to Aurelie
to express some of her reasoning, that is, to explain some of why it is that she decides she
is happy with the results of her test, despite her initial disbelief, and despite the test
result’s (apparent) utter contradiction to what she expected.
Aurelie mentions the following three points: (1) that she lives in London; (2) that
she “never really felt at home in my own country, in France”; and (3) she also refers back
to the previous conversation that took place two weeks prior in which she said, “I’d love
to be Italian.” This segment is closed with Aurelie saying, “It’s almost like my genes
know better than I do.”

Due to the editing of the video, it is difficult to ascertain some certain details of
this narrative which relays Aurelie’s experience of taking a genetic ancestry test (and
doing so under these particular, and rather unusual, public circumstances). We might
have to fill-in certain gaps, and we could make errors in those addenda. At the same time,
it is evident that important epistemological changes are taking place in Aurelie’s thinking
with regards to her identity, and it should be possible to analyze them in some good
measure.
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It was noted previously that the interviewer’s questions are framed in terms of
“nationality.” Aurelie tends to reply with forms of “to be,” and uses “country” and
“culture” to refer to aspects of identity as well. There is also the mention of feelings
about “home,” indicating the crucialness of belonging in Aurelie’s sense-understanding
of identity. The genetic test report itself is labeled using the word “ethnicity.” In this
analysis, the primary focuses will be on nation and country as aspects of human identity.
Reflecting on the three-points given by Aurelie and taken in combination with
what we know to be the listed test results, an apparent aspect of Aurelie’s epistemological
(and emotional) transition has to do with being pleased with the idea of “being British,”
or to be more precise, with having her ethnicity estimate show a high percentage listed by
the geopolitical term “Great Britain.” As we know, she lives in London, England, a part
(the emanating core) of Great Britain, and early in the video expressed an appreciation
for what she termed “British culture.” So, in short form, Aurelie seems to like the idea of
having a genetic makeup that corresponds to a culture that she appreciates, and also likes
the idea of living in a place where all those things appear to adhere together (genetics,
place, culture). Aurelie wants to feel that she belongs, and perhaps her words also
indicate that this belonging is something she feels she has been lacking in her life in some
way. We might note again that all of this is replied (from what we hear in the video) to
conversational prompting that uses the terminology of “nationality” and a genetic report
that is headed by the term “ethnicity.” In the video, Aurelie herself does not use the term
“nation,” nor “nationality,” nor “ethnicity.”
To turn our consideration to the exclusionary, rather than that which has to do
with belonging, another apparent aspect of this transition has to do with being okay with
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“not being French.” There is a strong sense in which this is discordant with Aurelie’s
statements and positive emotional projection at the outset of the video. How might a
person who appears so certain of their own identity (and their ancestors’ identity, e.g.
“her great, great, great grandparents are French”), and its homogeneity, all of the sudden
seem fine with that homogeneity being upset and its center vanished? Not feeling at home
in a place I would think is a key. Why Aurelie did not feel “at home” in France—why she
did not feel included—though she calls it her “own country,” we do not know. There is
surely so much more to this story of human life that we cannot learn from the video
alone.
But there is another, absolutely crucial aspect of Aurelie’s (supposed) lack of
“being French” in this narrative, which—to be direct—I was shocked was not included
by the producers of this video. It is a major component of what drives me to write about
it.
There was no possibility that Aurelie’s test results would include “French” or,
rather, “France” (since the test results list the names of nation-states and combinations of
nation-states, rather than nationalities or other national[istic] identifiers). This has nothing
to do with Aurelie individually. France was not one of the possible “ethnicity” outcomes
of this test. Why the producers of the series did not mention this to Aurelie (or include it
in the video if she was indeed informed of this at the time), especially when she directly
asked, “Where’s French?” is a big question. It is my estimation that her question implies
heavily that Aurelie assumed “France” was a possible outcome of the test, and
furthermore, in an epistemological sense, that “France” is correctly a source-origin of
something that might be called “ancestry” or “ethnicity.”
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I do not mean to imply in any way here that I think Aurelie was wrong to have
this assumption about a test that proclaims to provide information about “ancestry” and
“ethnicity.” On the contrary, in the end it is my aim to demonstrate ways in which this
genetic ancestry test and similar fail to take into account the complexities of such
sociocultural knowledges and epistemologies, such as, for example, the understandings of
“French” and “British” that Aurelie projects. In some cases, I argue these acts of
inclusion and exclusion constitute forms of epistemic oppression233 and other injustices
and encouragements of injustice.
This gap in the informational (or metainformational) output of genetic ancestry
testing—that is, in this instance, that “France” or “French” is not a possible outcome—is
at the heart of this case analysis. Why is this so? More broadly (and this cannot be fully
tackled herein), what are all the different reasons we might perceive behind the inclusion
or exclusion of certain ancestries-ethnicities in these sorts of tests?

It is at this point in the analysis that it is sensible, and, for this analyzer, necessary,
to refer to and apply theory in order to address this problematic. Indeed, it is my good
fortune in having been acquainted with these theories that set off such (epistemological
and ethical) alarm bells when I first encountered this narrative. This acquaintance led me
to think that this list labeled “ethnicity estimate” with which Aurelie was being presented
looked a lot more like a list of contemporary nation-states than a list of ethnicities or
other human cultural-ancestral groupings or communities. I noted too that it seemed to be
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the interviewers who persistently interjected the language of “nationality,” and that
Aurelie herself preferred to define identity in terms of “country” and forms of “to be.”
In order to flesh out these differences and to consider the significance of (at least
in this case) the apparent conflation of “ethnicity” and “nationality” in DNA ancestry
testing, and also in response to Aurelie’s and many other persons’ preferential usage of
the language-concepts of “country,” I will apply the work of Benedict Anderson and
Kwame Anthony Appiah as seems so immediately relevant in this case. Also
incorporated briefly in this analysis are the conceptualizations of Edward Said and V. Y.
Mudimbe. From the sociological literature the research and theory of Alondra Nelson
will be utilized as they are related. A number of these theories-concepts-modes which
were discussed in some depth in the literature review will not be reiterated here, but
rather applied to the narrative. Of course, the works of so many others can and might be
applied to this or similar cases as a part of future research.

To begin, nationality in the way that it is being spoken of here is surely not
citizenship. If one were, for instance, standing in a government embassy and asked,
“What’s your nationality?” the appropriate reply in most moments would be to state the
nation-state(s) of one’s citizenship(s). Here that is clearly not the case. (And, incidentally,
we do not know Aurelie’s national citizenship or citizenships from what is presented in
the video.)
What is being sought and spoke about in this scientific-technological-industrialpersonal-social movement (so often) appears to be something that cannot be changed
about a person, something that cannot be altered through will nor through any actions, as
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citizenship can be in certain circumstances. It appears to be innate, part of “being” as
Aurelie might term it. Whether it is (always) essential or essentialist in the philosophical
sense is a good and driving question in this research. It also appears (somewhat
paradoxically) to be a very complex thing, having many different components or aspects
and emphases for different persons and among social groups of persons. It is here that the
concept-term “ethnicity” arises in the mind. I will admit that, even after being a student
of human identity in a scholarly sense for quite some time, I thought often that I really
didn’t know what was meant by the term “ethnicity.” I likewise know that I have avoided
using the term in many moments, perceiving it as always tinged by its usages and that of
related terms—especially “ethnic”—which appear to be so deeply Western or Global
North or Euroamerican-centric, always othering and exoticizing, and often
condescending. Ethnicity seemed like such a catch-all concept with such little specificity
and vague meaning, and following it seemed not to be of much analytical value when
employed in generalized-universalized ways. I still think this is true, to a degree, but I
also think that I have come to a better understanding of some of its epistemological
structures or characteristics, if not a good summary of its contents, through seeing so
many of its innumerable employments in genetic ancestry testing. In short, this research
project forced me to stop avoiding it. One conclusion that I have drawn is that I’m not
certain there is any way that “ethnicity” can be interpreted correctly as being employed as
anything other than an essentialist concept in the context of DNA ancestry testing. If I
ever find a counterexample to this conclusion, I will share it.
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So then, what sort of information is being sought and received, if it is not
something like citizenship (some changeable attribute), when we see these lists of
descriptors that so closely resemble the names of (political) nation-states (and more
encompassing geopolitical regions)? What all do the terms-concepts of nation or country
refer to or encompass in a broader sociocultural sense? In this case, why does France not
make the count as an “ethnicity” in the test? Why is French not an “ethnic option” 234?
In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism,235 as discussed somewhat extensively in the review of humanistic
literature,236 Benedict Anderson makes it multiply and abundantly clear that nations as
they exist today cannot be conceptually extracted from the tenants of nationalisms and
also, and specifically, European colonialisms. In short, a nation is a socially-constructed,
sociohistorical thing—in Anderson’s phrasing, “an imagined political community,” that
has become over time (so often and for so many persons and communities) naturalized,
both epistemologically and ethically (and in other ways, too). That is, nations in many
senses make the appearance of being so eternal, so important, so central to human life,
that they are perceived to be essential in and of themselves, and essential in and of those
persons who are deemed to be of the correspondent nationalities. The nation becomes a
defining part or aspect or characteristic of the person; nationality becomes inherent and
essential. This naturalization of nationality into ethnicity (also naturalized) is so evident
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in DNA ancestry testing, both in its scientific-technological foundations, and as found in
the discourses and narratives which constantly arise from it. As we know and can
demonstrate in many ways that (complex, social) ideas about nationality (and therefore,
as informed by Anderson, nationalism and colonialism) are a part of the scientific basis
of DNA ancestry testing (the constitution of the lists of “ethnicities” in both Jasmine’s
and Aurelie’s cases make good examples), we might also ask, does it or how might it act
as an encourager of what, in the end, are nationalistic and colonial ideas about ethnicity?
If that encouragement is taking place, how so, how dangerous, and how might it be
remedied?
It is impossible for me at this juncture not to mention also and again the works of
Edward W. Said and V. Y. Mudimbe (utilized in the first narrative case analysis). Though
their theoretical offerings as I have referred to them in this chapter and in the literature
review do not focus primarily on nations, but rather even larger geopolitical entities (the
“Orient” and “Africa, respectively), they too are so helpful and relevant in understanding
the complexities of the development-naturalization of geopolitical assignations into
human identity. In Orientalism, 237 Said demonstrates the Western formulation of the
“Orient” and “Orientalism,” and is critical of it both in its aspects as an element of
widespread European cultural practices through history and in its formation as an
academic study which in many ways only encouraged misunderstanding,
marginialization, and ultimately, the continuation of colonial or colonial-like beliefs and
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practices. In The Invention of Africa238 and The Idea of Africa,239 Mudimbe explains
Africa not as a geographic, terrestrial continent bounded by water, but as a social thing,
as an idea, and again, as an invention of a European colonial mindset that set Africa in a
constantly opposite, and inferior, position. Mudimbe shows how “Africa” came to be
colonially defined in Western discourses.
So if these modes of theorization are correct, if nations (and many other
geopolitical groupings) are not only social things or constructions or ideas, but social
things very often created by and supportive of some of the most powerful and devastating
historically-sized forces (human movements) on the planet (nationalism, colonialism,
racism, to name some which have been discussed), then why (doubly) do they seem so
embedded in genetic ancestry testing, the aim of which is presumably to sort out
empirically natural-biological-genetic kinds? And what actual harms might be coming of
this? (I’m thinking here of, for example, personal and political strife and violence, but
also direct applications of this science in pharmacogenomics.)

To return to Aurelie’s question, “Hold on where’s French?!”—and to answer it
directly—we will bring together in this analysis Anderson’s historiography of nationsnationalities-nationalisms (holding in mind also the conceptualizations of Said,
Mudimbe, and Nelson) with the world map provided by AncestryDNA as of today.
Through this application of theory, we will consider what is included on the map and
what is not, where named areas are centered and where boundaries are drawn, and how
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those areas which are included are labeled. In the process, the structures of human
political-cultural-social power will be the focus, and it will be demonstrated how some
stretches of Earth are given preferential treatment in a variety of ways (they belong),
while others are included only in a cursory way, or are left out entirely (excluded from
belonging in this genetic world).
Now, first, to set the context, it must be noted that today (in 2022) this
minidocumentary series (posted to YouTube in 2016) is now six years old. This is
important because AncestryDNA “ethnicity” maps have changed significantly (and in a
variety of important ways) over time. While it would be interesting, and I think fruitful,
to examine the version of the map being used at the time that Aurelie’s test was
processed, I choose here to focus on the present-day (2022) map. This is for several
reasons. Firstly, so that this dissertation research project (overall) engages, as much as is
possible, with DNA ancestry testing as it exists now. Secondly, because it is very helpful
in this analysis to note how these sorts of genetic ancestry maps are changing over time,
and examining a present-day map makes this almost inevitable. Thirdly, and lastly, for
the purposes of my ongoing and future research (on more recent cases and those that are
yet to come), working with what is now rather than what has already past just makes
practical sense. That said, I may at some point in the course of future research return to
look at that 2016 map.
Looking today at the interactive world map labeled “latest ethnicity update” on
the AncestryDNA website,240 we see the land zones of Earth represented on a medium-
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grey background. There are some relatively few stretches of land that are colored a solid
darker gray, but most of the land (and some of the water) is highlighted in bright, jeweltoned hues ranging the spectrum of the rainbow. Some areas of the globe have many
more subdivisions of these colors than others. Notably without this semi-translucent,
colorful highlighting—the darker gray exposed—are (according to their contemporary
national identifiers) southern portions of China, all of Argentina, all of Chad, all of
Tanzania, all of Madagascar, all of Greenland, to name just some of those most visible at
this global scale and upon an initial inspection.
The default presentation of this map includes the entire surface of the globe. At
right we see the top-level regions provided by AncestryDNA listed, along with the
number of (sub)regions within each: “Africa – 113 Regions, America – 136 Regions,
Asia – 64 Regions, Europe – 1173 Regions, Oceania – 12 Regions, West Asia – 34
Regions.” Although it can only be noted briefly here, just by glancing at this list it is
already possible to perceive the impact of European colonialism on this map of the world.
The far greater granularity of regionalization in Europe with its 1,173 subregions is due
to the overwhelming Eurocentricity of this variety of (genetic) research from its historical
founding to the present. Although this is acknowledged by DNA ancestry testing
companies (and there are parallel discourses in pharmacogenomic research with regards
to what is often termed the “diversification” of human genetic samples), the imbalance is
far from addressed and even further from being resolved. Also, in noting recent changes
to the labelling of regions, it is the case that the region presently labeled “West Asia” was
until very recently labeled “Middle East,” a change clearly determined in reaction to
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sociopolitical ideas rather than to genetic ones. (Consider, for instance, if one wants to
move away from the terminology of “Middle East,” why not “Northeast Africa”?)
To focus on that portion of the map that is most relevant in Aurelie’s case,
“Europe” is selected from the list. The map then zooms in towards that region, still
displaying some portions of surrounding regions. Following the thread of this analysis
focused on the comparative degree of subdivision among different regions, it can be seen
that there are large differences or imbalances at this (continental) scale, as was the case at
the previous (global) scale. What is most obvious in terms of the imbalance in these
subdivisions here is that there is one huge, singular orange swath labeled “Eastern Europe
and Russia” that takes up fully two-thirds of the highlighted portion of the map that
shows at this scale; the land highlighted on the western (approximate) third of the map
contains at about twenty different patches of color, some overlapping with one another. If
all of the colorful patches in the west were to be combined into a quilt, I think that quilt
would still be smaller than the monotonous “Eastern Europe and Russia” blanket. The
difference is so stark.
Another thing that might be noticed about this map, or more specifically the
labelling of it, has to do with the way that the map as a whole is titled versus the way that
the components of it are. While here I am writing particularly about the 2022
AncestryDNA map, I can say confidently, having been surveying these types of maps for
about two years now, that the sort of discrepancy-tension that I am pointing out here is a
common one. On this map, the header (centered over the entire map) uses the term
“ethnicity” as a part of the sentence, “See the latest ethnicity estimate update using the
interactive map below.” The map’s legend, where one might expect to see a list of
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ethnicities, uses the term “region” as a part of the phrase, “AncestryDNA® Regions
List.” There is an odd equivocation at play here, with ethnicities seeming to be made the
same as geographic regions. While a number of difficulties (both epistemological and
ethical) with this problematic might be pointed out, first and foremost, there seems to be
the simple error of mistaking location (land) for humanity (beings, cultures,
communities). And, if we are to be generous (and I think we should be here) and assume
that the makers of the map are not making such an egregious logical error, and to look
further, then a next problematic to address is, what then is the connection? Is the aim to
assign peoples to certain lands, in an exclusive manner? That is, each person-group
belongs to (and possibly in) certain places? This epistemological aspect of this geneticgeographic practice is disturbing, and I cannot help but think of the manner in which it
must be in a deep way structured by the land ownership principles of capitalism and the
border establishment principles of nationalism.
We know, from Benedict, Mudimbe, Said and so many others that the present-day
political map of this planet is not reflective of the great diversity of the communities of
people who inhabit it. It is on the contrary, and tragically, shaped largely by some of the
worst principles and related actions taken by a relatively small number of humans (and
over a relatively short period of time). Following this, and so importantly, it cannot be
forgotten that within (all) communities of human beings, past and present, there has been
heterogeneity and constant change; it is not possible to point back in time to any one
human being or any one small group of humans and say that they are representative of a
certain ethnicity (as we refer to ethnicities today). So, how does AncestryDNA, for
example, do just that (or even approximate it), or rather, claim that they do? There is no
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short answer to this question, but, the point for now must simply be that is what they are
doing. It is hopefully clear from what has been given so far how complex the decisionmaking processes in such determinations must be, and how loaded with social-ness.
Returning to the map, set with focus on “Europe,” we can peruse the many
highlighted regions in the western portion of the map, and we do, indeed, find “France”
among them. (It is interesting to wonder if Aurelie’s test results were updated now and
they included France what she might make of that; perhaps I will have to ask her
sometime!) This is a change since Aurelie’s test. What will be seen, however, is that
regardless of the inclusion of a region labeled “France” on the map, that the region has
far different attributes than some regions around it which one might expect to be similar,
and which (at least with hindsight) betray France’s previous exclusion and its still (at
best) secondary representation on this map.
First, it is notable that this region labeled France is quite small, falling entirely
and well inside the borders of present-day France as defined by the French government. It
does not represent all of the areas of land that (I will presume) Aurelie would consider
part of France, but rather just a central portion of it extending from around the area of the
Perthuis Breton and the Pertuis d’Antioche southeasterly towards the Mediterranean
around Montpellier. Is this what France is? Is it well-represented by this small bowtie of
highlighting? And, more importantly (and despite the fact that this map is labeled by the
names of lands rather than the names of peoples or ethnicities), does it represent what is
French, or French-ness, or French ethnicity in an epistemologically valid and morally
acceptable manner?
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While it does feel like a somewhat counterintuitive example, my thoughts are
drawn to the French colonial governmental policy and practice called “assimilation,”
discussed in the literature review,241 which purportedly aimed at transforming those
persons who lived in those areas of the planet which the members of the governing
classes of France claimed as their colonies (or other sorts of territories) away from their
many and various indigenous identities and towards a French identity. The concept, in its
idealized (and never implemented) form, would mean that persons in those places arewere in fact, French (or descendants of those who were French). If this idealized,
projected form of what is being French is taken at face value, then it would seem that this
representation of France not only excludes areas and persons within continental Europe,
but throughout the globe. I prefaced this example by saying it feels counterintuitive,
because the map that would be created by this definition of French identity could look a
lot like one of the French colonial empire at its apex, and this is—of course—something
that would be not only undesirable but reprehensible (and incorrect). But these are the
sorts of (historical-scale, social) forces that I argue are shaping these maps of ethnicities
generated by DNA ancestry testing services. Why was this choice not made? Why, when
choosing which DNA samples to include in the pool considered to be representative of
France-French, were samples not taken from, for example, Senegal or Quebec to make
sure that those aspects of French genetics were included? This line of questioning,
perhaps, might seem absurd or at least too distant from present-day political realities, but
it is to demonstrate the innumerable sorts of decisions that are being made in the course
of choosing those “representative” populations for genetic sampling (those whose DNA
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is studied in order to determine ancestry-informative markers, or AIMs,242 nucleotide
sequences considered to be probabilistically indicative of certain lines of human
heritage).
Returning to the AncestryDNA map, zoomed in and centered on the bowtieshaped highlight labeled “France,” we find that there are no further subdivisions of the
region. There is just “France”; no way to drill down deeper into the map here. However,
if we move northwesterly, toward that region that in Aurelie’s test results was labeled
“Great Britain,” we find a region labeled “England & Northwestern Europe,” and within
this region there are 8 subdivisions, and within those subdivisions, cumulatively, at total
of 41 subdivisions. And this number does not include all of those subdivisions that are
included under “Wales and Scotland.” Without any further numbers, it is obvious that
(the DNA samples of the persons who were considered representative from) those areas
have been studied much more resulting in far greater detail in the mapping of geneticsocial relations. The granularity of the geographic area labeled, curiously, “Germanic
Europe” rather than “Germany,” is similarly detailed and complex, as are almost all the
other regions that fall under the greater region “Europe.” Again, this is unlike “France,”
which is utterly simple, containing no subdivisions whatsoever. Also to be noted when
comparing “France” with “Germanic Europe” is that “France” is far within the current
political-governmental borders of France (République Française), whereas “Germanic
Europe” extends far beyond the current political-governmental borders of Germany
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
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(To be noted, so briefly, here—but not as an indicator of its insignificance—is the
inclusion of “European Jewish” as an “ethnicity” on this map. It is the only descriptor
under the level “Europe” that refers to ethnicity in terms of people-communities rather
than places-countries-nations, and it is also the only descriptor in the list which might be,
and is so often, construed as having a very particular and directly related religious
significance. This is to be addressed in future research.)
So, we finally come to the question, but what makes “France” so different that it
has no subdivisions at all, unlike all of the other regions that fall under “Europe,” so
much so that it wasn’t even on the map back in 2016? (Personally, I rather wonder why it
is on the map now, that is, how-why exactly the decision to start including it as an
“ethnicity” was made.) From what I have been able to infer so far—and keeping so close
in mind ideas about nations-nationalities-nationalisms and postcoloniality—I find it hard
to question the theory that these sorts of DNA ethnicity maps are drawn primarily along
lines that follow not ancient threads of human inheritance (genetic and cultural) but rather
present-day structures political and physical power as manifest in nation-statehoods and
also capitalistic industries. These structures, in turn, and with a focus on history
understood in terms of coloniality and postcoloniality, are largely inherited from those
moments in time when humans, or rather, particular communities of men, who had the
ways and means to do so, went about trying to exploit as much of the planet and its
human inhabitants as they possibly could, without consideration for other humans and
groups of humans as fellow persons-communities, battling one another along the way,
and ultimately (attempting to) divvy up all, labeling it owned and governed. Is this
happening (yet) again, in a new, genetic, scientific way?
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But, even if this is all so, then what moment in colonial history does this map
represent? A difficulty in discerning the influences of these structures of (social-politicalcapital) power is, it is not just one moment. The various groupings of humanity provided
by these sorts of maps (AncestryDNA in particular does affirm this in writing) are not all
formed in the same way in the sense that the moments in time that they attempt to capture
varies significantly, but also, from a longer historical perspective, all fall within relatively
short period. The information (according to AncestryDNA, and for the map being
examined now) dates back to anywhere from a few hundred years to around one
millennium. Why this range? Could it be because the information about aspects of their
human identity that so many people are seeking (it is what they are being offered nonstop) are inherently informed and shaped by (post)coloniality, along with racialism and
other forms of distinction among humans that came into contemporarily recognizable
form at that time? Why has this become such a definitional range of time in determining
who we all “really are”? (This discussion will be returned to in the examination of the
next narrative case.)
In future research, the conceptualizations of Bernard Boxill and Paul C. Taylor, as
described in the literature review,243 might also be applied to this case and similar, further
substantiating and detailing the social-ness of the formations of these groupings and their
connections to the formations of nations-nationalities and colonialism-empire. What
additional answers might these approaches add to our understanding of Aurelie’s case,
and similar?
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Before closing this analysis recalling the sociological perspective of Alondra
Nelson, which ties together so well many of these threads of thinking about humans and
scientific practice and DNA itself, I think it is important to note again that in the video
Aurelie herself did not use the terms “nationality” nor “ethnicity,” but instead tended to
talk about her identity in terms of “country,” forms of “to be,” and feelings about “home”
and belonging.
Over the course of my study of this scientific-technological-industrial-personalsocial movement I have come across this again and again. That is, the varieties of
information being provided often don’t square up (at least linguistically) with how those
who receive the information talk (and appear to think) about human identity. In this case,
I take especial notice of Aurelie’s apparent preference of “country” over “nation,” in part
due to having witnessed this so many times before. Simultaneously, however, and
oppositely, I can also recall many instances where the preference is for “nation” over
“country” (I think of here of indigenous communities in North America who utilize the
term “nation” as a part of their identity, in many instance, at least in part, for political and
practical reasons), and also places and times where it is agreed upon by most of those
around that the two terms have quite different meanings and scopes, and therefore
preference or need is not so much an issue, they simply indicate two different socialgeographic entities.
In Aurelie’s case, her preference for “country” over “nation” we might infer has
to do with her perception-ideation that this term is more indicative of a group of persons
in terms of their culture-ancestry as opposed to being indicative of a group of persons in
terms of their governance. In Kwame Anthony Appiah’s second monograph having
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directly to do with human identity, The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity, Creed,
Country, Color, Class, Culture, 244 Appiah dedicates a chapter to “Country” which gets
into some of these concerns. In Appiah’s earlier related work, The Ethics of Identity,245
Appiah explains many understandings of and analyzes “the structure of social
identities.”246 Especially helpful is Appiah’s historical contextualization of the changingmultiplying usage (and rising importance) of the term “identity” in (especially English
language), the understanding of which has helped me to perceive more connections
between the use of “identity” in a individual-personal sense and the usage of “identity” in
a social sense (as is mostly being discussed in this dissertation, though their interrelation
is never forgotten). Important components-aspects-dimensions of human identity that
Appiah includes in this discussion are: “kinds of persons” (Ian Hacking), “identification,”
“social conception,” “internalization,” “narrative” dimensions, and “patterns of
behavior.”
Focusing on the formation of (contemporarily recognizable) nation-states from
the nineteenth century through the twentieth, Appiah, in The Lies That Bind,
demonstrates how clearly it must be the case that early on in this period, for example,
“German-ness” and “Italianness” were “more a matter of language or culture than of
citizenship.” (Were we to create a science fiction world where DNA testing was around
at that time, what answers might most humans in this part of the world be seeking about
their ancestry, if any, and what sorts of answers might they be offered?) This seems to be
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(much more so than nationality) the type of thing that Aurelie is talking about as she
describes some perceived attributes of different identities at the outset of the video.
Aurelie is, after all, a person who begins by telling us that she is French but that she does
not live in France, and she really doesn’t seem all that interested in doing so; Aurelie
most likely, living such a life, understands nationality to be something that is changeable,
and therefore wouldn’t be looking for that in a DNA test, which almost by definition is
taken in search of something that is permanent or unchanging about a person. It seems
Aurelie has quite distinguishable ideas about nationality, country, and where one lives, all
of which I would argue are being rather forced together through the process of this
ancestry DNA test, under the title “ethnicity,” and set in a discussion regularly injected
with the terminology of “nationality.”

To reintroduce a sociological perspective—one that has directly to do with DNA
ancestry testing, as opposed to (the majority) of these humanistic perspectives being
offered which more broadly have to do with human identity—Alondra Nelson, in The
Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation after the Genome, 247
explains a conceptualization of DNA and genetic sciences that integrates so effectively
many of the considerations brought into this analysis and goes far beyond.
As Nelson conceives it, in order to understand DNA one must look far beyond a
science textbook or educational video (or, even, medical school or a genetics PhD).
Understanding its twisted, wobbling ladder structure, how nucleotides encode for
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proteins, and all of that detail is but one way of understanding what it is. What DNA is is
not just physical, it is social as well. In Nelson’s phrasing (following, as Nelson indicates,
Arjun Appadurai in The Social Life of Things), DNA has a “social life” of its own.
Nelson’s theory was transformational in my research process as it added another (or
several other) important perspective(s) from-through which to think about what all is lost
when we define DNA only in scientific terms alone, and how that is not just deficient, but
incorrect, and also has ethical and practical consequences.
In addition to the “social life of DNA,” Nelson also writes of the “social power of
DNA,” and the “social utility of DNA,” among many other concepts, all of which are
valuable in different ways in the analysis of individual cases, but even more so valuable
as reflections broaden aiming towards an understanding the impact of this scientifictechnological-industrial-personal-social movement on the scale of global politics.

After Aurelie’s statement, “It’s almost like my genes know better than I do,” there
is an abrupt cut to the interviewer.
“So would you like to travel to all of these places?”
“Oh yeah. Hell yeah!” Aurelie replies with lilting laugh, curious (maybe even
mischievous) eyes, and no detectable anxiety.
Applause and cheers are heard in the background (sounding a bit louder than what
one would expect based upon visual inspection of the people in the room) as Aurelie
returns to her seat in the rows with the rest of the program’s participants. The closing
intertitle reads, “You have more in common with the world than you think.”
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Like so many similar professionally produced videos on DNA ancestry testing I
have surveyed, a big part of this video series’ announced purpose is to display how
“diversity” (or a similar concept-attribute) is present within all of us, encoded in our
DNA, that is, how it is that the interconnections of humanity can be discovered through
genetic science. This purported peaceful aim always seems a good one, but there are
many reasons for skepticism and caution.

Analysis of Narrative Case III: Tomi
Tomi Makanjuola brands herself “The Vegan Nigerian.” Tomi’s books,
website,248 and YouTube channel249 are centered on recipes, but she incorporates other
sorts of creative content as well. In one of her nonculinary-related YouTube videos, Tomi
shares with her viewer-listeners her experience of taking a DNA ancestry test.250 Tomi
utilizes the service My HeritageDNA.251
In contrast to making a test results reveal video—which so often contain those
moments of great surprise (as in Jasmine’s narrative)—Tomi begins her story by letting
us know that she read the results of the test prior to making her video. “I’ve already seen
them so I’m not going to pretend to be shocked.” (It’s interesting to note here also Tomi’s
possible skepticism regarding the emotional authenticity of some other DNA test-story
sharers’ videos.) And, as will be relayed over the course of this narrative case analysis,
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Tomi has not only read the test results, but has had time to reflect upon them and discuss
them with others as well.
Following this brief introduction (the duration of the video is just five minutes),
Tomi explains why it is that she decided to take a genetic ancestry test
I did this test because I’ve always been really fascinated by history, by genealogy, trying
to trace my family’s history I guess as far back as I can go. I love speaking with older
members of my family trying to figure out where we’re from…

Even in these preliminary remarks, there are a number of hints that might point us
towards appreciating and understanding how Tomi conceptualizes identity, or at least
how Tomi conceptualizes a variety of aspects of human identity. Some of the relevant
concepts-terms that Tomi employs include: “history,” “genealogy,” “family,” “family’s
history,” “older members of my family,” and “where we’re from.” It might be noticed
that this statement exhibits family as a central component of Tomi’s epistemology of
identity, that is, what Tomi understands knowledge of identity to be, and how it is that
she understands knowledge of identity to be formed. For Tomi, family is simultaneously
a source and an object of (highly desired) knowledge.
Also of significance is the phrase, “where we’re from.” This can lead this analysis
directly towards the consideration of the sort of information provided by this test, that is,
information that appears upon first glance to be principally of the geographic kind. As
was described in Chapter One, ancestry testing services in their marketing and their test
results very often (perhaps always) utilize geographic maps as a central means of
communicating what it is that they do and what kinds of information their services
provide. I say this to emphasize that the ancestral-genetic information is so often
presented geographically, showing the boundaries and names of places on the surface of
the planet.
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One of the principle aims in this narrative case analysis is to determine in what
ways this information, which is so often presented and understood geographically (and
with clearly-marked, seemingly static, borders-boundaries), is or might be infused with
social-cultural ideas about human identity (the boundaries of which are inherently porous
and ever-changing). In Tomi’s narrative it will be shown that the names of human
groupings listed in her DNA test results might better be described as political and/or
national identifiers, which are presented as geographic and also as ethnic (and more
specifically as geographically-bounded ethnicities). Furthermore, it will be argued that
these political-national identifiers can and should be understood as existing conceptually
in terms that recognize the effects of colonialisms and post- or neo-colonialisms on the
geopolitical, geocultural, geosocial world of humanity, and that they have significant
ethical and practical consequences in the daily lives of humans being at the present time.
Theoretical concepts-perspectives applied include those provided by Nkiru Uwechia
Nzegwu, Edward W. Said, Thandika Mkandawire, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Stuart Hall,
and Dorothy Roberts.

Next in the video Tomi goes on to explain a bit more about her motivations for
taking a genetic ancestry test, and why she chose to use the particular testing service that
she did.
I thought taking this test would be just a cool, fun thing to do I guess… I don’t know
whether to take it 100% as true and accurate, but they claim to have one of the best DNA
technologies…

In terms of in what way and how much Tomi values the sort of knowledge
provided by genetic ancestry test results, Tomi’s description of her motivation as “cool,
fun” indicates that she isn’t taking this all too seriously. At the same time, the sort of
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knowledge at which the test aims does appear to be important to her; she says she really
likes talking to family about family things—“trying to figure out where we’re from”—
and clearly that is meaningful in her life. So, that framing in mind, whatever might be
argued or concluded over the course of this case analysis it should be remembered that
Tomi herself has told us not to take, at least her, individual-personal genetic results as too
important or with too much gravity. That, of course, does not mean that it is inappropriate
to consider here Tomi’s experiences as she has shared them with us seriously insofar as
they form a part of this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement
being studied in its repercussions—both epistemological and ethical, theoretical and
practical—on a societal scale. We just won’t take it too seriously!
We then come to Tomi’s statement about truth and accuracy and see that perhaps
the self-proclaimed technological superiority of MyHeritage DNA may have led Tomi to
select their service as her provider. (Another factor in her choice was that the test she
took was, in Tomi’s words, “courtesy of MyHeritage DNA”—perhaps something to be
explored in future analyses.) That said, this statement is greatly softened by the
lighthearted and skeptical phrases which precede it, and the usage of the word “claim” is
indicative of Tomi assessing sources of knowledge, and not assuming that all claims
made by MyHeritage DNA are true. Were I to dare to intuit too much from this short clip
of Tomi’s speech, I might conclude that Tomi holds familial sources of knowledge as
having greater powers of verification-justification-truth as compared with genetic sources
of knowledge. Perhaps I am wrong or incomplete in this conclusion, but it seems possible
and reasonable to (tentatively) infer.
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Looking at a few more portions of Tomi’s speech prior to her sharing of her DNA
ancestry test results provides additional indicators about how Tomi understands her
particular test results and the larger process in which she is participating. We do learn that
Tomi was surprised by some parts of her results, and that taking the test has spurred Tomi
on in doing additional research about her family’s ancestry.
All I’ve known really is that we’re Nigerian. No other sort of family connections to other
countries, so I was really surprised by a lot of it… It’s got me thinking. It’s got me
wanting to dig a little bit deeper, and… figure out the links.

We also might note here Tomi’s utilization of the word “country” and reference to
“Nigerian” as, respectively, forms-aspects and particular types of human identity. As has
been discussed previously, most DNA ancestry testing services providers do not use the
language of country prominently, or at all, in their marketing and test reports.
MyHeritage DNA favors “ethnicity.” Test-takers themselves in my experience are often
the source of the insertion of the language of country into discussions about their test
results. This is not to say, however, that all test-takers do so for the same reasonsmotivations or with the same definitions of the term “country”; the cases show quite the
contrary.

The moment arrives. Tomi begins to play a video from MyHeritage DNA that
contains the results of her genetic ancestry test.
Dramatic music rises in the background. At first it is cascading violins, but then
comes the driving beat of a snare drum. I know it is the case that I have themes of
colonialism on my mind, but I can’t help but think that the soundtrack resembles military
marches featured in video games (and films and so forth) about ‘taking over the world.’
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One I played back in the 1990s was Sid Meier's Colonization: Create a New Nation.252 I
thought of it as one of those strategy games that smart people played, like chess; in
retrospect the Eurocentricity and fun-making of it all seems abysmal, if mostly in a
reactionary if not causal way. But it does reinforce the omnipresence of the ideology,
even in Western-founded kid’s games. It should be emphasized that this is not music
selected by Tomi, but rather is part of the MyHeritage DNA test results user experience.
And, I have to say, while in the midst of analyzing these sorts of narratives, it is hard to
find the music’s symbolic possibilities to be anything but tragic.
While the marching music plays, a starfield fills the screen like the beginning of
so many science fiction films. In the middle are the words, “Tomi, ready to explore your
ethnicity?” followed by a bold button with the words, “Let’s go.”
After the button is clicked, the text changes, now it reads, “Tomi, you are…” The
starfield zooms and rotates and a representation of the spherical Earth comes into focus.
At left, the language of “Tomi, you are…” remains (“ethnicity” goes away) as a list of
percentages and identities-identifiers appears below it. As each term is added to the list,
corresponding areas of the globe light up; these do not correspond exactly to political
borders (they are more rounded, like bubbles expanding outward).
The full list reads: “84.6% Nigerian, 12.8% Sierra Leonean, 1.6% English, 1.0%
Kenyan.” It can be seen already from this list that the report that Tomi shows to viewers
includes only descriptors-terms that are identical to contemporary, commonly used
(shortened) names for nation-states in English, all with clear colonial influences in their
formation.
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Fade back to Tomi. She begins to read aloud through the list with her viewers,
commenting on each of its components along the way.
As you just saw, I am 84.6% Nigerian. I expected that to be the highest, so no shock
there. 12.8% Sierra Leonean, this was surprising to me, probably the most surprising,
because it’s quite high, you know, and I don’t know any family members with links to
that country, apart from maybe an aunt whose mother was from there, but yeah, so that
was surprising and really exciting.

Throughout this portion of her discussion, Tomi’s tone is light, cheerful, and
helpfully explanatory, as fits with her typical demeanor on her YouTube channel. It is
also interesting to note here how Tomi weighs the significance of the varying percentages
in the list. She does not consider 12.8% insignificant, and 84.6% is high enough that it is
“no shock” and appears to adhere well with her personal-familial-social identity as
Nigerian.
When she gets to “English,” the tone and content of her speech changes
noticeably from what seems to be mostly accepting curiosity towards a more critical
stance.
The 1.6% English, like, what? I can’t even begin to think where that’s come from… My
grandparents will probably have no idea, but I can ask. You know, no harm in asking. But
yeah, no idea where that could be from.

As she says, rather half-whispers, “like, what?” she shakes her head back and
forth, and over the course of the rest of this statement her forehead becomes increasingly
furrowed with thought. Then, Tomi arrives at the last line of her results, commenting on
it individually and also the totality of the list.
And of course the Kenyan 1.1% is so tiny, but still quite, cool. So yeah, those are my
results. Obviously still predominately Nigerian so I get to keep my brand name “The
Vegan Nigerian,” nothing changes there.

All in all, Tomi’s sense of personal-social identity does not appear to be at all
“shaken” as it is in some experiences of ancestry DNA testing. The test acts as a
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confirmation of her Nigerian identity (at least “predominately”), as indicated by her
joking-laughing mention of keeping her brand name and her earlier comment about that
result not being shocking. And, she expresses entirely positive curiosity and excitement
about the Sierra Leonean and Kenyan test results. However, the identifier not
geographically identified with the Africa, “English,” generates skepticism and brings
about a perceivable emotional change and also an epistemological change insofar as
Tomi then concludes that she will ask her grandparents what they might know. But, as
she makes it clear, she doesn’t really expect to get answers on that front.
Perhaps most importantly about this English identifier, and Tomi’s questioning of
it, is that English is not simply some random political-geographic identifier from
someplace else on the globe that has nothing to do with Nigeria. “English” or
“England”—as a descriptor of that particular, political-economic-militaristic center of
Western colonial power that exploited the nation-country-land now referred to as
“Nigeria” (in English language), and persons and communities within it—understandably
generates a critical, reflective (but again, not too serious) orientation in Tomi’s thinking.
Tomi is not alone. As can be seen in some of the comments on Tomi’s video,
some viewers who chimed into the conversation have similar concerns. Keke, a person
who reports having taken a DNA ancestry test, comments after sharing their own test
results (including a full list of percentages and correspondent identities-identifiers),
…My family is African American, so we have no idea where any of this is coming from
lol. However, we're pretty sure that the European DNA comes from the slave trade. These
DNA tests seem to align with historical events; they're telling our story

Tomi replies to Keke (in part, see Appendix I for the full contextualizing text of
these exchanges in the comments on the video),
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…Above anything else, these tests allow us to paint somewhat of a picture of our pasts,
and are a stepping stone to flesh out our stories.

It’s interesting to note here the complexity of Tomi’s multifaceted, multisourced
approach to understanding “our pasts” and “our stories.” Tomi is clearly not taking one
single source of potential knowledge as authoritative on its own.
Another user, Oluwadamilola Akinayo, who reports not having taken a DNA
ancestry test, writes (reacting quite strongly to learning of Tomi’s test results),
Thanks for sharing,Tomi. Frankly that 1.6% English scared the hell out of me. Got me
wondering a lot of things though I haven't done any DNA test...

Tomi’s reply to this comment expands upon her earlier, “like, what?”
considerably, and her expression that she doubts she’ll ever come into a better or more
exact understanding of the source of that “English” percentage.
Oluwadamilola Akinayo listen! As soon as I saw that, I was shaken. Like “who? What?
Where? How?” Loool. I doubt I’ll ever get answers though… And if you ever do take the
test, please come back and share

These exchanges in the comments are helpful in further understanding Tomi’s
experience of interpreting this DNA ancestry test both on her own and with others.
Especially interesting, undoubtedly in part due to my perspective living in the United
States, is the reaction from Keke, whose “family is African American” and who took a
DNA test which displayed, as Keke terms it, some “European DNA.” Keke points to the
“slave trade” as explanatory; in this analysis I have been referring to discourses about
“colonialism.” These are of course two directly related manners of discussing history.
The cross-continental or continental-diasporic conversations being generated today by
genetic ancestry testing deserves further study, and I think would generate meaningful
insights into some of the many global dynamics this movement.
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To begin the application of scholarly concepts-modes to this case—our aim
continually being to better comprehend this scientific-technological-industrial-personalsocial movement via humanistic perspectives and as informed by social scientific
understandings—we will start by considering, rather than what Tomi included, some of
what she did not include in her video. It is notable and significant that Tomi did not
choose to use in this video any language or other references to indigenous or regional
identities, such as Igbo or Yoruba, established prior to the invasion and establishment of
colonial forces and structures. Why is this?
One huge factor is, of course, that Tomi is being prompted in this discussion by
the list of “ethnicities” provided by MyHeritage DNA. It is a short video, focused on
those particular results, and I really wouldn’t expect her to discuss other factors. We also
might consider that her audience on YouTube is (unevenly) global, surely another
influence on how Tomi discusses these results. I believe most everyone speaks at least
somewhat differently to “the world” than we do to, for example, other persons with
whom we are closely connected through community. In sum, it is interesting to wonder,
for example, what sort of language-concepts Tomi might employ in her telling of her
story if the testing service she utilized provided different sorts of categories of human
identity, or if Tomi were speaking to a different audience.
But to focus on this absence—not Tomi’s lack of discussion, but rather
MyHeritage DNA’s lack of inclusion of indigenous or regional (noncolonial) human
group identifier-identies—we may turn to the conceptualizations of Nkiru Uwechia
Nzegwu, especially in her essay, “Bypassing New York in Re-Presenting Eko:
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Production of Space in a Nigerian City,”253 but also in her (later) monograph, Family
Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture.254
In the essay, Nzegwu analyzes the “Yoruba notion of space,” utilizing especially
examples from the environment and architecture of Lagos. The essay, though in no way
having directly to do with genetic ancestry testing, is so beautifully applicable to it, and I
expect will continue to be helpfully applicable in similar case analyses, especially
alongside Nzegwu’s other works.
Nzegwu’s analysis of what is a city, how cities are so often described almost
solely in terms of economic and political indicators, demonstrates that,
The result is that symbolic representational forms deriving from social and cultural
beliefs that are non-quantifiable, or irreducibly economic, are either treated as superficial
or hardly merit attention.255

This attention to the “non-quantifiable” is one of the things that makes Nzegwu’s
conceptualization of social-cultural spaces so enlightening in cases having to do with
DNA ancestry testing. Throughout these analyses, with their lists of percentages, a major
point I have been hoping to demonstrate is how the sort of information produced by this
scientific-technological practice, quantified and purportedly objective, does not match
with the sort of information that is really being sought by humans about their identity,
which is so qualitative, subjective, and variegated; and furthermore, how the information
is simply incorrect insofar as it does not (and cannot) take into account the “nonquantifiable.” Do percentages of human identity really make sense? Are they really
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helpful in our personal and collective journeys to understand who we are? If they are,
how so? If so, it must be in some highly limited fashion; there are far too many questions
about the quantified, seeming-certainties that these tests claim to capture, from what
moment in time and why, to how they are labeled, to who is included and who is not, and
in what ways. .
In future analyses, Family Matters I think will also be usefully applicable, in a
number of ways, among these in applying Nzegwu’s explanations and analyses of the
intersections and nonintersections of matrilineality and matriarchy, of patrilineality and
patriarchy. This, I expect, will be especially true when examining cases having to do with
those particular forms of locally based human identities-communities-cultures on which
Nzegwu bases her examples, but more broadly as well. For example, Nzegwu’s
scholarship would be useful in the further examination of the prior narrative case in
which the test-taker (Jasmine) took an mtDNA-based test, which is also sometimes
referred to as a “matrilineal genetic test.”

In the previous narrative case analysis, that initiated by Aurelie’s experience of
genetic ancestry testing, there was a focus on the presentation of human identitiesidentifiers as solely or principally genetically founded when they are in fact deeply
infused, and even based upon, social ideas which are left unexposed and unexplained. It
was argued specifically that those categories presented to Aurelie were based on
contemporary nation-states (forms of nationalisms) and other political unions-empires
(e.g. “Great Britain”) more so than anything else. A parallel argument might be made
with regards to this case having to do with the experience of Tomi Makanjuola.
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However, rather than making that parallel argument, which it is hoped might
already be evident based upon what has been presented previously, in this case analysis
our next aim will be to bring attention to relationships between that which is called
“colonial” and that which is called “postcolonial” in order to better understand how they
are manifest in DNA ancestry testing. Also, insofar as these concepts might be better
construed as dynamic ideas and discourses about human history rather than just notations
for periods of time, we will consider two humanistic approaches to understanding these
ideas-discourses that might ultimately be useful in gaining greater insight into this
scientific-technological-industrial-personal-movement in humanity. These two
approaches are “traveling theory” and “discursive continuity” and might be well-applied
to a number of concepts about human identities in terms of how they are being shapedformed within and by this movement.

The terms “colonial” and “postcolonial” are often used to denote periods of
history in terms of who or what is perceived to have been (from the perspective of the
historian) the correctly, legally recognized power of governance at that time. Taken
simplistically, it would appear that these terms are opposites in the sense that “operative”
and “postoperative” are used to describe distinct states of affairs in a medical setting.
However, in the case of colonialism and postcolonialism, the difference is not so clear.
Colonialism did not take place within a single, definable time period nor in just one way,
nor was it experienced in the same way by all those who participated and were affected.
In many senses the end of the colonial period has yet to come in the sense that all who
hope for justice should act towards. For this reason, the term “neocolonialism” is
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sometimes used in place of “postcolonialism,” especially in political contexts and by
certain parties, as it in some circumstances better communicates the indefinite and
complex nature of its power relations, and the continuance (and renewal, and even
creation) of colonial influences into the present time.
Moving beyond chronology, thinking in terms of concepts and theory, we can
perceive postcolonialism as a set of discourses and conceptualizations aiming towards
understanding humanity in terms of how colonial ideas and action (coloniality) continue
into the present and form significant structures of human society, and how this is and can
be resisted. This discourse on theory, as all human communication, takes many forms.
Some is written. Some is spoken. Some is implied through action. Some takes place in
academia. Some takes place in the political arena. Some takes place in domestic spaces.
This list could go on indefinitely, and the items on it are not mutually exclusive; it is why
theorization on the nature of discourse involves many complexities.
Traveling theory, as put forth by Edward W. Said, attempts to address this
complexity by examining the movement and transformation of ideas over time in a
number of different modes. “[I]deas and theories travel—from person to person, from
situation to situation, from one period to another,” according to Said, and this “circulation
of ideas” takes place in several different ways including “acknowledged or unconscious
influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation.”256 Said furthermore goes on
to say that these ideas, as they travel, are “to some extent transformed by its new uses, its
new position in a new time and place.” In other words, it is crucial, when endeavoring to
understand any discourse, to take into account the sources and contexts of ideas, that is,
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who puts them forth, who is meant to receive them, in what context are they situated, and
especially, how they change in response to these various factors.
These concepts of “person,” “situation,” “influence,” “borrowing,”
“appropriation,” and “transformation” as defined by Said, with his emphasis on
understanding how a theory travels and its ability to travel, can be utilized in order to
gain a better understanding of the dynamics of colonialism-coloniality (and also
postcolonialism and postcoloniality) in terms of how personal and social identities are
formed-shaped by these powerful factors in human history, and subsequently how this
plays out in DNA ancestry testing. These concepts are so helpful and fascinating in
pondering the many dynamics involved. So often, and I do think reasonably so, my focus
is on those situations in which one sort of discourse is so clearly dominating others, but
there are so many other intricacies to be considered in the multitudinous ways that ideas
travel through discourse (and definitely as social ideas show up in genetic ancestry
testing).
Analysis in terms of discursive continuity, by contrast, focuses more on the theory
or theories in question, and how various incarnations of theory compare to one another
and to related theories, rather than on the conditions under which a theory or theories
became a part of discourse. For example, it is possible to discuss the discursive continuity
of Négritude, Afrocentricity, Pan-Africanism, Black Power movements, even
Consciencism and so forth without reference to the persons who generated those theories
and movements, or the context in which they were created and developed. Compared
with traveling theory this approach may seem archaic (detached, inappropriately
universalizing) and consequently irrelevant or always misleading, however, it might be
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argued that this approach can still be very helpful and interesting insofar as it opens us up
to discuss potential theoretical connections where the physical, geographic, or practical
connections are unknown or uncertain, and might subsequently assist us in the generation
of new thinking through the synthesis of earlier ideas and our own reflections on them. I
argue that it is helpfully promotional in the creation of new ideas and in finding new
conceptual connections, but that it is a tactic that should be used with caution, both
epistemological and especially ethical, when those new ideas are put or otherwise find
their way into practice. To be direct, what I am thinking of in particular here are current
discourses and ideas about “conspiracy theory,” as characterized by the thinking of those
who find connections among ideas and actions that cannot be substantiated, and who
obsess over these perceived connections to the detriment of themselves and others, both
in terms of ideas and actions. In terms of the detriment to ideas (and subsequently
actions), I think these obsessions, in significant part, limit their holders from perceiving
what are truly vast conceptual and institutional structures of society that cause harminjustice every day. While these considerations are not typically a part of the discussion
of “discursive continuity” as a scholastic or interpretive approach, I think they are worth
discussing; I say much of this from reflection on my own experience.
Having considered these two approaches to the interpretation of discourse, our
next task is to discuss the nature of discourse within the colonial and postcolonial
contexts, and to continue to consider just a bit more how each of these terms may be
interpreted, given that they are utilized in so many ways. This all being done in the
context of continuing to think about how all of this is—that is, must be—manifest in
those social ideas that are a part of the theory-practice of DNA ancestry testing; the
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scientific being not separate from the social, but a part of it, as its practice is undertaken
by (social) humans.
When thinking in terms of colonialism and postcolonialism, discourses are
typically emphasized as taking on characteristics specific to those contexts. But as stated
previously, the eras-ideas denoted by these terms are not as distinct as they may appear.
As expressed in a somewhat extreme (but understandable) form by Thandika
Mkandawire in his notes to his chapter entitled “African Intellectuals and Nationalism” in
African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development, “I use
post-colonial only in its purely chronological sense, without suggesting any sociophilosophical condition, let alone psychological mood.”257 In this I read Mkandawire as
resisting the utilization of the colonial-postcolonial distinction as the all-pervasive or
defining force of history, especially on the African continent. Although I agree with this
wholeheartedly, at the same time, and perhaps this comes in part from being the teacher
of mostly young adult students in the United States, I find it difficult to underemphasize
this as an important aspect of history that is so critical to take in if one is to understand
(in whatever way that we can) current events on local to global scales. And when I look
at these geographic maps presented by DNA ancestry testing companies, I cannot help
but see those forces at play in a huge way. (I will say in teaching about ideas about
colonialism and postcolonialism that I always emphasize that it is not a binary distinction
but rather a conceptual tool for understanding that is dynamic and multifaceted.
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This brings to mind an example put forth by Kwame Anthony Appiah in his essay
entitled “The Postcolonial and The Postmodern,” 258 wherein he describes a 1987 art
show in New York City which had as its theme art from the African continent, and the
exhibition of which displayed in a very clear way the continuing effects of colonialism
into postcoloniality (that is, correspondingly, postmodernity, according to Appiah’s
argument), though in art rather than in science. As Appiah describes it and analyzes it, the
manner in which the show was curated displayed deep and obvious signs of the
continuing aftermath of colonial ideology. The one co-curator, artist Lela Kouakou, who
could be described as being less influenced-founded by Western or Euroamerican
aesthetics was disqualified from evaluating the artistic value of anything produced
outside his own particular community; meanwhile, persons who had little or no academic
or artistic credentials for evaluating art of any kind (e.g. David Rockefeller) were asked
to review and judge all of the artworks of all contributors without discrimination.
Examples such as this make it so clear that the ”postcolonial” and likewise the
“postmodern” are not so fully “post-” as their grammatical structure causes them to
appear. And although we are now 35 years past this exhibition which Appiah cites, it is
easy to think of numerous critiques of art curation and display that are ongoing at present.
Another example of how the continued effects of colonialism are disguised in
modern discourse can be found in any encyclopedia or other popular general reference
source (at least in English). As examples, if one looks up entries for “The Colony and
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Protectorate of Nigeria” or “French Togoland,” they are described as being governed by
Great Britain and France respectively, whereas “Nigeria” and “Togo” are identified as
contemporary, independently-governed nation-states. Without further reflection on these
brief definitions, it might appear that at one time the British and French governments had
utterly penetrative influences over the people who live in the regions defined by those
borders, but that now those influences are absent. This, of course, is a far too simplistic
depiction of the state of affairs, on both sides of the historical coin. The simple fact that
the governmental languages of these nations today are what they are displays one of the
most obvious impacts of colonialism. At the same time, it would be a mistake to think
that this colonial-postcolonial distinction is what should—historiographically,
epistemologically, or ethically speaking—define the identities of those human persons
and communities who live and have lived in these parts of the world. But is that not
precisely what MyHeritage DNA did, in part, in Tomi’s case?

This returns us to Tomi’s identity as it is presented in the MyHeritage DNA test
results report. Even setting the percentages aside, taking a sort of majority rule mentality,
if it is correct to think of this test as a confirmation of Tomi’s identity as Nigerian, then
what does this mean about all of those other aspects of Tomi’s personal-social identity
(not of the nation-state-based variety), perhaps for example those which Nzegwu would
point out, which are not accounted for in these results in any way?
If the claims of this testing service (and these types of genetic testing services)
were more limited, perhaps things would feel different. But, as demonstrated, the test
report itself labels these terms “ethnicities,” and furthermore states that this is who-what
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the test-taker is (i.e. “Tomi, you are…”). And, it might be added (as was described
previously)—to really sell the message—all of this is presented with a highly dramatized
aesthetic that signals great importance and potential meaning for its recipients. They are
making big claims, and they are falling far short in crucial ways.

Yet another means-mode for examining some of the ways that DNA ancestry tests
such as the one that Tomi took do not take into account the sociality of human identity on
a global scale—nor on an appropriately (epistemologically and ethically) local scale, for
that matter—is through some of Stuart Hall’s conceptualizations of human identity
formation as it has been shaped by large-scale historical events and ideas such as
colonialism and coloniality. There is only space for this work of Hall’s to be mentioned
briefly here in this particular case analysis, but it is included that it might be utilized in
future research and analytical work. I am thinking here especially of what Hall wrote in
“Cultural Identity and Diaspora.”259

As Tomi’s video comes to its end, Tomi tells her viewers that, as she has shared
her experience of taking a DNA ancestry test with others, a question in reply sometimes
has been, quite pragmatically, to ask what she will do with this newly acquired
information or knowledge.
Tomi gives her reply to the query, concluding much the same way that she began
her video, speaking of her family and of wanting to learn-know yet more.
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For me it just makes me more curious, makes me want to find out a lot more about my
family, it certainly makes me want to explore more Sierra Leonean food.

And, of course, Tomi tosses in at the end, so casually yet so professionally, that
comment relevant to her vegan cuisine channel, that is potentially of specific interest to
many of her viewers, and which interconnects this particular creation of Tomi’s more
closely with her other content and her branding. It is interesting to note that Tomi appears
to choose this cuisine in accordance with the second highest percentage in the report (the
first already being her culinary specialty).

So, did Tomi get what she (might have) wanted out of the DNA testing
experience, at least as reported in this narrative? Perhaps in some ways, but in other
ways, Tomi seems to remain in the same or a similar state of seeking (enthusiasm maybe
a bit more heightened) as was the case prior to her testing experience. Tomi’s statements
early on the video, such as “where we’re from” and “who we are,” indicate important
forms of identity-seeking and contain far more depth of meaning than can be conveyed
by the highlighting of a particular stretch of land on a map, labeled with a list of numbers
and the names contemporary nation-states, which is that with which Tomi was presented
(and supposedly represented).

Reflections on these Analyses, and Potential for Future Analyses and their
Epistemological and Ethical Utilities
Having completed analyses of these three narrative cases, it has been found that
some tactics-modes-applications have been more successful or fruitful than others. I aim
to take forward with me in my future work these lessons learned, and expect that this
methodology of the analysis of individual narrative cases in order to better comprehend
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this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement might yield even better
results in the future. Some errors in particulars may have been made (though I hope they
are very few), but some of the patterns that have been found I think cannot be mistaken
for anything but what they are, and among these patterns or structures are racist, colonial,
and nationalistic ideologies and practices.
Before closing this chapter, we will consider one more theorist’s work, drawing
again from the sociological (and legal) realm, which will bring this research and
application of scholarship having to do with human identity squarely back into contact
with scholarship that directly addresses and theorizes about DNA ancestry testing. In
Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-Create Race in the TwentyFirst Century,260 Dorothy Roberts brings together so many of these discourses and
concepts which have been discussed throughout these analyses and throughout this
dissertation (and many other concepts and discourses, too). In it, Roberts addresses a
subject matter even more broad than what is attempted herein, from the “the invention of
race”261 and especially the legal construction of racial categories (for instance, Roberts
gives examples from the changing language of the U.S. Census over time), to racialized
scientific practices and ideas, especially in medicine, which Roberts calls “medical
stereotyping,”262 and is commonly practiced in pharmacogenomics and personalized
medicine.
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Even more broadly, and bringing together her theorization through the lenses of
these different realms or disciplines (natural science, social science, law), Roberts states,
“There is no biological test for whiteness. White means belonging to the group of people
who are entitled to claim white privilege.”263 The key is structures of privilege, not of
genetics. Roberts goes on to state, even more directly, “While race is not imaginary—it is
a very real way our society categorizes people—its intrinsic origin in biology is.”264
After establishing many historical precepts and contemporary happenings that
support her claims, Roberts shows how this variety of scientific practice is “redefining
race in genetic terms.”265 Although Roberts focus is race in this monograph, some of her
arguments work in parallel with other forms-aspects of human identity-identification that
are engrained in the scientific-technological practice of genetic ancestry testing as has
been demonstrated. I think here also of Appiah, “biologizing what is culture,
ideology.”266
I find Roberts work very compelling. This is not only because it is so useful in
application to the sort of cases about human identity with which I am working, but also
because as I read Fatal Invention it became an apparent likelihood to me that Roberts and
I are motivated by at least some of the same paradoxes (Roberts’s choice of term) in
doing research on closely related topics. For example, prior to encountering this
following paragraph, I can say that a similar thought had occurred to me (about Rick
Kittles and his role in AfricanAncestry):
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Kittles was the paradox I saw in his work. On the one hand, he is an outspoken critic of a
genetic definition of race and has written several prominent articles debunking claims of
natural racial boundaries found in our genes. On the other hand, he is a leader in the
scientific investigation of distinctive African genetics, starting a business that deals in
African DNA and conducting studies on genetic contributions to the high rate of prostate
cancer among African American men.267

Here I do not intend to focus on Rick Kittles, because it is not my point to
interrogate his work in particular. What I do wish to point out is that this is the sort of
pattern, the sort of paradox, that can be found in so many aspects of this movement. In
the case analysis having to do with Aurelie’s experience of DNA ancestry testing, for
example—which was professionally produced as an advertisement—the presentation was
surrounded by the language of diversity and inclusion, but the contents of the test results
cannot be described as such. I conclude that they are highly exclusionary (in addition to,
in many ways, empirically incorrect). Roberts might call this a part of what she refers to
as “biopolitics.”268
Stepping past the levels of specialization indicated when speaking about
“genetics” or even about “biology,” Roberts states, “Science is the most effective tool for
giving claims about human difference the stamp of legitimacy.”269 If this is true, and I
think in so many contexts it overwhelmingly is (as will be discussed further in Chapter
Four and the Conclusion), it makes all the more clear the importance of epistemologically
and ethically critiquing this movement in humanity, which is so complex despite its
youth.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MOTIVATIONS: ACCUSATIONS OF RACISM, ANTI-RACIST
HOPES, AND THE ONGOING SCRAMBLE FOR IDENTITY
AND PRIVILEGE
Humans’ conceptions of their own individual and collective identities as
persons—when analyzed in conceptual terms through the application of scholarly
theories, as was done in the previous chapter—have been demonstrated to display a rich
variety of definitions, of roles, and of purposes in human personal and community life.
As has also been demonstrated, this beautiful, interesting, and important variety cannot
be adequately nor appropriately accounted for (neither epistemologically nor ethically) by
the scientific-technological-industrial practice that is DNA ancestry testing.
At the same time, many humans are in a state of seeking that has something to do
with what has been referred to herein as “identity,” and this has driven many actions,
among which is participating in genetic ancestry testing, the topic of this research and
study. But what are we seeking? This is a difficult and immense question to answer, and
there cannot be any single answer to it, nor even a few, that would apply in all cases. For
the individual human person, in many instances, this seeking appears to be of a sense of
belonging or union, sometimes sought in opposition to deep feelings of isolation or
lonesomeness, even estrangement or alienation. Sometimes the desire for sense of place
or space is a significant factor. Sometimes there is a fear or hatred of others as well.
What will be considered in this chapter are some of the most profound
sociopolitical and individual implications of the ways in which humans identify
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themselves and others. For instance, identification with one social group or another (for
example, a nation or a family) can and do drive decisions of mortal consequence, such as
the willingness to sacrifice one’s own life or that of others in violence. In arenas that
might not immediately appear so life-threatening or crucial to life, there are matters to
consider such as with whom one shares kindness and how to allocate resources that are
beyond necessities (however one might define that). These identities-identifications and
related actions take place on scales that are both very small and very large, even global.
Among the direst consequences are war, famine, and the suppression of political
activities that might fight against this maldistribution, hatred, and violence.

While to distill these potentially devastating effects down to a single phrase would
be misleading, at the beginning of the previous chapter it was promised that we would
return to the “hot political discourses [that are] sometimes described as ‘identity
politics,’” 270 and that moment as arrived. There is one sense in which using this
terminology as a means to better understanding something with consequences so grave
seems not only inadequate but inappropriate due to it intense uses in so many fora as an
attempted means to cheapen an opponent’s argument—“this is all just identity politics.”
Yet there is another sense in which this terminology seems so fitting to this research and
study, and perhaps is even a needed focus due to its popularity. I think it is possible that,
if communicated well, a person who might have used the above phrase in a flippant,
dismissive manner might be encouraged to revise their understanding and realize the
depths and magnitude of the ways that how we humans identify one another (such as via
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concepts-terms of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion) affect life for everyone,
and the top-down, hierarchical politicization of all of it.
In order to break down the concept-term “identity politics” just a bit, we may
attempt to consider it in some of its aspects. There are, of course, the overtly political. For
example, the companion pairing of Censuses and redistricting for democratic
representative purposes always brings with it a consideration of the variety of human
group identities-identifiers that will count, and how, and for whom. All of this might be
considered in other ways, too, but it is clearly occurring in a definitively political arena.
But what about those aspects of identity politics that reach beyond that which is
(obviously and primarily) political? There are broad-reaching considerations and analyses
of identity politics provided in the collection, Identity Politics Reconsidered,271 edited by
Linda Martín Alcoff, Michael Hames-García, Satya P. Mohanty, and Paula M. L. Moya,
including a number focused on disability and sexuality (which have not been addressed
directly in this research, but certainly should be), as well as an overall theoreticallyoriented approach to the subject which comes into contact with many epistemological and
ethical problematics related to identity.
Another aspect of identity politics, which was addressed just a bit in the literature
review, has been helpfully termed the “marketization of identity politics” by Catherine
Bliss.272 Here we encounter that which might not be considered political but rather
economic, and it is in this aspect of identity that we might investigate the various power
relations among those who seek to gain economic-monetary means through the
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manipulation and exploitation of persons seeking to better understand their identities as
humans. Many persons operating in this mode undoubtedly perceive themselves as
(simply) part of an organization-industry that provides services that are desired, and
themselves are constrained economically. All those caveats aside, I think that it would be
very hard to argue that there is not the marketization of identity politics taking place in
many forms within this scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement.
To demonstrate some of the complex ugliness that is taking place in the world of
identity politics, but leading towards something more substantial (Kim TallBear’s work),
in the Spring of 2020, in The College Fix, a self-described source of “right-minded news”
[emphasis in original], there was an article titled “‘Self-Indigenization’ and the (Further)
Contradictions of Identity Politics”273 This article utilizes the phrase “identity politics” in
the dismissive manner described previously. Here the author points to certain narratives
having to do with persons who have claimed their own indigeneity or indigenous
community membership without consultation with or permission from the pertinent
community or communities, and claims that this is all a part of “identity politics,” and
therefore identity politics is wrong or absurd. It is quite tempting not to use the phrase at
all.
Henceforth, when and if I utilize the terminology of “identity politics”—I may
switch to “the politics of identity,” but I’m not sure it will help—it will not be in this
dismissive, propagandistic, rhetorical sense, but rather to generally indicate those aspects
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of how human beings think of themselves and their relationships with one another in
terms of governmental or otherwise political affairs.

In this chapter I will utilize primarily the works of Kim TallBear, Helen E.
Longino, Sandra Harding, Patricia Hill Collins, and Kristie Dotson in order to answer the
following questions and similar: Why so popular? That is, what are some of the
motivations driving this movement? Some motivations are personally oriented (such as
feelings of belonging), but some involve claims of privilege with tangible components
(like physical resources). What is and should be the relation between DNA and
sociopolitical privilege? How is this science-technology employed in racist ways, and
why? Is this, or might this, science-technology be employed in anti-racist ways? If so,
how is it or should it be?
In addition to giving some answers to these questions and discussing ensuing
problematics, the aim will also be to relay and propose some epistemological and ethical
frameworks which might be useful in finding different ways to interpret all this data
coming at us from the scientific-technological industry of DNA ancestry testing, and
furthermore some things that, in turn, might be asked of that industry.

At the outset of this dissertation, I included the following brief description, which
was prompted and inspired almost entirely by my reading of Kim TallBear’s Native
American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science.274
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Numerous indigenous communities and individuals converse and participate in national
and global debates about the usefulness of DNA for member-identification and
citizenship purposes. Some persons and groups are coerced by law and by force into
incorporating DNA test results into their definitions of who they are with regards to their
indigeneity and their specific group membership. The result of these oppressions can and
does often have the immediate and practical effect of increasing or decreasing, beginning
or ceasing, the provision of basic goods and services that sustain individual, familial, and
community life. On a grander and longer-term scale these efforts are a part of the
continual reshaping of the conceptual boundaries that define indigenous communities—
present and past—sometimes with, but more often without, meaningful consent from
those same communities, or their descendants as may apply. Meanwhile, foundational
practices and principles utilized in the formation and evolution of DNA ancestry testing
science and technologies rely fundamentally on the acquirement of genetic materials,
actual bodily resources, from these communities, and indeed also historical and cultural
information. These foundational principles, or concepts, and actions form the
epistemologies and ethics which are being investigated as a part of this project.

In Native American DNA, TallBear conveys and utilizes an “indigenous, feminist
approach to DNA politics.” And, although she does not term it in this way, in this
monograph TallBear argues that indigeneity—or, rather, indigeneities, since they are not
all of the same kind, but rather grouped together, it might be argued along the lines of
(post)coloniality—is not captured by genetic science and takes away from communities
their epistemic power to determine their own membership according to local communitybased ideas and ways. Following a brief aside in order to clarify some terminology and
make one brief related observations, there will be a summary of some of TallBear’s key
concepts and analytical tools as they might be applied in this research project, including
“coproduction (of natural and social orders),” “articulation,” and “decolonizing
methods.”
In some previous portions of this dissertations, especially those having to do with
critiques of nationalism (for example, Benedict Anderson), there has been made a
distinction between “nation” and “country” that emphasized, for example, how some
DNA ancestry-test takers tend to insert the word “country” even when prompted with the
word “nation” or “nationality” when discussing those results. In those contexts, the
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conceptual distinction we were seeking to understand seemed to have something to do
with how (some) humans feel that their country is more a part of them in terms of their
identity, whereas nationality is something that comes from the outside. From that
perspective, with its emphasize on feelings of personal-social identity, “country” is the
preferred term.
Something that is not quite opposite, but very dissimilar, is the preference for the
term “nation” in certain contexts as indicating a community of humans much smaller than
the country/nation-state. This is, for example (and as might pertain to Tomi’s case from
the last chapter), is for some Igbo in Nigeria who identify as members of the Igbo Nation.
I am certain that I understand only a fraction of the sociopolitical dynamics involved in
this, however it seems that at least one aspect of seeking the status of nationhood in this
instance is for official, and other practical, recognitions and benefits.
This brings us to a, at least as I perceive it, somewhat parallel situation in North
America, where indigenous communities are also motivated to gain-maintain the status of
nationhood in order for their communities to be recognized by those persons and
institutions which quite actually hold powers of life and death. A great motivation for
nationhood.
To get into some of the particulars of this, rather than remaining in the realm of
generalizations and comparison, we can now turn to TallBear’s “indigenous, feminist
approach,” and especially her explanation and applications of “coproduction (of natural
and social orders),” “articulation,” and “decolonizing methodologies.” It may also be
recalled that in the literature review there was some general discussion of TallBear’s
work, including some of that done in partnership with others, which will not be repeated
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here. Also in the literature review was some mention of TallBear’s commentary on some
highly prominent figures (prominent in quite different ways, of course), politician
Elizabeth Warren and documentarian Spencer Wells.275

TallBear’s work is self-reportedly highly multi- and interdisciplinary, drawing
from “…science and technology studies (STS), or social studies of science and
technology, and Native American and indigenous studies (NAIS). It also draws on
‘cultural studies’ scholarship and frameworks but informs them with STS and NAIS
literatures and methods… All three fields—STS, NAIS, and cultural studies—share
critiques of universality and objectivity in the Western sciences, with feminist-oriented
strands of STS being more critical in that regard than is mainstream STS.”276 TallBear’s
approach and methodology is not only so well-suited to application this project, but
bolstered my confidence in my own interdisciplinary work.
TallBear describes “coproduction” as “a key STS analytical tool that explains
natural and social orders as coproduced.”277 Although I was not familiar with this termconcept-tool prior to reading TallBear, it did not seem unfamiliar insofar as it (helpfully)
corresponds or complements several humanistic ideas and theories with which I have
been long familiar. To mind immediately comes my training in feminist philosophy of
science, in particular Helen E. Longino in Science as Social Knowledge: Values and
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Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry278 and Sandra Harding in The “Racial” Economy of
Science: Toward a Democratic Future,279 both referenced in the literature review.
Though I will not write of their conceptualizations-theories here, in their differences and
similarities, I will say that it is the study of these works and similar that, in large measure,
led me to have an understanding of “science” that is social and that is humanistic. I would
say that prior to my encounter with these ideas that, generally speaking, I considered
“science” to be near synonymous with “objective truth that has nothing to do with human
perception.” I was taught that one of the main points of science is to remove variables,
and human beings seemed like one of those big variables that just must have been
removed before something could be called “science.” Now my understanding is rather
opposite. Science is a type of action, a human practice, and (as have already said a few
different ways throughout this dissertation) is infused-affected-created by human
ideologies as much as other human practices, like law and music.
This thinking, springing in part from my close attention to feminist philosophers
of science, coheres well with this term-concept of “coproduction” as described by
TallBear. “[S]cience and technology are explained as actively entangled with social
norms and hierarchies. Rather than being discrete categories where one determines the
other in a linear model of cause and effect, ‘science’ and ‘society’ are mutually
constitutive—meaning one loops back in to reinforce, shape, or disrupt the actions of the
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other.”280 TallBear goes on to clarify and emphasize that coproduction is not some
elegant, well-balanced partnership, quite the contrary. “[P]ower is held unevenly,” thus
this coproduction loop not only involves influence back and forth but also reinforcement
of existing social power structures.
In the context of “Native American DNA,” as TallBear somewhat provocatively
titles her book—given that she is, as I understand it, arguing against the conception of
Native American identity being quantifiable in genetic terms alone, and that is exactly
what many might read into that title were they not to make it past those three words—
TallBear discusses how “coproduction facilitates and helps make sense of what could
otherwise be a very confusing multidisciplinary analysis of the emergence of Native
American DNA as a complex social and scientific object… such bounded ethnic or racial
descriptions of certain nucleotide sequences would not have any salience were it not for
the established idea within genetic science that ‘Native American’ (or ‘Amerindian’ and
the like) is a distinct genetic or biological category.”281 So, as I think about it, there is one
sense in which I might think of the social as prior, and yet another sense in which I might
think of the genetic-biological as prior. Rather than considering this an unresolvable
paradox, the idea of coproduction is helpful (in a manner similar, but distinguishable,
from Longino’s “science as social knowledge” and Harding’s focus on “‘racial’
economy” in science).
“Articulation,” similarly (and, as TallBear specifies, following Stuart Hall and
James Clifford in their early expressions of this idea), “complicates overly dichotomous
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views of phenomena as either essentially determined or overly constructed or invented,
thereby implying a lack of ‘realness.’” Perhaps a principle difference between
“coproduction” and “articulation” is that articulation emphasizes this new real-ness that is
created when two things are brought together and something else, “neither strictly old and
traditional nor completely new and different” comes into being, into reality. The
emphasis is on the dynamic transformation of culture through borrowing, interpretation,
and reconfiguration, and the (ontological) reality of that throughout despite the incessant
change inherent in human life.282
The last emphasis-approach, and something which TallBear advocates throughout
her work so far as I have encountered it, is “decolonizing methods.” As TallBear defines
this, “Rather than integrating community priorities with academic priorities, changing
and expanding both in the process, decolonizing methods begin and end with the
standpoint of indigenous lives, needs, and desires, engaging with academic lives,
approaches, and priorities along the way. [Linda Tuhiwai] Smith’s Decolonizing
Methodologies (1999) opens with a classic charge against researchers by indigenous
peoples.”283 While this statement is wonderfully clear and helpful, it is the rest of this
monograph which made this practice so very clear to me, and it is the first part of it
which most captures me upon revisiting it now. Following that “Rather than…” is a
string of words that likely capture what many people, including myself in many
instances, probably think of as good or at least acceptable relations between researchers
and those persons whom they research. Is it not good enough to integrate the aims of the
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research process with the aims of the subjects of research? This certainly seem far better
than many, for instance ethnographic and anthropological studies that I have read over
the years, and even some of those coming out today. Here it seems that at least the
persons being studied are taken into consideration. But that “at least” is the problem. It is
not enough, not balanced, and light years away from “decolonizing”; it does not
recognize or take into account the structures of social power involved, and does not work
towards justice-decolonization. What is necessary, by contrast, and as TallBear puts it, is
that research begins and ends with “the standpoint of indigenous lives, needs, and
desires.”
Connecting these ideas, which are still rather abstract, to that which is causally
effective in making manifest in life these hierarchical discriminations, TallBear reaches
repeatedly into the realm of law, not only as a means of finding examples to support her
arguments (which she does), but also to question how it is that all of this, the capacities of
this science-technology, might be harnessed and utilized by indigenous Native American
communities and nations as they continually resist and fight back against renewed
oppressions that have not ceased since the murderous-rapacious European mostly settlercolonialism of the continent began so many centuries ago.
So, following this, one of TallBear’s big questions is:
The question is, as genetic identities and historical narratives command increasing
attention in society, will they come to rival as legitimate grounds for identity claims the
existing historical-legal foundations of indigenous governance authority?284

This is an excellent question for our purposes here as well. It may the case that
whoever is reading this might disagree with the ways in which identity claims are made
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in their own (legal-governmental) society, but at least we know what those means of
making identity claims are, or we can presumably find out. However, to predict the ways
in which “genetic identities” might gain precedence, now that such a concept is possible
(and, I think, already sensible to many) is quite another task. And furthermore, to attempt
to work with those possibilities and make them advantageous to one’s own community is
yet another level of problematic. But that is what TallBear is tackling, and for her own
community as well as others.

Moving in this journey of research and study from the more abstract towards that
which can be more readily applied as well, and seeking to sift through theory in order to
find those which might better address some of the political problematics of DNA ancestry
testing, we will next take a look at the framework for a “Black feminist epistemology” as
outlined by Kristie Dotson and as “inherited” from the sociological contributions of
Patricia Hill Collins.
This scholarship is personally-academically especially interesting to me due the
amazing bridge creates between work in sociology and work in philosophy, and in
epistemology specifically. This scholarship is doubly interesting and applicable insofar
as, although we only see the word “epistemology” in the title, it can be thought of as
dealing with ethical issues as well. As will be outlined here, and this is another bridge
that has had a huge impact on my thinking and was largely inspired by the work of
Dotson, in this Black feminist epistemology, epistemology and ethics are not separate,
nor separable. Theirs is intellectual work in service of social justice.
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Now to be considered is “Black feminist thought” and “Black feminist
epistemology” as articulated by Patricia Hill Collins and Kristie Dotson with an emphasis
on how each of these scholars understands their academic work as contextualized by, and
existing for, the purposes of ending oppression. Patricia Hill Collins is a sociologist by
training and is Distinguished University Professor of Sociology Emerita at the University
of Maryland, College Park. Collins is renowned for her seminal monograph Black
Feminist Thought, first published in 1991, which is now in its second edition and third
printing, as well as for her lecturing, social activism, and many other written works.
Kristie Dotson is a philosopher and epistemologist by training and is Professor of
Philosophy and Afroamerican and African Studies, and University Diversity and Social
Transformation Professor at the University of Michigan, who has explicitly picked up
Collins’s epistemological project. I state their academic disciplines and positions here to
show some of the relation of this “inheritance,” and due to my interest in continuing to
follow Dotson’s ongoing epistemological work.
I will begin by outlining Collins’s conceptualizations of Black women’s
standpoint and Black feminist thought, giving particular emphasis to epistemological
concerns. Next, I will outline Collins’s epistemology as described in Black Feminist
Thought, occasionally referring to some of her other writings I will then proceed to look
at how Kristie Dotson has taken up Collins’s work as a definitively philosophical
enterprise, especially in her article, “Inheriting Patricia Hill Collins’s Black Feminist
Epistemology.” Lastly, I will return to Collins in her more recent article, “Black Feminist
Thought as Oppositional Knowledge,” wherein she revisits her previous work, and
provides some insights and updates for contemporary times. Through this process I aim
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to develop a better understanding of the epistemologies put forth by Collins and Dotson;
how their epistemological-ethical work addresses the intersectionality of racism, sexism,
gender discrimination, and class discrimination, among other forms of oppression; and,
some of the ways in which these scholars form their intellectual work so that it
contributes to (the practical ends of) social justice.
At the outset, it is helpful to establish that Collins’s analysis makes a useful
distinction between Black women’s standpoint and Black feminist thinking. According to
Collins, Black women’s standpoint (or, perhaps better, standpoints) consists of the social
positioning of the Black women and their diverse responses to that positioning. Black
feminist thought, by contrast, is defined as that mode of Black women’s thinking which
takes place in the institutional academic context, often in the form of critical social (or
philosophical) theory. While she defines these two realms clearly, the point is not to
separate them, but rather to show the relation between the two, about which more will be
said later. The second layer of distinction which is helpful here may be made within the
realm of Black feminist thought, and that is between Black feminist thought generally,
and Black feminist epistemology specifically. So, to summarize Collins’s framework in
reverse, Black feminist epistemology falls within the realm of Black feminist thought,
which in turn reflects on the overall realm of Black women’s standpoint.
According to Collins, some of the main themes of Black feminist thought are:
work, family, and oppression; controlling images; the power of self-definition; sexuality
and sexual politics (including systemic rape and abuse); love relationships; motherhood;
and, that there are many varieties of political activism and other manifestations of
resistance. Collins also speaks of the “distinguishing features” of Black feminist thought,
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some of which overlap with the key themes, and some of which provide (this reader, at
least) additional insight into her overall analysis.
The first of these distinguishing features is entitled, “Why U.S. Black Feminist
Thought?” This question might be most simply answered, “Because Black women in the
U.S. are oppressed.” It is interesting to note that right off the bat she notes how African
American women are oppressed due to the “intersecting oppressions of race, class,
gender, sexuality, and nation.”285 Quite the opposite from over-simplifying, Collins
constantly reminds us of the complexity of networks of oppressions. This question is also
clearly addressed in Collins’s essay, “The Social Construction of Black Feminist
Thought,” which slightly predates the monograph and was likely written around the same
time. Herein Collins discusses the long tradition of resistance among Black women
activists and notes how “[t]he long-term and widely shared resistance among African
American women can only have been sustained by an enduring and shared standpoint
among Black women about the meaning of oppression and the actions that Black women
can and should take to resist it.”286 Unpacking this rich quote reveals a great deal. The
tradition of Black women’s resistance is not only historical and present-day, but also
descriptive and normative. It is what has already been occurring and, according to
Collins, it is also that which should be continued and built upon.
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The second feature of Black feminist thought Collins distinguishes has to do with
the great diversity of responses of Black women to their common challenges.287 Collins
explains these differences on both an individual and a group scale. In terms of
individuals, of course there is significant variation from person to person based on their
individual experiences, but there is also variation based upon societal norms and
assignations of varying kinds which are forms-aspects of human identity, including, for
example, social class, gender identity, religion, and sexuality. Here of particular interest
epistemologically-speaking is Collins’s idea that Black women’s standpoint (which she
also defines as “group knowledge,” although with caveats) has embedded within it the
historical struggles of Black women.
The third feature Collins notes is a strong link between thought and practice. Here
Collins discusses what she terms the “dialogical”288 relation between thinking and
action—between our knowledge and how we act on it—in Black feminist thought. In
contrast to the practice of separating, or attempting to separate, the two, she explains a
reciprocal relationship wherein one is always responsive to the other. Changes in thinking
require changes in action, and vice versa.
The fourth feature discussed expounds on the importance of, in Black feminist
thought, the relationship between African American women intellectuals and Black
women’s standpoint. As Collins explains, the mere “fact” that there is a Black women’s
standpoint does not mean that all Black women intellectuals have a firm grounding in it,
nor that their understanding of it is being put to good use (i.e. for the empowerment of
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Black women).289 Herein (and elsewhere) Collins discusses the long and rich history of
Black women’s intellectual thinking which has been destroyed, disvalued, and subverted
by the hegemonic powers at play in the academic world (and in culture more broadly),
and also the relationship of Black women intellectuals to Black women’s communities.
She affirms that this relationship has historically been very strong, and that it is up to
contemporary Black women intellectuals to continue and strengthen this tradition of
interconnection. This feature also emphasizes the high value of Black women’s
experience in Black feminist thought. Also, of special interest to our epistemological
discussion of human identity is (again) Collins’s affirmation of the importance of selfdefinition. “Black women intellectuals from all walks of life must aggressively push the
theme of self-definition because speaking for oneself and crafting one’s own agenda is
essential to empowerment.”290 This, I believe, is a key theme both of Collins’s social
theory. Self-definition and (subsequently or simultaneously) identity are absolutely
crucial components that inform both our internal or reflexive thinking, and our outwardbound or social thinking (if it is even appropriate to separate the two at all, since they are
so interdependent).
A fifth feature of Black feminist thought discussed by Collins is dynamism and
responsiveness. As Collins describes, Black feminist thought cannot afford to be anything
but “dynamic and changing.” 291 As a part of Black feminism broadly speaking, its main
aim must be to be a support to the social justice project, and to do this effectively it must
constantly respond to changing social conditions. In this section, Collins also addresses
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how the changing conditions which affect Black women’s work in all of U.S. society
also, in turn, have great significance for Black women’s intellectual work. Here she
remarks again on the historical repression of Black women’s intellectual work, and
explains how, in many or most instances prior to very recent times, Black women’s
intellectual work by necessity took place outside of academic institutions (which have
typically excluded or marginalized their work). Collins notes that, now that this has
begun to change and Black women intellectuals have more influence in institutional
settings, that there are many new opportunities but also new dangers. The new
opportunities, of course, lie in greater visibility for Black feminist thought. As for the
dangers, Collins outlines them as falling into (at least) three categories.292 First, in
becoming isolated from Black women’s collective experiences in the greater society, and
therefore in becoming unresponsive to those voices. Second, in the tendency to fall in line
with the inertia of “traditional” academic thinking and to separate thought from practice,
which is central not only to Black feminism but to all critical social discourse. And third
(similar to the first), in becoming enamored with one’s own way of thinking and no
longer feeling compelled to address the needs of Black women in the rest of society.
Although not mentioned here, these three dangers are also responded to by Collins’s
oppositional knowledge project, which will be addressed before concluding this sections
on the work of Collins and Dotson.
Collins ends this description of distinguishing features of Black feminist thought
by contextualizing it within the broad framework of social justice for all. Here she draws
on Ama Ata Aidoo, writer and former Ghanaian minister of education, and notes some
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similarities between U.S. Black feminism and Black diasporic feminisms. I will quote it
here at some length because it so beautifully reinforces one of the key themes of Collins’s
work, that of its interconnectedness with other discourses which have similar or
intersecting aims:
Aidoo recognizes that neither African nor U.S. Black women nor any other group will
ever be empowered in situations of social injustice. Social just projects are not either/or
endeavors where one can say, ‘We have our movement and you have yours—our
movements have nothing to do with one another.” Instead, such projects counsel, ‘We
have our movement, and we support yours’... The words and actions of these diverse
Black women intellectuals may address markedly different audiences. Yet in their
commitment to Black women’s empowerment within a context of social justice, they
advance the strikingly similar theme of the oneness of all human life. 293

Here we see that Black feminist thought is, in part, born out of necessity. Given
deeply embedded white supremacist social structures, Black women will not be
empowered otherwise. There is both beneficence and self-interested practicality at play
here. Beneficence insofar it is clear that Collins wishes to communicate that there is a
theme of empathy and caring in Black feminist thought. Self-interested practicality
insofar as all Black women are the targets of multiple forms of oppression always
including racism and sexism, and many times also including class or economic
discrimination, religious discrimination, colonialist ideologies and actions,
heteronormativity, ableism, and the list goes on. And, of course, as intersectionality
indicates, these oppressions are not experienced in ways that can be extricated from one
another; the effects are interlocking and interdependent, and in many ways, create a new
“articulation” of identity (Hall and Clifford) in every individual person.
To elaborate further Collins’s position, she is emphatic, throughout Black
Feminist Thought and all of her other work that I have encountered, that all social justice
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movements are interconnected and should be thought of and acted on as such. The
varieties of oppressions that are present in this world are not independent from one
another, and in order to combat one we must combat them all. This is, of course, not to
argue that those who are most oppressed do not deserve the most support (I believe they
do), but rather to come to the understanding that each form of oppressive, hierarchical
discrimination that exists reinforces all the others. In weakening one, we weaken them
all, In strengthening one, we strengthen them all.
To summarize, Collins’s Black Feminist Thought outlines Black feminist thinking
in terms of core themes (work, family, sexual politics, motherhood, and political action)
and distinguishing features (those outlined above), and constantly contextualizes itself by
relating the conversation back to social goals. And, after establishing all of this, she
moves forward to propose a Black feminist epistemology, which we will now discuss.
Collins begins her discussion of Black feminist epistemology by describing the
(hostile) context in which it emerges. She explains that, in the context of “Western”
epistemological traditions, Black women’s knowledge has been systematically excluded
and distorted due to, in large part, there being no conceptual space for the legitimization
of their knowledge. As all knowledge validation takes place within and as a result of
social context, so too (and perhaps especially), what counts as knowledge in U.S.
institutions of higher learning (and elsewhere) is determined by white, male, elite
norms.294 That given, Black feminist epistemology has an incredibly steep uphill climb in
order to gain acceptance.
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As a precursor to presenting her epistemology outright, Collins briefly articulates
some helpful distinctions worth reviewing here, namely, the differences among
paradigms, methodologies, and epistemologies. As she outlines, intersectionality is an
example of a paradigm, in that it is an “interpretive framework” which we use to help us
understand social phenomena.295 A methodology by contrast, is a specific manner in
which we apply that interpretive framework (presumably hoping for consistent results).
Lastly, an epistemology is utilized in order to determine what questions will be asked,
what interpretative frameworks and methodologies will be applied in order to answer that
question, and how the answers will be put to use. Now, having already outlined Black
women’s standpoint earlier in her analysis, and with the aforementioned definitions in
mind, Collins begins to build a Black feminist epistemology.
The first criterion for knowledge in Collins’s Black feminist epistemology is lived
experience. Here Collins differentiates between knowledge and wisdom, and notes how
wisdom, described as that sort of knowledge which has been passed on and enabled
survival in an oppressive society, is highly valued in Black women’s standpoint, and
therefore should be part of a Black feminist epistemology.296 She further clarifies this in
two ways, through the lens of race and through the lens of gender. In terms of race,
Collins gives that example of foolishness (i.e. the opposite of wisdom) as not allowable
for members of subordinate groups. While white women are allowed more foolish
mistakes, Black women have the wisdom to know that they will be afforded no such
luxury. In terms of gender, Collins notes that some feminist thinkers argue that women as
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a group are more likely to value lived experience, regardless of race and other personalsocial identity factors.
The second criterion for knowledge put forth by Collins has to do with the
importance of dialog in the assessment of knowledge claims.297 In keeping with
extrapolating her epistemological criteria from Black women’s standpoint, she establishes
this criterion as having both African and African American origins. In terms of African
origins, she cites Molefi Asante’s (relational) understanding of humanity as something
that one gains over the course of a lifetime, and that is worked out through discussion
with others. Focusing on U.S. cultural aspects, she emphasizes how “Black women’s
centrality in families, churches, and other community organizations”298 also portends this
emphasis on dialog as a criterion for assessing knowledge. Again, it is through discussion
that what is the truth is worked out.
The third criterion she establishes is an ethics of caring. This, I find, is a striking
feature of Collins’s epistemology that even further refines and distinguishes it from the
Western modes of epistemology which it opposes. Typically, again in Western
epistemology, ethics would not even be a concern. In fact, it is easy to look up a map or
tree of the branches or subdisciplines of philosophy, and, by in large, one will find that in
those maps epistemology and ethics are about as far apart as two realms can be. Collins’s
epistemology runs strongly contrary to this, and places ethics in a central role. Again, as
with the second criterion, she notes an overlapping in principles of feminist and African
origins that further support this criterion.299
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The fourth criterion regards personal accountability. Again, in traditional Western
epistemology this is not even a concern. In fact, much of the point of traditional Western
epistemology is to separate the knower from the known.300 Here, that conception is
turned upside down and who the knower is becomes centrally important. The knower is
accountable in at least two senses. First, they must demonstrate that they care about the
position being advocated. Second, they must be accountable for their own opinions, both
in theoretical and practical aspects. Collins provides an example in support of this from
her teaching. She relays one instance when she was teaching a class of students
consisting entirely of Black women, and the topic was an analysis of Black feminist
thinking written by a Black man. She remarks how her students “demanded facts about
the author’s personal biography,”301 especially information about his social relationships,
before making knowledge claims about his theoretical work. Collins assessment is that
this sort of knowledge validation process is an example of the alternative criteria
employed by Black women, and that it should therefore be addressed by a Black feminist
epistemology.
Collins last epistemological criterion relates to agency, particularly, “Black
women as agents of knowledge.”302 In certain regards this is self-explanatory: Collins
clearly wishes to emphasize that the overall effects of this reformulation of epistemology
should be to place Black women in the center as knowledge-creators. She is specifically
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concerned with Black women scholars as they continue to enter academic professions in
greater and greater numbers. She explores this idea further in “Learning from the
Outsider Within,” where she appeals to Black women sociologists, who remain grounded
in their communities and have a deep (but critical) understanding of theory, as being in a
remarkable position to be critical from both “outside” and “inside” perspectives.303
Collins ends her exhibition of Black feminist epistemology by noting the practical
impetus for creating it. It is not conceptual incongruencies nor philosophical inclinations
that principally guide her work, but rather results. She argues that controversial
knowledge claims are rarely taken seriously, and even more rarely incorporated into
mainstream theories, because the epistemological space for them is lacking.304 Collins
hopes that, through the creation of a new and oppositional epistemology, such space
might be expanded, making way for future knowledge claims that are reflective of Black
women’s concerns. Collins views creating a new epistemology as more “threatening” to
the current paradigm than making new knowledge claims alone, and therefore pursued
creating that epistemology.
Kristie Dotson takes up where Patricia Hill Collins leaves off in the development
of her Black feminist epistemology. As a philosopher and epistemologist with a scholarly
background ranging from African American studies to Business Administration to
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Literary Criticism,305 Dotson approaches the subject in a way that few (or perhaps, none)
have. I say “perhaps, none” here because Dotson herself notes how rare her point of view
is. According to her 2012 article, there were as of that time “fewer than 30 Black women
[who] hold PhDs in philosophy and also work with philosophy departments within North
America,” and if one further narrows that number to those are working on Black
feminism, the number would grow “to something like roughly 8 people.”306 .
Although there are a number of fascinating points which Dotson draws out from
Collins’s work, for the purposes of this paper I will focus on two: one, her overall
estimation of the magnitude of Collins’s work, and two, her primary concern about it. To
address the first point, Dotson makes very clear the truly epic nature of the work that
Collins undertook in Black Feminist Thought. Dotson explains how Collins not only took
on the “first-order” work of articulating the standpoint of Black women collectively, but
also the “second-order” work of analyzing that standpoint for themes, and the “thirdorder” work of seeking out an explanatory framework for those themes.307 (Dotson
further elaborates how, per Hortense Spillers, “third-order” discourse can become “firstorder” if it remains in touch with and relevant to the purposes of the community in
question.) Dotson also emphasizes how empowerment is a primary theme of Collins’s
work, both empowerment through the deconstruction of hegemonic ideologies, and
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empowerment through the construction of new knowledge, and states her adamant
agreement with these conclusions.
Dotson’s primary worry with Collins’s epistemology arises in relation to “ascriber
roles for knowledge possession.”308 Insofar as the theory must deal with who is able to
generate and validate knowledge, it is in part ascriber-based. The piece provides an
analysis of the ascriber dynamics of this epistemology and leaves us with the question of
how it might be worked out. Dotson takes it as her next question to answer, “[H]ow does
one construct a Black feminist epistemology without relying on ascriber-based
knowledge possession criteria?”
In her current work, Collins continues to address and reflect on both her prior
work and the constantly changing circumstances of the present. In her recent (2016)
article, “Black Feminist Thought as Oppositional Knowledge,” Collins argues that the
concepts and methodologies of Black feminist thought deserve revisiting in light of
contemporary conditions in both public and academic spheres. Black feminist thought
was born, practically and theoretically, out of opposition.309 It rose in opposition to the
practice of the economic and political oppression of Black women. It rose in opposition
to the white male-dominated realm of Western-centric theories in the academy. Today,
Collins relays, there is a greater sense, at least on some surfaces, of inclusivity. However,
in a time when universities are professing that their curricula are intersectional, yet
systematic oppression persists, Collins asks, what does it mean to be oppositional?
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Ultimately, she argues that it is through the continued creation and sustenance of diverse
Black women’s intellectual communities, through the recognition of the superficiality of
some things labeled “progress,” through the perseverance of Black women and (to a
lesser degree) all their allies, and through a focus on the power dynamics of knowledge
creation and distribution (rather than the knowledge product alone) that there might be a
continuous renewal of oppositional thought.

It is my conclusion these approaches or theories or sets of tenants—such as Black
feminist epistemology with its oppositional insistence, reaction to dynamism, and
concern about the relation between knowledge production and action—are key to
understanding not only what is occurring in this scientific-technological-industrialpersonal-social movement, but also how we ought act in reaction to it, politically, given
its significant, varied, and ongoingly changing implications. It is likewise with that which
was described earlier as indigenous, feminist, and decolonizing. It is these sorts of
theories, multifaceted in their concerns, unflinching in the face of fast-paced change,
dealing with the concerns of knowers and knowledge creation, and so insistent on ends
that create justice, that should be at the forefront of this research and its applications.
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CONCLUSION
PROBLEMS WITH REALISMS
It is safe to say as I have been writing this dissertation on DNA and human
identity that I did not know how it would end. Indeed, possible conclusions remain
tentative and amorphous as I write these last words, although simultaneously I know that
some definable progress has been made.
I feel compelled to reiterate at this juncture that it has not always been the case
that I was so open to such a variety of possible conclusions with regards to this subject of
genetic ancestry testing. Initially, I approached this research project with, if not
predetermined conclusions in mind, then at least strong inclinations along a particular
critical trajectory. But that changed, at first slowly, and then rapidly and in a variety of
ways.

Now that I have read, listened to, watched, overviewed, and reviewed hundreds of
materials pertinent to these discourses and these ideas—and as I continue to ponder the
possible integrations and meanings of them, the many ways that they are and can be
understood—the ways they might be brought together and analyzed, seem infinite and
certainly uncertain. Yet, at the same time, I am sure it is all very important. I continue to
do this work from a place of curiosity, wonder, urgent concern, and necessity.
Beyond the conclusions in Chapter Four, with regards to the sorts of humanistic
and social-scientific theories that might be best applied to understanding this scientific279

technological-industrial-personal-social movement from a political perspective oriented
towards action—which I do think are important and I intend to make good use of in the
future—I have remaining philosophical questions and concerns, which may never be
resolved, but that I continue to ponder as I experience this human life. Having explored
so many components and aspects of this movement, I have wondered how it contributes
to our understanding of what is human, what it is to be human, what it is to be human
with others, and furthermore, what is real?

In this research, study, and writing, I have encountered again and again ideas
having to do with things as tiny as the microscopic (or even smaller—such as
nucleotides), and things as macroscopic as continents (and even larger—considering this
as a global movement). I have dealt intermittently, and hopefully integratively, with
analyses of that which we might term “concrete” or “physical” and that which is
“abstract” or “conceptual” (researching and reflecting on how the ‘two’ are the same and
different at once). And, throughout these contemplations has run the continual theme of
relationships between personhood and community and their historical dynamics.
Early on in this dissertation I briefly discussed the relatively recent, ongoing, and
substantial change in the use of the term “identity” in English language discourse. While
prior to recent decades, say the last half of the twentieth century to the present, the
primary usage of the term “identity” was in reference or relation to the individual person
(e.g. “Could you identify her?”), though sometimes more abstractly than that, but then
there was a change towards this usage of the term “identity” to refer to how individuals
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define or view themselves in relation to communities of which they are a member, and
communities of which they are not, that is, “social identity.”
But this reported change in linguistic usage, its etymological evolution, does not
indicate a transformation from one into another that is utterly different from that which it
sprang. To the contrary, the two are intimately related (I speak here not to the etymology,
but to the concepts). How is it that my social identity becomes a part, or is an aspect of,
my personal-individual identity? If I am a woman, and I am white, and I am an American
and so forth, what is the sense of being as indicated by that “am”? The separation
between the self and the other is not so clear.
When considering other sorts of conceptual separations and boundaries, not just
the borders of nations and the definitions of races as have been discussed so much herein,
and going microscopic again, at what point does one cell become two? This is (in my
scholarly world) a traditional philosophical problematic that can and has inspired
seemingly endless debate. Reflecting on that problematic in the context of cell division,
wherein the DNA is replicated and so forth, and knowing how impactful these tiny, tiny
sequences of genetic code are and can be on human life, what additional dialog might be
inspired?
Philosophers of science—as Charles W. Mills discusses, and as I have perceived
also in my own studies—tend to describe realism and that which is “realist” as strongly
associated with, I dare say correspondent with “a belief in natural kinds with defining
essences.”310 There is an equation or equivocation among that which is real, that which
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has an essence, and that which is scientifically deemed to be knowledge. That is to say,
according to this line of thinking, that to be a realist, to think knowledge empirically
obtainable and objective, that one must, in short, be a scientific essentialist, believing in
that which can be categorized and named according to its essence. “DNA” is most often
utilized to indicate such an essentialist idea.

There are, however, other ways to think about what DNA is, and what it means.
As explicitly conceptualized in a number of theories researched, studied, and applied in
this dissertation, DNA is not best, nor even correctly, construed as a solely physical,
quantifiable object. It, too, is social. It, too, is ideological.
And, as the gene is “enculturated,”311 so too has culture become geneticized in
response to this movement, and perhaps also in anticipation of what is potentially to
come. Hence our question: how might genetic knowledges be used or abused?
Superseding in scope this conversation about genetics is a greater humanistic
discourse about the overwhelming dominance of the natural sciences in the determination
of what is truth, what is knowledge, and what is reality. This dissertation is intended as a
contribution, and as a promise of future work, towards complicating and remediating the
reductiveness, stagnation, and lack of empathy in human thinking and action, which is
resultant from the epistemological and ethical dominance of this one sort of discourse—
this one sort of perspective on the world—over so many others.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Selected Text from the Comments
on Tomi Makanjuola’s YouTube video312
Comment exchange A:
Keke: “Hi! So I just discovered your youtube channel. Thanks so much for sharing your
Vegan Nigerian recipes. I've been vegan for a few years now, and it's refreshing
to see more diversity in the vegan community. I took a DNA test from 23andme a
few years back, and they are constantly making improvements and updates. My
most current results show that I'm partially Nigerian too! My results are 34.5%
Nigerian, 22.7% Ghanian/Liberian/Sierra Leonian, 3.4% Senegambian/Guinean,
12.6% Congolese and Broadly East African, 0.1% African Hunter-Gatherer, 3.3
% Broadly Subsaharian African, 9.2% European, 1.5% East Asian and Native
American, and 0.1% Broadly South Asian. My family is African American, so we
have no idea where any of this is coming from lol. However, we're pretty sure that
the European DNA comes from the slave trade. These DNA tests seem to align
with historical events; they're telling our story.”
The Vegan Nigerian: “Thanks Keshanda :) Wow, that is quite a mix! And I couldn't agree
more.. Above anything else, these tests allow us to paint somewhat of a picture of
our pasts, and are a stepping stone to flesh out our stories.”

Comment exchange B:
Oluwadamilola Akinayo: “Thanks for sharing,Tomi. Frankly that 1.6% English scared
the hell out of me. Got me wondering a lot of things though I haven't done any
DNA test...
”
The Vegan Nigerian: “Oluwadamilola Akinayo listen! As soon as I saw that, I was
shaken. Like “who? What? Where? How?” Loool. I doubt I’ll ever get answers
though. Thanks for watching. And if you ever do take the test, please come back
and share
”
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Makanjuola, Tomi. “MyHeritage DNA Results | ANCESTRY | Nigerian and...?? - The Vegan
Nigerian.” 14 Apr. 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4r7upR-99s.
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Oluwadamilola Akinayo: “@The Vegan Nigerian Most def,I plan to share mine when
done. I'm curious to know if they deliver kits worldwide like to Africa or just
certain countries. Didn't see anything on that via Google. I want to be sure before
signing up,thanks.”
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